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ABSTRACT 
 
ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS’ 
EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTIVITIES IN ATTAINING IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 
 
Hamza Demirel 
Old Dominion University, 2016 




This dissertation aims at analyzing the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ 
(IRGC) extraterritorial activities in attaining Iran’s foreign policy goals. Based on observations 
and assessments from internal and external determinants, Iran’s foreign policy goals are defined 
as follows: regime survival, which is an indispensable goal of Iranian foreign policy, is above 
everything; state security and survival; projecting power and becoming the dominant power in 
the region. 
The regime has deliberately supported several armed non-state actors to achieve the 
aforementioned goals, and as seen in the case studies, the IRGC has served as a node in 
providing a broad range of state support. 
Although the IRGC has the characteristics of conventional armed forces, its 
extraterritorial activities contradict the legal frame of ‘use of military force’ and mostly fit the 
characteristics of ‘state sponsorship of terrorism.’ Moreover, these activities challenge 
international norms and provoke other regional actors. This condition creates an obstacle to 
Iran’s integration into the international system which is increasingly globalized and 
interconnected and an environment which is costly to live within and leaves it isolated. These 
attitudes paradoxically place Iran in a situation that challenges the goals of ‘state security and 
survival’ and ‘becoming the regional power’ in the long run. Thus, it is argued that the real 
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This study examines the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) 
extraterritorial activities in attaining Iran’s1 foreign policy goals. I specifically explore how the 
IRGC’s extraterritorial activities contribute to the survival of the regime. This study will 
illustrate that the deployment of IRGC in operations beyond national borders not only serves 
foreign policy goals and interests, but also supports regime survival back at home.  
The 1979 Iranian revolution does not just represent a change in political leadership. In 
Walt’s words, it also introduced new principles of legitimacy, new symbols of authority and 
identity, new rules for elite recruitment and new political institutions and governmental 
procedures.2  Although the revolution was made by a variety of segments of Iranian society, 
which ranged from Marxists to the liberal National Front, from secularists to Islamic activists, in 
the end Khomeini and his supporters hijacked it. Since the revolution, the concept of velayat-e 
faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists) that was developed by Ayatollah Khomeini has been 
the core of Iran’s newly-established political system and ideology, which can be characterized as 
a blend of Persian nationalism and Khomeini’s interpretation of Shiism. The revolution has 
influenced every aspect of life including political structure, preferences of policy makers and 
regional and global relations.  
The new regime has a dual and unique political system; in addition to an ideological 
velayat-e faqih system, it also enjoys republican institutions. In the political structure of Iran, 
there is a parliament and a president, both selected by Iranian voters. There is also a Supreme 
                                                
1 The word “Iran” is the unofficial but commonly used name for the Islamic Republic of Iran, abbreviated IRI. 
Throughout this work, in an effort to avoid undue repetition, I will vary the nomenclature.  
2 Stephen M. Walt, “Revolution and War,” World Politics 44, no. 3 (1992): 334, doi:10.2307/2010542. 
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Leader who is not democratically elected and ranks above the state president. The concept of 
velayat-e faqih has positioned the Supreme Leader as the temporal, spiritual and legal leader of 
the ummah (Muslim community) during the absence of the Twelfth Imam. In addition to his 
religious status, ultimate political power resides in the Supreme Leader: He appoints and 
dismisses all key senior positions - the head of the judiciary, the supreme commander of the 
IRGC, the supreme commander of the regular military and security services, the head of state 
radio and television, and the clerical jurists of the Council of the Guardian; controls all important 
institutions of state such as the courts, the police, the military; can veto candidates for office and 
veto parliamentary legislation; and approves/disapproves foreign policy initiatives. 
The dual political system, the superiority of unelected institutions (in addition to the 
Supreme Leader, Expediency Council and Guardian Council) over elected ones, factional 
rivalries and powerful key individuals make strategic decision-making opaque and unpredictable. 
While ideology was the dominant factor in decision-making until the mid-1980s, since then 
pragmatism and strategies based on rational calculations have come to the fore. Although, 
particularly after the death of Khomeini, reformist and pragmatist policies have become 
dominant, the regime’s core ideological principles have always remained as the limits of 
decision-making under the protection of the supreme leader and conservative faction. Until now, 
different factions’ priorities based on regional and domestic concerns have placed Iranian foreign 
policy at different places on the scale of isolation/integration with the international system at 
different times. 
Besides the shift back and forth between “isolation” and “integration with the 
international system,” an expectation gap -the difference between what is expected and what is 
actually possible- has also been another characteristic that influences Iran’s foreign policy 
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making. Shiite-Sunni mutual hostility, Sunni dominance in the region, Iran’s comparative 
economic and conventional military weakness, post-revolution hostile relations with Israel and 
the United States (US) and potential ethnic fragmentation on the one side versus aspirations for 
being the regional power and leader of the Muslim world and a desire for a high profile in the 
global arena on the other side leads to an expectation gap originates mostly from the regime’s 
ideology. 
Reflections of these ideological motivations can be seen in Iran’s relations with Shiite 
groups beyond national borders. Despite Muslim populations -regardless of sect differences- that 
initially shown considerable interest in the Revolution, the regime soon realized the 
inapplicability of Muslim world leadership. Thus, the regime turned its attention to Shiite groups 
in the region. Among those groups, the most well-known relationship has been with the 
Lebanese Hezbollah. The revolution had a stimulating effect on Lebanese Shiites. Besides the 
convergence of mutual interests and ideological affinity, Iran’s ideological and material support 
has been a vital instrument in the movement's development. In turn, Hezbollah served Iran in 
various ways such as a deterrent and retaliatory force against the adversaries of Iran, a tool for 
projecting power, and most importantly as a laboratory for Iran’s subsequent foreign 
engagements.  
Iran’s ideologically motivated relations with Shiite groups then became an outcome of 
strategic calculations by the regime’s ruling elite. Since the deployment of an IRGC contingent 
in Lebanon in the early 1980s, the IRGC has been the key actor in establishing, improving and 
directing these groups by giving birth and providing a wide scope of support ranging from 
finance, know-how, military logistics, ideological and military training. Although there was not a 
geographical connection with Lebanon, Iran’s most successful foreign involvement has been 
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with the Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran’s engagement with the Lebanese Hezbollah has worked as a 
laboratory and provided very crucial experiences, which would be used in post-Saddam Iraq.  
In the post-revolutionary era, the Iranian military has been composed of two main 
segments: regular (conventional) forces and revolutionary forces. The latter actively took on the 
role both as a means of securing and consolidating the revolution at home, and achieving 
ideological and strategic goals abroad. The IRGC’s roots are based on the militias who actively 
supported the revolution and had unquestioning loyalty to Khomeini. Over time the IRGC has 
been transformed in to a kind of regular military entity, which has a navy, ground forces, air 
force, headquarters, hierarchical structure, and different levels of military training centers. Today 
the IRGC is domestically an economic and political power and also has been Iran’s primary 
mechanism for foreign extraterritorial activities. In addition to the Lebanese Hezbollah, the 
IRGC has relations with Shiite groups in different states such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and 
Syria.   
The regime saw the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities as a solution to the expectation gap 
problem. As an invisible army, the IRGC has enabled the Regime to achieve its interests without 
provoking conventional military retaliation. This strategy can be characterized as asymmetric, 
low cost, easy to deny, and difficult to prove.   
However, the strategy has provoked some regional and other international actors and Iran 
has been accused of being a state sponsor of terrorism. For example, according to the Global 
Terrorism Database, the number of Hezbollah or Hezbollah-suspected fatalities is roughly 1200 
between 1983 and 2014 in 398 incidents.3 In many incidents, such as hostage taking, 
assassinations, subversion, bombings, aircraft hijackings, the IRGC’s name is associated with 
                                                
3 “Hezbollah,” Terrorist Organization Profile - START - National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 




Lebanese Hezbollah.   
Despite international actors’ efforts concentrated on stopping Iran’s nuclear weapons 
programs, I argue that the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities are as dangerous as the possession of 
nuclear weapons, which, to date, have caused thousands of fatalities in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and 
Yemen.  
Some prominent scholars believe that the further spread of nuclear weapons would have a 
stabilizing impact on the Middle East. Conversely, the regime’s strategy of using the IRGC in 
extraterritorial activities for attaining foreign policy goals provokes other regional actors to adopt 
similar strategies, deepens the sectarian divide, and subsequently creates chronic instability in the 
Middle East.  
Iran is the second largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa region after Saudi 
Arabia, which mainly depends on its hydrocarbon sector. It also has the second largest 
population of the region with an estimated 79 million people in 2015. It ranks second in the 
world in natural gas reserves and fourth in proven crude oil reserves.4 Its natural resources, 
population and the rooted tradition of statecraft that has been created over centuries naturally 
make Iran a potential regional power. Nevertheless, Iran’s strategies challenging international 
norms are an obstacle to its recognition in its region and in the international arena as a legitimate 
regional power and impede integration into the international system. If we take into account both 
the regional and global consequences of this strategy, which creates a more unstable, hostile and 
competitive environment and conditions, in the long run the strategy has high costs for Iran. 
Given this background, this study raises the following research questions: What is the 
role of the IRGC in Iranian foreign policy making? How and to what extent do the extraterritorial 
activities of the IRGC contribute to Iranian national and state interests and objectives? What 
                                                
4 “Iran Overview,” The World Bank, April 1, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/overview. 
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might the broader implications of this particular case be for foreign and domestic policy-making 
and for domestic and regional security in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world 
system? This study advances two major claims: First, despite the fact that Iran has natural 
potential for being the regional power, its aggressive strategy that challenges international norms 
and provokes other regional actors is an obstacle to its integration into the international system 
which is increasingly globalized and interconnected. Additionally, by provoking other regional 
actors who are mostly Sunni, Iran creates an environment that is costly for the country to live 
within and highly isolating. Thus, the real reason behind the regime’s insistence on this strategy 
is to preserving the current political system and the power of the current ruling elites; briefly it is 
labeled as ‘the survival of the regime’ in this study.  
I argue that the survival of the regime is paramount and defines the limits of domestic and 
foreign policy-making. Second, the IRGC is the key executor and instrument of this strategy. In 
addition to providing security against internal and external threats, the extraterritorial activities 
of the IRGC helps the Iranian political leadership consolidate the Islamic regime at home. This 
phenomenon can be defined as ‘boomerang effect.’ It refers to a situation in which policies, 
discourse and actions in external relations also target social and political actors in the domestic 
sphere. In the Iranian case, IRGC activism in foreign policy also serves regime survival. Iranian 
political leadership considers the IRGC an instrument to safeguard the political regime against 
domestic threats and challenges. Regarding the nexus between domestic and foreign policy 
making, most analyses focus on how domestic politics shape foreign policy making. Little 
attention has been paid on how foreign policy-making affects domestic politics. Hence, the case 
of the IRGC provides a rather interesting context in which we can analyze how foreign-policy 
making tools and strategies can also become instruments of reinforcing the political regime. 
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Methodologically, the study is structured as single case study. In terms of data sources, 
this study utilizes the secondary literature, official publications and documents of Iranian 
governments, official statements of various international organizations and states, speeches by 
political leaders, and newspaper articles, including interviews with prominent political and 
military figures.  
This study is not based on a single system of transliteration. The reader is asked to 
forgive any transliteration inconsistencies. 
The study is divided into six chapters. This Introductory chapter is followed by Chapter 
2. The second chapter aims to give critical background that clarifies the dynamics that today 
drive Iran’s domestic politics and international affairs. Undoubtedly, among several factors, 
particularly the clerics’ role in the society that has improved over time, foreign interventions, 
domestic events such as the 1891-92 Tobacco Movement, the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-
1909, the Coup D’etat 1921 and most importantly the CIA/MI-6-orchestrated 1953 Coup that 
overthrew the democratically-elected Prime Minister and, finally, the emergence of Khomeini all 
created the structural roots of the 1979 Revolution. In the words of Meyer, these common 
historical experiences, geo-strategic circumstances and developments in society were planted 
deep into the collective memory of Iranians as ‘lessons learnt’ and ‘beliefs held.’5 The 
combination of ‘lessons learnt’ and ‘beliefs held’ deeply influenced the ideology of Khomeini 
and subsequent Iranian political structure and policy makers’ post-revolutionary worldview. 
Most importantly the effects of these long, short and immediate historical events can be seen in 
the new regime’s Constitution. The goal of the second chapter is to minimize opacity by focusing 
on the components that are the long term, shorter term, and immediate historical, political and 
                                                
5 Christoph O. Meyer, “Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for 
Explaining Changing Norms,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 4 (December 2005): 525. 
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social events that have shaped the priorities, worldview and mindset of Iranian policy makers. 
Intensified focus will be on the post-Revolutionary period political structure and decision-
making process. In addition to Iran’s demography, geopolitical position and strategic importance, 
the chapter aims to draw and define Iran’s position in the Muslim world and its sphere of 
influence in the region. 
The third chapter aims to explore the characteristics of Iran’s foreign policy and its 
foreign policy goals through analyzing internal and external determinants. To this end, the 
chapter introduces the key individuals and bodies in charge of Iran’s foreign policy-making, 
including their functions, responsibilities, and limits. Additionally, to outline the characteristics 
of Iran’s foreign policy, this chapter deals with the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy under two 
supreme leaders; Khomeini (1980-1988) and Khamenei (1988-present); and four presidents; 
President Rafsanjani (1989-1997), Khatami (1997-2005), Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), and 
Rouhani (2013-present). The Khomeini period is addressed as a whole period during Khomeini’s 
rule without separation of presidential periods because of his dominance over decision-making. 
Lastly, by analyzing the characteristics of foreign policy, explicitly stated objectives of 
politicians and foreign policy practices, Iran’s foreign policy goals will be outlined.  
In the fourth chapter, based on the findings in the previous chapter, Iran’s use of the 
IRGC in attaining foreign policy goals will be analyzed through two cases: First, relations with 
the Lebanese Hezbollah and, second, Shiite groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq. In both cases, 
Iran’s relations with the Shiite groups dates to the early days of the Revolution. Indeed, personal 
relations between the Iranian revolutionaries and the leaders of these Shiite movements are 
rooted in the pre-revolutionary era. But, these relations were institutionalized after the 
Revolution. Following Israel’s 1982 invasion, Iran deployed its first contingent to Lebanon. The 
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IRGC’s activities in Lebanon were Iran’s first and most successful extraterritorial engagement. 
All forms of Iranian support have been essential to Hezbollah’s long-standing success. In turn, 
Hezbollah served Iran in several ways. Lebanese Hezbollah became a laboratory for the IRGC’s 
future foreign engagements particularly in post-2003 occupied Iraq and the 2011 Syria civil war. 
During the Iran–Iraq war, Iran and Iraqi Shiite groups actively fought against Saddam’s Baathist 
regime. This cooperation was a part of the war, and an alliance against a common enemy. In 
post-2003 occupied Iraq, however, despite the fact that Iran was not a part of the conflict, as was 
not the case in Lebanon, it used the IRGC to shape Iraq’s internal politics for its own interests. 
Both cases have common characteristics in terms of the strategies followed and the desired 
outcomes. Although the covert nature of these activities is an important obstacle to research, the 
IRGC’s relations with Hezbollah and its activities in Iraq are relatively well-documented. Thus, 
both cases are very valuable for observing Iran’s motivations, and the level and characteristics of 
the IRGC involvement in these engagements. In this context, after some background about the 
post-revolution military and the IRGC’s establishment, structure, and responsibilities, this 
chapter covers two case studies; the IRGC’s relations with Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite 
groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq.  
The fifth chapter assesses the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities. The IRGC is a 
constitutional organization and has the characteristics of regular army structure. Generally, the 
conditions of the use of military force are defined by international law and norms. Owing to the 
IRGC’s extraterritorial activities, Iran is accused of being a state sponsor of terrorism. The state 
sponsorship of terrorism literature gives comprehensive insights on the dynamics of state-
terrorist organization relations. Thus, this chapter intends to analyze the IRGC’s extraterritorial 
activities through the lenses of international law and state sponsorship of terrorism literature. 
10 
 
The following questions are the focus of the chapter: what is the status of the IRGC’s 
extraterritorial activities within the international legal framework of use military force? What is 
the basis of these activities in international law? Are these activities categorized as state 
sponsorship of terrorism? If so, what is the regime’s real motivation behind the decision to use 
the IRGC in extraterritorial activities, despite the risk of being labeled as a terrorism sponsor? 
Since the revolution, Iran has always prioritized internal security concerns above external 
ones. Iran's first priority has consistently remained the survival of the regime and regime survival 
has been the most influential factor in the decision-making process. I argue that there is a strong 
connection between the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities and the ruling elites’ regime survival 
strategy. This issue has not been addressed adequately in the literature of state terrorism 
sponsorship, and studies on Iran and the IRGC. To fill this gap, the remaining part of the chapter 
will investigate the dynamics between the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities and the survival of 
the regime, which is also the specific objective of this study. 
The sixth (final) chapter will be a general conclusion, stating the main arguments of this 







If you want to understand today, you have to search yesterday. 
Pearl S. Buck 
Introduction 
The strategic decision-making of Iran is shaped by its formal and informal power centers, 
which are quite opaque, even to its own citizens. The goal of the first chapter is to minimize this 
opacity by focusing on the components that are the long term, shorter term, and immediate 
historical, politic and social events that have created today’s conditions and changed the 
worldview and mindset of Iranian policy makers.  
The 1979 Iranian Revolution was not merely a leadership change. It also made 
Khomeini’s ideology which is blend of his interpretation of Shiism and Persian nationalism, the 
dominant character of the post-revolutionary era, and has influenced every aspect of Iranian life. 
The revolution changed the political structure, the preferences of policy makers and the 
economic structure of Iran, but even more fundamentally, its culture and society.  
This chapter is structured into six main topics as shown below, which aim to identify the 
fundamental factors that affect the post-revolutionary Iranian foreign policy mindset and 
subsequent decision-making. Intensified focus will be on the post-Revolutionary period political 
structure and decision-making process. In addition to Iran’s demography, geopolitical position 
and strategic importance, the chapter aims to draw and define Iran’s position in the Muslim 
world and its sphere of influence in the region. The outline of the chapter is as following; 
-­‐ Demographic structure, Iran’s geopolitical position, and strategic importance  
12 
 
-­‐ The Roots of the 1979 revolution 
-­‐ Foreign Policy of Iran after the Revolution 
-­‐ Post-Revolutionary Worldview and Political Structure  
-­‐ Mutual perceptions of Sunnis and Shiites 
-­‐ Iran’s sphere of influence. 
Iran’s Demographic Structure, Geopolitical Position and Strategic Importance 
Iran is a Gulf and Middle East country, which is bounded by the Caspian Sea, 
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Turkey, and Armenia. 
Iran is the 18th largest state in the world with its 1.648.000 km2 area. However, only a tenth of its 
total area is in economic use; the rest is desert, steppe, and high mountains.1  
                                                
1 Keith McLachlan, The Boundaries of Modern Iran (London: UCL Press, 1994). 
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Figure 1: Topographic Map of Iran 
 
Source: University of Texas Libraries - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection2 
These high mountains draw most of Iran’s borders. The geographic structure of Iran 
looks like a bowl with a high outer rim that is formed by the Zagros, Talish, and Alburz 
mountain chains. Especially in the west and north, the mountains are not only high, but also 
extensive in ground area, while those of the south and east are narrower and lower in general, 
more interrupted by lowland basins, and therefore less of a barrier. The Zagros Mountains extend 
from northwest to southeast and occupy the entire western part of Iran as a natural wall along 
Iran’s Iraq-Turkey border. The Talish and Alburz chains diverge from the northern Zagros in an 
easterly direction which are narrower, equally high and also relatively unbroken.3  
                                                
2 “Iran Maps - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection,” University of Texas Libraries, accessed July 7, 2016, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/iran.html. 




While the mountain chains along its borders provide strategic defensive terrain to Iran 
against any external threat, the long coastline along the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea prevent 
Iran from being isolated and blockaded. This geography puts Iran in a favored and privileged 
position to dominate land accesses to oil-producing regions of the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, 
and the Caspian Sea and other strategically important zones particularly Iraq, Afghanistan and 
the Central Asian Republics. Moreover, Iran controls the northern coast of the Strait of Hormuz, 
which is the sole waterway leading out of the Persian Gulf. “The Strait of Hormuz is the world's 
most important oil chokepoint because roughly 30% of all seaborne-traded oil flowed through 
the Strait of Hormuz in 2013.”4 
Iran is the second largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa region after Saudi 
Arabia, and mainly depends on the hydrocarbon sector. It ranks second in the world in natural 
gas reserves and fourth in proven crude oil reserves.5  
Iran is home to the region’s most populous country with almost 75 million people.6 The 
Islamic Republic of Iran is ethnically, religiously and linguistically diverse-roughly 50 percent of 
its citizens are of non-Persian origin. 
Despite its multiethnic composition and unlike many of its neighbors, Iran has had a long 
history as a state-as Persia, the land has been an empire or state for millennia. However, this long 
history has not made Iranians a nation.7 Persian ethnicity has been the dominant nationality and 
the heterogeneity within the state has not been recognized by the authorities. The absence of 
detailed data on ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic diversity, and their geographical distribution is a 
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sign of the way authorities perceive ethnic fragmentation as a threat to Iran’s unity. Thus, the 
ethnic composition of Iran cannot be determined precisely. The lack of precise and objective 
information about ethnolinguistic groups constrains researchers to a very limited number of 
sources that mostly depend on estimations and very old data.  
One of the sources that is used widely on this issue is the Central Intelligence Agency 
World Fact Book. According to the World Fact Book, the estimation of Iran’s ethnic distribution 
is as follows; Persian 61% (includes Gilakis and Mizandranis), Azeri 16%, Kurd 10%, Lur 6%, 
Baloch 2%, Arab 2%, Turkmen and Turkic tribes 2%, other 1%.8 Another source is Brenda 
Shaffer’s Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity. In this book, 
Shaffer defines the percentage of Azerbaijanis and tribal Turks as ‘20-30’, Kurds as 9, Baluchis 
as 3, Arabs as 2.5, Turkmens as 1.5.9 Shaffer cites this data from Shahrzad Mojab and Amir 
Hassanpour’s article of The Politics of Nationality and Ethnic Diversity. Mojab and 
Hassanpour’s ethnic distribution is roughly the same, except the distribution of Azerbaijanis that 
is precisely defined as 24%. Mojab and Hassanpour state that the only official data regarding 
ethnic and linguistic distribution dates back to 1956, which is the ‘population according to 
language’ figures released after 1956 census.10  
In addition to the above mentioned references, by reviewing the literature it has been 
observed that Mojab and Hasspour’s figures are widely shared by scholars; the central authority 
is dominated by Persians who constitute roughly half (51%) of Iran’s population. The other half 
of population is classified as 24% Azeri, 8% Gilaki and Mazandarani, 7% Kurd, 3% Arab, 2% 
                                                
8 “Iran: People and Society,” The World Factbook, May 17, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ir.html. 
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Press, 2002), 221. 
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Lur, 2% Baluch, 2% Turkmen, and others (1 percent).11, 12, 13 
Linguistic distribution in Iran is almost the same as ethnicity: Persian (official) 53%, 
Azeri Turkic and Turkic dialects 18%, Kurdish 10%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 7%, Luri 6%, 
Baluchi 2%, Arabic 2%, other 2%.14 
We can see the same opacity in the official data of religious-sectarian and linguistic 
composition. For these categories, there is no data published by Iranian government. However, 
the data of both of these categories is more consistent than the data of ethnic composition in the 
literature. The widely accepted percentage of Muslims is approximately 98 percent. Among 
Muslims, the estimate of Sunnis ranges from 5 to 9 percent, but 9 percent is broadly accepted. 
Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Baha'is make up two percent of the total population.15, 16 
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8 7 Shiite 
Lur 2 6 Shiite 
Azeris 24 18 Shiite 
Arabs 3 2 Predominantly Shiite 
Kurds 7 10 Predominantly Sunni 
%9 Baluchis 2 2 Sunni 
Turkmens 2 2 Sunni 
Other 1 2  %2 
    Source: Compiled by the author from the aforementioned studies for the ethnic distribution and the 
linguistic distribution, and from Sanarisan17 for the Sunni-Shiite distribution 
As shown above, in contrast its ethnic diversity, Iran’s religious diversity is relatively 
homogeneous.  Including its biggest ethnic minority, Azeris, the Shiite population represents 89 
percent of the total population, the 9 percent of the population that is Sunnis includes Kurds, 
Baluschis, and Turkmens.  
                                                
17 Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in Iran. 
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Figure 2: Map of Iranian Ethno-Religious Distribution 
 
Source: University of Texas Libraries - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection18 
Shiism is a non-dominant branch of Islam, and Iran has the highest Shiite population in 
the Muslim world. The division of Shiism dates back to the early days of Islam. Keddie states 
that it was originally a political movement of followers of Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of 
Prophet Mohammad. They “believed that legitimate succession to Mohammad could only be in 
Ali's line and that these leaders, called Imams, had divine power and knowledge.”19  
However, as time passed by, this political view evolved into a new branch of Islam; 
Shiism. Shiism has been divided into different branches with different interpretations. Twelvers 
is the one that represents the overwhelming majority in Iran. They believe that their Twelfth 
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Imam had gone into hiding but would return as the messianic Mahdi. In the absence of the 
twelfth Imam, leading clerics, through their knowledge, have become the will of the Imam. This 
status formed a kind of clerical hierarchy embedded in the society where leading clerics, and 
mostly a single top leader, were accepted as the source of correct belief and action. This 
development has made the imams very powerful actors not only in Iran’s religion history, but 
also in its political history. According to Keddie, “[t]he history of Iran's Shi'i clergy is unique in 
the Muslim world and forms a background to clerical participation in the two major twentieth-
century Iranian revolutions--the constitutional revolution (l905-1911) and the Islamic Revolution 
(1978-79).”20 
The Historical Developments Before the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
The 1979 Iranian Revolution is the most important turning point in Iran’s late history that 
has put Iran in a controversial and exceptional position in the Islamic World and in the regional 
and global arena. After the revolution, Iran declared itself a theocratic republic guided by 
religious principles and named itself the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
Calling the 1979 revolution ‘Islamic’ shouldn’t bring us to the conclusion that the causes 
of the revolution were entirely religious. As Kimmel states, “[r]evolutions do not simply happen 
because of an economic crisis, or because a religious leader urges his or her followers to rebel, or 
because a group of people suddenly find themselves discontent with political arrangements in 
society, or because a nation is defeated in a war and is there for vulnerable to mass discontent –
although each of these has been offered as a casual explanation of revolution.”21 There is no 
doubt that Shiite clerics were very crucial actors in the making of the Iranian Revolution against 
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the Shah, but not the only ones. According to Skocpol, 
In Iran, uniquely, the revolution was "made" - but not, everyone will note, by any of 
the modern revolutionary parties on the Iranian scene: not by the Islamic guerillas or 
by the Marxist guerillas, or by the Communist ("Tudeh") Party, or by the secular-
liberal National Front. Instead it was made through a set of cultural and 
organizational forms thoroughly socially embedded in the urban communal enclaves 
that became the centers of popular resistance to the Shah.22  
Kimmel asserts that structural roots of revolutions are deeply embedded in society’s past 
including long term structural causes, short term events, and the immediate historical events. 
These three levels include the long term, structural shifts in the social foundations of the society; 
the short term historical events that allow these deeply settled structural forces to emerge as 
politically potent and begin to mobilize potential discontents; and the immediate historical events 
that set the entire revolutionary process in motion. These three levels, which are named as the 
preconditions, the precipitants, and the triggers, allow us to make an adequate analysis of 1979 
revolution.23 Analyzing the Iranian revolution through these lenses contributes to understanding 
the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
Several long-term factors in Iranian history prepared the conditions for the revolution. 
Among these factors, the roles of clerics and Shiism in daily life occupy a very noticeable place.  
Safavid Dynasty 
The establishment of Shiism as the state religion of Iran dates back to the foundation of 
the Safavid Empire in 1501. Until that date, different branches of Sunni Islam were believed and 
practiced by the majority of the Iranian population. Under the Safavid authority Iranian society 
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was subjected to mass conversions to Shiism by using various assimilation strategies: “example, 
zeal, massacre, pillage, and torture.”24 Additionally, by importing Shiite theologians and building 
up theological centers, Safavid Shahs tried to establish an intellectual and institutional basis for 
the Shiite creed in the predominantly Sunni population of Iran.25  
In this period, the systemic institutionalization of Shiism into the state power obviously 
became the priority of Safavid rulers. It was a way of controlling the society. Ashtiani states that 
“[a]part from the political and military structure of the Safavid state, Shiism was instrumental in 
giving the new Iranian nation-state a sense of political unity and cultural cohesion.”26 At the 
same time, “the state religion provided an ideological justification and theological basis for the 
Safavid political power.”27 In addition to surmounting the new state’s initial problems, 
conversion to Shiism “clearly differentiated the Safavid state from the Sunni Ottoman Empire, 
the major power in the Islamic world in the sixteenth century, and thus gave it territorial and 
political identity”28 that aimed to block the expansion of Ottomans. 
As Shiism became more and more institutionalized, Shiite clerics not only dominated 
daily religious life, but also rose to a position of political power. It was a two-way interaction: to 
empower clerics to spread and consolidate Shiism in the society made them more powerful in the 
bureaucracy of the state.29, 30  
The process of conversion to Shiism and its institutionalization in Iranian society was a 
political act not for spiritual reasons. Thus, without any doubt; this Safavid designed process 
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made Shiism the essential ingredient not only of religious, but also social, cultural, political and 
even economic aspects of life.  
Pre-Qajar Period 
In the aftermath of the Safavid’s collapse in 1722, until the establishment of the Qajar 
Dynasty (1785), a strong central authority, and permanently stabilized region couldn’t exist 
under the rule of Sunni Afghans, Nader Shah and the Zand Dynasty. Barrett states that 
“[w]ithout a strong authoritarian state, Persia reverted to a fractured tribal society in which 
political power and identity reverted to political factions including the Shi’a clergy.”31  Despite 
temporary stability due to the powerful personality of leaders such as Nader Shah and Karim 
Khan, tribally-led wars and Russian and Ottoman invasions became characteristic of this period.  
In this period, the Shi’ite clergy began to lose their privileged position that was given by 
state authority and most of the power that was gained under the Safavids. Dorraj says that Shiism 
was downgraded to the status of other Islamic schools, and Shiite endowment properties were 
seized, which in turn weakened the power of the clerics.32 These changes compelled the Shi’ite 
clergy to depend on their own resources and develop an autonomous structure that could survive 
without government sponsorship.33 
Qajar Dynasty 
After this fluctuation between stability and chaos following the Safavids, the Qajar 
Dynasty, whose reign stretched from 1785 to 1925, reestablished stability and reunified Iran to 
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some extent. According to Keddie, this roughly two-century-era was a “key transitional period 
between pre-modern Iranian culture and society and Iran’s modern development.”34  
The Qajar period marked a noteworthy breakpoint in Iran’s political and social history in 
several important respects: 
-­‐ Iran was transformed from a predominantly tribal territory into a relatively 
centralized monarchy.35 Centralization increased but remained limited. Owing to 
the political and financial weaknesses of the central government, the reforms that 
were necessary for a strong central authority could not be fully implemented. 
“The vested or territorial interests of notables, tribal khans, religious figures 
(ulama) and others who stood to loose power if the central government became 
stronger”36 were the chief obstacles to fully accomplish these reforms.   
-­‐ In this period, relations with the West increased. The West’s colonial expansion 
efforts driven by their own interests and the enthusiasm of a few reform-minded 
Qajar politicians who believed that the country’s progress could be advanced 
through increasing its economic and diplomatic ties with Europe, contributed to 
the growth of significant political, socioeconomic, intellectual relations for Iran. 
In general, these factors turn Iran into a playground international rivalry and 
competition.37 However, this environment also created strong opposition to 
Western imperialism. 
-­‐ The independent power and wealth of the clergy that began under the Safavids 
became fully operative under the Qajar Dynasty. There were a number of 
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developments strengthened the Shiite clerics. As a result of the 
deinstitutionalization and weakening of Shiite clergies’ status in the government, 
the clerics developed an autonomous structure and a set of religious doctrines, 
which consolidated their status in social life and made it possible to survive 
without any government support and against any challenge by Qajar authorities.38 
Arjmond states that during the Qajar period, the autonomous power of the 
religious leaders reached its zenith.39 Furthermore, ‘alliances among many ulama 
merchants and others sometimes forced the government to change policies.’40  
The extensive network of the Shiite clergies and their direct and regular contact with the 
laity –in particular with the traditional merchant class–provided the institution of Shiism room to 
maneuver in domestic and foreign policy.41 Thus, the Shiite clergy played a prominent role in 
several rebellious movements: the 1891-92 Tobacco movement, the 1905-06 Constitutional 
Revolution, the 1951-53 Oil Nationalization Movement, and the 1979 Iranian revolution. 
1891-92 Tobacco Movement 
Among rebellious movements, the Tobacco movement is an important milestone in 
Iranian social and political history, which allowed the clerics to establish themselves as 
‘defenders of nationalism and independence in Iran.’42  
In 1892, after the Shah granted a monopoly to the British in the sale and export of 
tobacco in addition to the other concessions, the widely-joined opposition movement started, 
which included clerics, bazaar traders, intellectuals, and military officers, who saw these 
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concessions as a threat to national sovereignty. To protest government policies, smoking was 
prohibited, and the bazaars were closed in addition to strikes and demonstrations. The Shiite 
leader, Ayatollah Hasan al-Shirazi, had a prominent role in the religious legitimation of the 
protests. He issued a fatwa against smoking tobacco. Mosques served as centers of resistance and 
sanctuary to protesters, and also mobilized society.43 The successfully orchestrated protests, later 
named the Tobacco movement, led to the cancelation of the tobacco concession and embodied 
the cooperation between the clergy, merchants, and dissident intellectuals. The tobacco 
movement, which should be seen as the first sign of popular revolt against the prevailing order, 
was a rough rehearsal for the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1906.44  
The Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909 
As a result of the Tobacco movement, the clergy and their cooperation with other 
discontented elements of Iranian society appeared as a noteworthy development in Iranian politic 
history. A decade and a half later, these groups actively participated in the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1905-1909, which was a seminal event in the country's history that forced the 
Shah to grant a Western-style constitution including a parliament.45 The dominant motivation for 
this rebellion was the public’s sense that political leaders’ were selling national resources for 
personal profit, but was not the only reason; in addition the revolutionaries wanted to replace 
“arbitrary power with law, representative government, and social justice and to resist the 
encroachment of imperial powers with conscious nationalism, popular activism, and economic 
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The revolutionaries tried to establish a strong centralized state by reducing the power of 
the tribes and institutionalizing modern education and judicial reforms. According to Keddie, 
“although internal discord and especially a Russian invasion ended this experiment in 1911, the 
constitution remained until a new regime replaced it in 1979.”47  
However, despite the Constitutionalists’ efforts, a strong centralized modern state could 
not be established. In contrast, it was followed by a period of disintegration, anarchy and the 
involvement of foreign powers such as Russia and England until 1921.48 
Britain’s strategic and economic interests continually evolved in the Gulf. Initially, the 
importance of the Gulf was dominated by the security of the principal lines of communication 
and supply between Britain and British India. The discovery of Persian oil in the first decade of 
the twentieth century, and the 1912 decision to convert the Royal Navy to one powered by oil, 
instead of coal, renewed the strategic value of the Gulf to London.49  
Iran's geographic importance and its oil made it indispensable for the British and 
Russians to dominate this state. ‘The Great Game’ referred to the strategic rivalry and conflict 
between the British and Russian empires for control of the Central Asia. In 1907, two imperialist 
powers agreed to divide Iran into three parts; a Russian zone in the north, a British zone in the 
south, and a neutral buffer zone between the two.50 World War I and post-war improvements 
radically altered the Great Powers’ calculations in Iran. However, roughly a decade later Anglo-
Russian cooperation ended with the Bolshevik revolution. With this developments, Russian 
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imperialism was removed from the picture. Subsequently, the possible expansion of the 
Bolshevik revolution was seen as a threat and “Britain was favorably disposed toward the 
creation of a strong nationalist state to withstand the threat of Bolshevism.”51 
The agreement of 1919 between Iran and Britain was designed to strengthen the central 
government and make Iran a virtual British protectorate. Despite British pressure for 
implementation, it was not ratified by the Iranian parliament (Majles). Britain’s efforts and a new 
Russian intervention in northern Iran provoked the Iranian people and also increased instability 
in the state.52 Many, including local British officials, feared that the withdrawal of British troops 
from Northern Persia would be followed by an attack on Tehran with Bolshevik backing and 
looked for preventive measures.53 During the great destruction of World War I, the imperialist 
powers’ struggles over Iran and its use as a battlefield increased nationalist and democratic 
sentiment among Iranians.54 
The Coup D'etat-1921 
Under these circumstances in 1921, Reza Khan, an army officer, and Sayyed Zia, a 
journalist, initiated a successful coup d’état. In 1925, continuing instability and chaos in Iran 
allowed Reza Khan to assume authority. He had himself named Shah, ‘styling himself a 
cosmopolitan Persian King in the 2,500-year-old image of Cyrus the Great.’55 Thus, formally the 
Qajar dynasty was replaced by the new Pahlavi dynasty. The coup not only prevented the spread 
of revolutionary Bolshevism, but also opened a new era of modernization and state centralization 
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1925-1941 Reza Khan Period 
Reza Shah wanted to create a Western-style modern state under his autocratic power by 
establishing a powerful central state with modern fiscal and economic tools, a modernized 
judiciary, education, health and transportation systems, the establishment of industry and large-
scale corporations and, most importantly, a modern and powerful military.  
During his reign, Reza Shah stressed nationalism and “Iran gained greater national unity 
and autonomy than ever before in modern times.”56 According to Abidi, his most significant 
contribution to Iran was that he enabled the country to continue to exist as a single unit.57 
Arjomond states that the modernization programs of the Pahlavi era also entailed the significant 
secularization of Iranian culture. 
New branches of learning, the history of pre-Islamic Iran, Ferdawsi's Epic of the 
Kings, and the secular nationalist ideology of the Pahlavi state were propagated by 
the new system of national education in the 1930s. This ideology bypassed 
constitutionalism and was emphatically monarchist, as best illustrated by the order of 
the three words in the motto it inscribed in the minds of the whole generation of its 
school children: God, the King, the Fatherland. Perhaps the most spectacular aspect 
of the state promoted secularization of culture was the unveiling of women in 1935, a 
forced but nevertheless courageous break with the Islamic tradition.58 
Nonetheless, the Shah’s modernization program and his nationalist policies disturbed two 
parties. Within Iran, on the one hand, the clergy, the traditional business class (the bazaari 
merchants) and tribal leaders saw modernization as a direct threat to their status in society. On 
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the other hand, the British viewed the Shah’s nationalist policies as a potential threat to their 
economic interests in the AIOC (Anglo-Persian Oil Company).59  
Since first discovering oil in the early years of the twentieth century, the British 
maintained control of Iranian oil through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which 
strengthened British economic and military power rather than improving Iranian socioeconomic 
life. As Kinzer explains, the AIOC was an immensely profitable company, with the Abadan 
refinery constituting Britain’s largest overseas asset and the largest installation of its kind in the 
world. While the refinery produced enormous profits and provided fuel for the Royal Navy, Iran 
owned only 20% of the company.60 British monopoly on the production and sale of Iranian oil 
maintained British leverage over Iranian politicians and society.  
After World War II broke out, Reza Shah declared a policy of neutrality; however, 
increasingly close relations with Germany made the Allies anxious. As stated by Kinzer 
“[w]estern leaders feared that the Nazis were planning to use Iran as a platform for an attack 
across the Soviet Union’s southern border that would greatly complicate the Allied war effort.”61 
Therefore, the Allies invaded Iran in August 1941 and Reza Shah was forced to abdicate. This 
ended Reza Shah's reign and started the era of Mohammad Reza (his eldest son), which would be 
ended by the 1979 Iranian Revolution.    
To fund Iranian modernization with oil revenue, the National Front demanded the 
nationalization of the oil industry throughout the late 1940s. In particular, Dr. Mohammad 
Mossadegh was a passionate figure in the nationalization struggle. He believed no country could 
be independent without economic independence. According to him, "[t]he moral aspect of oil 
                                                
59 Barrett, “JSOU Report 12-8 Iran  : Illusion , Reality , and Interests,” 32. 
60 Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2003), 107. 
61 Ibid., 45. 
30 
 
nationalization is more important than its economic aspect."62 This issue caused a great debate in 
the Majlis (parliament). After the assassination of Prime Minister General Ali Razmara who 
opposed nationalization for technical reasons, the Majlis nationalized foreign oil interests under 
the insistence of the National Front on 20 March 1951. Almost a month later, Dr. Mohammad 
Mossadegh was nominated for the position of Prime Minister, and was elected by a majority of 
the Majlis.63 
The nationalization of the oil industry, Mossadegh’s populist brand of nationalism and 
the advent of the Tudeh (a well-organized and disciplined Communist Party) resulted in the 
alienation of the Shah and the army. As Mosaddegh's power grew, the neo-patrimonial power of 
the Shah was restricted and he was reduced to a constitutional monarch and a ceremonial 
figurehead.64 These changes also were seen as direct threats to British interests.   
After the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the issue was raised at the 
United Nations, although some in the British government wanted to invade Iran as a response. 
The British government perceived that it would not be easy to solve this problem in the UN and 
decided to convince the U.S. government for a joint operation. The British government knew that 
their transatlantic allies would not participate in a plan that was motivated purely by British oil 
and economic interests, so instead they emphasized the Communist threat. Eventually, Operation 
Ajax, which comprised propaganda, provocations, demonstrations, and bribery, and employed 
agents of influence, dissident military leaders, and paid protestors, was created. On August 19, 
1953, with CIA/MI6-orchestrated support, under General Fazollah Zahedi’s leadership, a coup 
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was carried out.65 The 1953 coup removed democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister 
Mohammed Mossadegh from power. Then the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza, was installed as 
an absolute monarch and became a reliable ally of the United States. 
1953-1979 Mohammed Reza Period 
With the support of the U.S., in 1963, the Shah announced the modernization program 
called the “White Revolution”. It included land reform, the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises and a profit-sharing plan for industrial workers, etc. Additionally, the program 
increased women's minimum legal marriage age to 18, improved women's legal rights in divorce 
and granted women the right to vote. These reforms brought the Shah into conflict with the 
clergy.66 Khomeini, who harshly criticized as land reform and votes for women, came to 
prominence during this conflict. After that time, Khomeini would be one of the most influential 
figures in modern Iran history. Due to his opposition, in 1964 he was sent into exile in Turkey 
and subsequently Iraq. Some of the fashionable Leftist and Third Worldist ideology of the time 
influenced him during his exile. In 1970, he devised a clerical government as an alternative to 
monarchy. This would, ultimately, pave the way to his Supreme Leadership.67 
 With the rise in oil prices in 1973–1974, Iran’s annual revenue increased “from about US 
$1bn to about US $25bn.”68 By starting industrial and military modernization with this revenue, 
Abidi states that, Mohammed Reza initiated a series of measures aimed at transforming his 
nation from the preparatory phase of the “White Revolution” to the grand era of the “Great 
Civilization.” However, almost 18 months later, world demand for Iranian oil contracted, and 
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many projects had to be cut and workers lost their jobs. Thus, the Shah’s dream ended in the 
chaos of inflation, port congestion, and shortages of basic goods and services.69 
These changes led to a variety of social problems in Iran. In addition to economic chaos 
and suppression of society, the Shah’s populist policies such as the new calendar dating from 
Cyrus the Great caused the Shah’s prestige loose. Discontent with the Shah’s policies was 
spreading through various segments of Iranian society. After that time, protests and major 
demonstrations against the government became increasingly common, and several sequential 
events triggered the turmoil.  
First, Khomeini’s son, Mostafa, was accidentally killed in Karbala on 23 October 1977, 
and it was widely suspected that he was killed by SAVAK, the Shah’s security service.70  
Second, an insulting article published in a January 1978 issue of the newspaper Ettelaat, 
accused Khomeini of being an Indian agent of the British. The seminary town of Qom, which 
was the center of Khomeini’s supporters, reacted very severely to this article. Uprisings spread to 
several cities, tens of people died, and the army was deployed for the first time.71 
Last and the worst of the incidents, on 19 August 1978, militants set fire to the first floor 
corridor of the Rex Cinema in Abadan. More than 400 people died, suffocated by the fumes. 
Shiite clergy under Khomeini’s leadership and the liberal opposition claimed that the fire was the 
work of SAVAK and was designed to discredit the religious protest.72  
All of these issues fueled the revolutionary movement gave the most prominent role to 
Khomeini, who was in Najaf, Iraq at this time. Mohammed Reza’s first reaction was to dismiss 
premier Amouzegar and replace him with Jafar Sharif Emami. Although Emami tried to calm the 
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religious opposition by taking some measures such as rescinding the imperial calendar and 
closing casinos, he could not break the momentum of the demonstrations. The lack of 
improvement pushed PM Emami to attempt to silence Khomeini. Because of pressure from 
Iranian officials, the Iraqi government increased the pressure on Khomeini. Khomeini found a 
solution by going to France where he was safer than in other countries of the region and where 
Iranians could stay for 90 days without a visa.73 In France, Khomeini kept severe opposition 
alive by doing print and broadcast interviews, and sending messages to his supporters.  
Meanwhile in Iran, the weakness of Emami government led the Shah to form a military 
government to end the chaos. Initially, the government was successful to some extent, however, 
the month of Moharram, when Iranians traditionally mourn the death in the battle of the 
Prophet’s grandson, Hosein, protests and street marches intensified. According to Buchan, “those 
marches were a decisive rejection of the monarchy and an endorsement of Khomeini as the 
undisputed leader of the rebellion. The Left and the liberals convinced themselves that Khomeini 
and the clergy would mobilize the masses and then somehow leave the modern classes to 
establish the new government.”74  
In the end, Reza Shah was convinced to temporarily leave Iran for Egypt believing his 
absence might soothe the protests and chaos. Despite attempts to stop him, Khomeini returned to 
Iran on February 1st, 1979 and ten days later, on February 11, the power in Iran switched to “the 
coalition of Khomeini and his followers, including clericals, lay religious figures led by 
Barzagan, and for a time, a few lay National Front and other ministers, notably Dr. Karim 
Sanjabi.”75 
Keddie states that at the beginning Khomeini and the clergy seemed reluctant to govern 
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the state. Khomeini’s appointment of the non-clerical Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister and 
support of Bani Sadr in the first presidential elections can be seen as proof of this perspective.76 
However, immediately after eliminating their common enemy, ideological differences surfaced 
amongst the revolutionary partners. Rather than returning to their mosques, Khomeini and many 
clerics began to take steps to increase their power and to control the government. President Bani 
Sadr and PM Bazargan were driven from office.77 According to Keddie, some opposition 
Iranians saw this as Khomeini’s hijack of the revolution.78 Thus, Pahlavi family rule ended, and 
the era of Khomeini and his clerics started. Buchan well sums up Pahlavi family rule periods: 
Both Reza and Mohammed Reza claimed to be constitutional monarchs, but both 
sought absolute rule: Reza from the late 1920s till his abdication in 1941, and 
Mohammed Reza from 1964 until the end of 1978. Thus, even as their schools, 
factories and model armies were creating a new middle class, they refused to admit 
that class to power. During those periods of absolute rule, Parliament, the Press and 
intellectual life were suppressed. The Pahlavi Court took on a composite, or 
Ruritanian, character. Their reforms brought both Shahs into conflict with the Shia 
clergy, which had long seen itself as the guardian of Iranian character and traditions. 
There was nothing new in that. What was new was the character and will of Ruhollah 
Khomeini.79  
Thus the Pahlavis’ suppressive and autocratic rule was replaced by the rule of Khomeini. 
“The decade of Khomeini’s rule was marked by the ever-growing power of his followers and 
elimination, often by violence and despite resistance, of opposition groups, and by increasing 
enforcement of ideological and behavioral controls on the population.”80   
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The Causes of the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
Sociological and Political Causes 
Skocpol puts different and more comprehensive perspectives on the causes of the Iranian 
Revolution. First, in general, the Iranian revolution can be regarded as a result of an excessively 
rapid period of modernization. During both Shahs’ reign, and particularly, the later Shah period, 
Iranian society saw “land reform, massive migrations from countryside to cities and towns 
(above all to Teheran), unprecedentedly rapid industrialization, and the sudden expansion of 
modern primary, secondary, and university education.”81 Excessively rapid social change and 
additionally, a mismanaged economic policy increased the discontent of Iranian society with the 
Shah. As stated by Skocpol “the Revolution was straightforwardly the product of societal 
disruption, social disorientation, and universal frustration with the pace of change,”82 but this 
was one aspect of the revolution. Because “disruption and discontent alone do not give people 
the collective organizational capacities and the autonomous resources that they need to sustain 
resistance to political and economic power holders.”83  
Second, remarkably, the Shah’s army and police were ineffective in preventing the 
revolution, even though immense investment had been made in the modernization of both 
organizations.84  
Third, Skocpol’s last departure from other theorists is the concept that ‘revolutions come, 
not made.’ According to Skocpol, the Iranian revolution “did not just come; it was deliberately 
and coherently made - specifically in its opening phase, the overthrow of the old regime.’ It was 
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made by ‘a mass-based social movement aiming to overthrow the old order.”85 Undoubtedly; the 
revolution was not made by a single segment of Iranian society; the segments ranged from 
Marxist to the liberal National Front, from secularists to Islamic activists. It was made “through a 
set of cultural and organizational forms thoroughly socially embedded in the urban communal 
enclaves that became the centers of popular resistance to the Shah.”86  
The Role of Shiism and Clergy in the Revolution 
During both Shahs’ period, the clergy perceived that the modernization policies and 
reforms had significantly weakened the foundation of the religious institutions and their 
influence on Iranian culture. Land reform, the loss of judicial and educational functions, the loss 
of control of religious endowments, and an increasing number of well-educated secular 
competitors caused the clergy to fear the permanent loss of their historically important social 
functions and their power in society. This led the Shiite clergy to react and to be the most 
influential actor in the revolution. 
Shiite clergy mosque network that had been rooted in Iranian communities since the 
Qajar Dynasty served as centers for propaganda, mobilization, and organization of urban mass 
movement and gave moral-religious justification to the struggle against the Shah. Additionally, 
as Esposito states, “Shiite Islam provided a common set of symbols, historical identity, and 
values - an indigenous, non-Western alternative. Shiite belief provided the basis for an 
ideological framework for opposition and protest against oppression and injustice.”87  
In Islam and Democracy, Esposito and Voll highlight Shiism’s role in Iranian politics and 
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society as well in its latest revolution.  
Shiism has been integral to Iranian identity and a source of a political legitimacy 
since the sixteenth century when it was declared the state religion of Iran. Shia Islam 
has been embroiled in politics from its origins, and as such provides history and 
system of the belief that can be interpreted and used in political crisis. In Iranian 
History, “Twelver Shiism (Ithna Ashari) has often been apolitical, finding a tolerable 
accommodation with the state. However, at critical points throughout history, Shia 
belief, leadership, and institutions have played an important role in Iranian politics 
and society. Shiism has been interpreted and utilized to safeguard national identity 
and independence and to mobilize popular support.”88  
The replacement of one set of rulers or a ruler by another doesn’t solely mean a 
revolution. A revolution is more than this. According to Walt,  “revolutions redefine the political 
community within a given territory by creating a "new state" that rests on principles and 
procedures that are a sharp departure from those of the old regime.”89  
Walt’s definition of ‘a sharp departure from those of the old regime’ totally explains what 
happened in Iran during the 1979 Revolution. Following the revolution, Shiite doctrines have 
formed the basis of all facets of life: the political, educational, legal, social, and religious.  
Post-Revolutionary Worldview and Political Structure 
Velayat-e Faqih 
After the revolution, the concept of velayat-e faqih that was developed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini has been the basis of Iran’s political system. The origin of velayat-e faqih dates back 
to the debate between the akhbari and usuli schools of Shiism in the 18th century. The akhbari 
school asserts that since the disappearance of the twelfth imam, the Quran and the hadith 
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(sayings and actions of Prophet Muhammad) were sufficient for Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and 
there was no need for the leadership of the mojtahed (highest learned clergy who have the 
authority to make ijtihad (interpretation of the religion)). Conversely, the supporters of the usuli 
school believe in the necessity of ijtihad and that the leadership of the mojtahed need to update 
interpretations depending on current circumstances. The debate between the akhbari and usuli 
schools ended in the late eighteenth century with the victory of the latter. This dynamic created 
the Shiite clerical hierarchy in Iranian society and gave the right of ijtihad to only the mojtahed 
or to the ayatollah, whose interpretations had to be followed by each believer. This highest rank 
of Twelver Shiites who execute sharia later called marja-e taqlid (religious authority followed as 
the source of emulation). Additionally, zakat (religious tax) and the khums (which is one fifth of 
the annual net profit of a Shiite Muslim) enhanced the financial autonomy of the clergy and their 
status in the society. According to Eva Patricia Rakel these four developments politicized Shiism 
and increased the clergies power in Iran; 
1. The triumph of usuli school 
2. Ijtihad 
3. Marja-e taqlid, and  
4. The khums.90  
In this context, the concept of velayat-e faqih states that the supreme leader is the 
temporal, spiritual and legal leader of the ummah (muslim community) during the absence of the 
Twelfth Imam. Velayat-e faqih has provided the ideological justification for the regime’s 
political reconstruction. Iran’s interpretation of Shiism has shaped the worldview of Iranian 
decision makers; thus it is almost impossible to separate the government’s decision-making from 
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its religious principles. And this is also guaranteed by the 1979 constitution. 
Article 177: The contents of the Articles of the Constitution related to the Islamic 
character of the political system; the basis of all the rules and regulations according to 
Islamic criteria; the religious footing; the objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran; 
the democratic character of the government; the wilayat al-'mr the Imamate of 
Ummah; and the administration of the affairs of the country based on national 
referenda, official religion of Iran [Islam] and the school [Twelver Ja'fari] are 
unalterable.91  
Political Structure 
The concept of velayat-e faqih is not the sole character of the power structure of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. It has a dual and unique political system; in addition to deriving its 
legitimacy from the velayat-e faqih system, Iran enjoys republican institutions inherited and 
adapted from the constitution of 1906.    
In terms of regime type, there is opacity whether Iran has a democratic or authoritarian or 
totalitarian regime. Linz contrasted each regime with reference to five characteristics:  
-­‐ The selection of leaders through elections, 
-­‐ The degree of pluralism, 
-­‐ The nature of participation, 
-­‐ The scope of the regime’s ideology, 
-­‐ The degree to which the political system is institutionalized.92 
In terms of these characteristics, it is not easy to place Iran into a particular regime type. 
According to Chehabi, “Iran, like totalitarian regimes, proclaims absolute supremacy over the 
public life of an ideology; like authoritarian regimes it permits a limited degree of pluralism, and 
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like democracies it holds elections.”93  
In the political structure of Iran, there is a parliament and a president, both selected by 
Iranian voters. However, it also has a supreme leader who is both more powerful than the 
president and not democratically elected. Moreover, the unelected institutions of Iran's 
government are more powerful than the elected ones. 
Figure 3: Political Structure of Iran 
 
         Source: BBC News, 200994 
The structure of Iran’s political system contains two power centers; formal (as mentioned 
above) and informal which are “a multitude loosely connected and generally fiercely competitive 
power centers.”95 Whereas the formal power centers are grounded in the Constitution and can be 
seen as a concrete structure, the informal power centers are different political factions of the 
political elite that are embedded in the concrete power structure; “such as the heads and members 
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of state institutions, religious-political associations, religious foundations, and paramilitary 
organizations; those individuals that directly or indirectly participate in the decision-making 
process in Iran and/or in the ideological discourse.”96  
Informal Power Structure 
Buchta describes the informal power structure by using a model made up of four 
concentric rings. In this model, the power of each faction increases in size from the inner to the 
outer circles. 
Figure 4: The Informal Power Structure in Iran 
 
  Source: Buchta, 199997 
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The First Ring: Patriarchs (Conservatives) 
This group represents the regime's most powerful decision-making body that controls not 
only their own ring of power, but also a large portion of the remaining political spheres. It 
includes the most influential political clerics from the executive, judicial, and legislative 
branches; the Council of Guardians; the Assembly of Experts; and the Society of Teachers of 
Qom Theological Colleges.98 According to Rakel, since the revolution, conservatives have 
controlled the politics, the military and economic system.99  
The Second Ring: This group includes representatives from the executive, judicial, and 
legislative branches, provincial governors; mayors of major cities and technocrats. They are the 
ideologically right-wing traditionalist.100  
The Third Ring: (The Power Base of the Regime) This group includes revolutionary 
institutions, religious security forces, law enforcement forces, committees, IRGC, revolutionary 
newspapers, and the media. It is dominated by ideologically left-wing Islamicists and right-wing 
traditionalists.101  
The Fourth Ring: (Formerly Influential Individuals and Groups) Buchta states that this 
ring includes the "semi-opposition" who are positioned between the regime and civil society and 
whose goal is the peaceful reform of the system from the inside.102  
Formal Power Structure 
The formal power centers consist of the president, the cabinet, the parliament, the 
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assembly of experts, the guardian council, the supreme leader, the head of the judiciary, the 
armed forces, and the expediency council.  The responsibilities and functions of these institutions 
briefly will be explained in this section.    
The Supreme Leader 
The Supreme Leader is the most powerful institution in the newly established political 
system, which is based on the Khomeini's politico-religious theory of velayat-e faqih. According 
to the article 110 of the constitution, the important duties and powers of the Supreme Leader are 
as follows:    
-­‐ Assuming supreme command of the armed forces. 
-­‐ Declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces.  
-­‐ Appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of resignation of: 
• Six clerical jurists in the Guardian Council (six laymen, six clerical jurists), 
• The supreme judicial authority of the country, 
• The head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
• The chief of the joint staff,  
• The chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.  
• The supreme commanders of the armed forces.  
-­‐ Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by the 
people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic, with respect 
to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be confirmed before elections 
take place by the Guardian Council; and, in the case of the first term [of the 
Presidency], by the Leadership; 
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-­‐ Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the 
country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his 
constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly testifying 
to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89 of the Constitution.103, 104  
The Parliament 
The members of the parliament are elected by popular vote every four years. Although 
article 56 of the constitution emphasizes the absolute sovereignty of God, it also explicitly states 
that Parliament is the trustee of this sovereignty. The following are the Parliament's important 
functions; 
-­‐ Drafting legislation (Articles 71-75 of the Constitution);  
-­‐ Ratifying international treaties (Article 77);  
-­‐ Approving state-of-emergency declarations (Article 79) and loans (Article 80);  
-­‐ Examining and approving the annual state budget (Article 52);  
-­‐ Moreover, if necessary, removing from office the state president and his 
appointed ministers.105  
The President 
The president is elected for four years and no more than two consecutive terms. The 
Guardian Council vets all presidential candidates. The president is the second most powerful 
official in the Iranian political system, “but his influence is primarily over the social, cultural, 
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and economic policies of the country.” According to Buchta, it is a false belief that the executive 
plays a dominant role in setting domestic and foreign policy, which originates from the high 
public profile of the president and other representatives of the executive in the media and at 
international conferences. The Supreme Leader controls the armed forces and makes decisions 
on security, defense and major foreign policy issues. Buchta states that Iran's presidency is 
unlike any other in many respects;  
-­‐ A supreme religious authority who is not elected by the people approves the 
president who is elected by the people, 
-­‐ The state executive does not have control over the armed forces, 
-­‐ The entire executive branch is subordinate to a religious authority.106 
The Council of Guardians  
It consists of twelve jurists (six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader and six 
jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by parliament) who determine the compatibility 
with sharia of laws passed by the Parliament. The council has the power to veto laws if they 
consider the laws inconsistent with the constitution and Islamic law.107  
The Assembly of Expert  
Consists of 86 members who are elected for an eight-year term. The responsibilities of 
the Assembly of Experts are to appoint and monitor the Supreme Leader. The assembly gathers 
at least once a year. Most importantly, according to Article 111, the assembly has the right to 
“remove the supreme leader if he becomes unable to fulfill his duties, if he loses one or more of 
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the qualifications necessary to perform in his office, or if it is revealed that he never possessed 
these qualifications in the first place.”108 
The Expediency Council  
The Supreme Leader appoints its thirty-one members, who are prominent religious, social 
and political figures. It has a mediation role in disputes between the parliament and the Guardian 
Council. There are two Constitutional Responsibilities of the Expediency Council: 
-­‐ Advise the supreme leader in all matters related to the leader's right to establish 
guidelines for the overall policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (de facto, not 
invoked until 1997). 
-­‐ Discern the supreme interest of the system through ultimate arbitration in cases in 
which the legislative authority of Parliament is overruled by a veto of the Council 
of Guardians.109 
Armed Forces  
The armed forces comprise the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the 
regular forces under the Joint Armed Forces General Staff.  The regular forces (the Artesh) are 
responsible for defending Iran's borders and maintaining internal order. Both the Artesh and 
IRGC are comprised of army, navy and air force.110 
As is stated in Article 150 of 1979 Constitution, “[t]he Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, 
organized in the early days of the triumph of the Revolution, is to be maintained so that it may 
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continue in its role of guarding the Revolution and its achievements.”111  The reason behind the 
establishment of IRGC was Khomeini’s concerns about the loyalty of the Shah’s military.  
The Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-QF) is an elite unit that 
“conducts clandestine operations outside Iran; provides training, financial, and other support to 
Islamic militant groups; and collects strategic and military intelligence…”112 All leading army 
and Revolutionary Guard commanders are appointed by the Supreme Leader. 
Foreign Policy of Iran after the Revolution 
This topic will be addressed broadly in Section 3. Here, the Iranian Revolution’s initial 
effects on foreign policy are described.  
The revolution altered not only Iran’s internal dynamics, but also led to a dramatic 
change in the Iranian foreign policy outlook. Iranian foreign policy adopted two principles just 
after the revolution: “Neither East nor West” and “Export of the Revolution, based on the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran rejected an alliance with both the US (West) 
and USSR (East), two superpowers of the Cold War period and tried instead to achieve unity 
with other Muslim countries. Several articles of the Constitution mention Iran’s foreign policy 
preferences;  
Article 152: The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the 
rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the 
preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial 
integrity, the defense of the rights of all Muslims, nonalignment with respect to the 
hegemonist superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all 
non-belligerent States.  
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Article 153: Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural 
resources, economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of the 
national life, is forbidden. 
Article 154: The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout 
human society, and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of 
justice and truth to be the right of all people of the world. Accordingly, while 
scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other 
nations, it supports the just struggles of the mustad'afun against the mustakbirun in 
every corner of the globe.113  
These articles draw attention to the basics in the conduct of Iranian foreign policy. These 
are ‘sovereignty’, ‘independence’, ‘peaceful relations with states that are not hostile to Iran or 
Islam in general’ and ‘opposition to any form of intervention and subjugation.’  
Article 11: In accordance with the sacred verse of the Koran "This your community is 
a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me" [21:92], all Muslims form a 
single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran have the duty of 
formulating its general policies with a view to cultivating the friendship and unity of 
all Muslim peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring about the political, 
economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world.114 
In article 11 Iran emphasizes the unity of the Islamic world. The new leadership viewed 
its victory as a model for imitation by other Muslim countries and aimed to universalize its 
revolutionary appeal by exporting it. However, in the first decade after the Revolution, there was 
no success institutionalizing revolution abroad. According to Olivier Roy, there were two causes 
in the failure of the revolution to export itself abroad: “First the revolution was unable to 
transcend the Shi’a-Sunni divide to any substantial degree.  … Secondly, the revolution was 
carried unanimously by all Shi’a, even if the majority of non-Iranian Shi’a did feel solidarity.”115 
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Without any doubt, Khomeini’s success created admiration in Muslim countries, but mutual 
suspicions between parties and deep religious and political divisions, even in Shiite World, 
prevented other countries from accepting Khomeini’s leadership.  
Mutual Perceptions between Sunnis and Shiites 
At this point, in order to understand the level of the schism in Islam, we look at the 
distribution of the two major Islamic sects. According to Pew Research Center, Shiites constitute 
10-13% of the total Muslim population. Almost 75% of the total Shiite population live in Iran, 
Pakistan, India and Iraq. Shiite Muslims make up a majority of the total population in four 
countries: Iran (where ~93% of Muslims are Shiite), Azerbaijan (~70%), Bahrain (~70%) and 
Iraq (~67%).116  
These two main sects of Islam divide into branches. Sunnism includes followers of the 
Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki and Hanbali (Wahhabi or Salafi movement) schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Shiism includes Twelvers (Ithna Asharis), Seveners (Ismailis), Zaydis and Alawis 
as shown below 
The Sunni- Shiite divide is not just a simple differing interpretation of Islam; it is also a 
result of a 1,400-year old political disagreement. The world’s 1.6 billion Muslims all agree that 
‘there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah (Shahada-the declaration 
of faith). Muhammad is the last prophet of Allah who has brought the final revelation.’ To make 
this profession of faith is the first prerequisite for those who wants to become a Muslim. While 
Sunnis believe that Quran, the practice of the Prophet and his teachings (the sunnah) are 
sufficient to live Islam, the Shiites believe that ayatollahs are divinely guided and considered as 
                                                




the only legitimate interpreters of the Quran. Furthermore, the Shiites see their ayatollahs as 
reflections of God on earth. The perceived exaggerated status of Ali and of ayatollahs have led 
Sunnis to accuse Shiites of heresy.  
Analyzing the mutual acceptance of the two principal sects helps to clarify the level of 
division and the nature of contemporary relations. A Pew Research Center analysis makes crystal 
clear the level of mutual acceptance between two main sects of Islam.  
According to the Pew Research Center survey, the acceptance of Sunnis is universally 
very high; the answer to the question of whether Sunnis are Muslims is ‘yes’ by more than half 
of respondents in 17 of the 23 countries. For instance, in three countries with significant Shiite 
population -Iraq (~67%), Lebanon (~50%) and Azerbaijan (~70%)- the majority agree that 
Sunnis are members of the Islamic community.117   
Table 2: The Acceptance of Sunnis as Muslims in the States that Have Shiite Majorities 
 % of Shiites in the Total 
Population 
% of the acceptance of Sunnis as 
Muslims 
Iraq ~67 99 
Lebanon ~50 97 
Azerbaijan ~70 78 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2012118 
The acceptance of Sunnis as Muslims even in Shiite dominant states is very high. 
However, the converse is not nearly as true. In 11 of the 23 countries, the acceptance of Shiites 
as Muslims is not higher than %50 of total respondents. This value is lower particularly in 
                                                





countries where Shiites 5% or less of the population.119 
Figure 5: Percentage of Sunnis Who Accept Shiites as Muslim (Countries Where 5% or 
Fewer Self-identity as Shiites) 
 
 Source: Pew Research Center, 2012120 
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Unsurprisingly, in countries where 6% or more of Muslims self-identify as Shiite, the 
acceptance of Shiites as Muslims is higher. It ranges from 90% in Azerbaijan, to 85% in Russia, 
to 83% in Afghanistan, to 82% in Iraq, to 77% to Lebanon. The sole exception is Pakistan where 
the approximate percentage of the Shiite population constitutes 10-15%, and half of the 
correspondents from Pakistan recognize Shiites as Muslims.121  
Figure 6: Percentage of Sunnis (Countries Where 6% or More Self-identity as Shiites) 
 
 Source: Pew Research Center, 2012122 
In the context of the survey, if we focus on the countries that are in the Iran’s region and 
possibly related to it, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, and Egypt, majorities of the populations 
do not accept Shiites as Muslim.  
From these findings, it can be said that in those where there is a substantial Shiite 
population mutual recognition between Sunnis and Shiites is higher.  On the other hand, Sunni 
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dominant countries have a significant bias against accepting Shiites as Muslims. 
Figure 7: Percentage of Sunnis Who Accept Shiites as Muslim (Iran and Related States) 
 
  Source: Pew Research Center, 2012123 
Without question, the Iranian Revolution created initial enthusiasm among other Muslim 
nations, but after a time, Khomeini’s call for Islamic upheaval did not appeal broadly to Arab 
Muslims. Sunnis’ psychological resistance stems from the 1,400-year old religious-political 
Sunni– Shiite divide but was not the only reason for the failure of the revolution to export itself 
abroad. The start of the Iran–Iraq war in 1980, just after the Iranian Revolution, deepened the 
split between Iran and the Sunni-dominated Arab world. According to Roy, this dynamic created 
another geostrategic factor: ‘Persians’ against ‘Arabs.’ He states “two vectors interacted here: for 
the Arabs, Arab and Sunni solidarity; for all Sunni Islamists, condemnation of millenarist Shiite 
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theories and role of the imam and as such, of Khomeini.”124  
Iran’s expansionist ambitions were seen as a threat by Sunnis and thus triggered sectarian 
tensions between Shiite and Sunnis. To balance this threat Sunni dominant states, namely Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan, encouraged the development of Sunni movements whose inspiration was 
Salafist. Increasing the influence of Salafist and Wahhabi sects was intended to isolate the Shiite 
and caused them “to lose all hope to reach out to Sunnis, but to face the emergence of a Sunni 
religious movement that was both radical and anti- Shiite.”125 The Revolution unquestionably 
moved different Islamic groups from a phase of quiet passivity into activism.  
In the meantime, Iran gave up expansionism and began to follow a more pragmatic 
policy. Instead of expansionism, Iran supports Shiite movements in neighboring states. Iran’s 
support for Hezbollah has increased Iran’s weight in the regional balance of power.  
The Taif agreement brought an end to the Lebanese sectarian civil war and made it 
possible for Hezbollah to enter into Lebanese politics. This ‘revealed the foreign policy shift of 
Iran, which strove for rapprochement with the conservative Arab states during Rafsanjani’s 
presidency.’126 
Additionally, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the US-led ‘war on terror’ 
removed Iran’s two principal enemies; Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominated regime in Iraq and 
the Sunni fundamentalist regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Thus, inadvertently, Iran gained 
an active transnational role in the regional power vacuum.  
Salamay and Othman argue that “the so-called ‘war on terror’ has, in effect, not only 
removed key obstacles from the path of an expansionist Iranian foreign policy agenda but has 
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also provided a rational pretext to justify the revival of an ideological Shiite agenda.”127 
 At the same time, despite a sectarian divide, Tehran has always supported the Sunni 
Palestinian cause to position itself as a defender of the Muslim world. 
The pro-Iranian Shiite domination of political power in Iraq, the relations with the 
Alawite Shiite Assad regime and the success of Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah reinforced the power 
of Shiites from the Mediterranean to Pakistan. Naturally, several Sunni leaders have urged the 
West to counter the expansion of Iran’s sphere of influence and its rising power in Iraq, Syria 
and Lebanon.  
Conclusion 
With the 1979 Revolution, Iran drastically changed from being a secular and autocratic 
monarchy to an Islamic Republic. In Iran, the Revolution did not simply result in a change of 
leadership, it also completely transformed Iran’s foreign policy and international standing. The 
revolution made Iran prominent on the international scene but also severely isolated the country.  
As Skocpol states the 1979 Revolution did not occur as commonly thought, it was made 
by ‘a set of cultural and organizational forms systematically socially embedded in the society,’ 
that developed over the course of Iranian history. In a series of events, the Tobacco Monopoly 
revolt (1890-1891), the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1906), the Oil Nationalization 
Movement of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh (1951-1953), and the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution (1978-1979), which were all reactions to foreign influence over Iran and the 
exploitation of its wealth and resources by foreign powers.  
The clergy and Shiism have played a disproportionate role in these reactions. Since 1501, 
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when Shiism became the state religion along with the compulsory conversion of the Iranian 
people to Shiism as a political reaction against the expansion of foreign influence, Shiism and the 
clergy have been significant actors in Iranian politics, which has also diminished the potential 
fragility of an ethnically heterogeneous nation.  
The 1979 Iranian revolution created a hybrid and a unique political system. In addition to 
the democratic elements of the newly established regime, the clergy’s influential role in society 
was institutionalized as the concept of velayet-e faqih in the political structure. The dominant 
role of the appointed political institutions controlled by the clergy over the elected political 
institutions has been the key feature of Iranian politics. 
The 1979 revolution altered not only Iran’s internal dynamics but also led to a dramatic 
change in Iranian foreign policy. Iranian foreign policy switched from pro-Western bias to one 
that is fundamentally anti-Western, anti-US and anti-Israel. 
After the revolution, the fundamental principles driving the conduct of Iranian foreign 
policy can be summarized as ‘sovereignty’, ‘independence’, ‘peaceful relations with states that 
are not hostile to Iran or to Islam in general’, ‘opposition to any form of intervention and 
subjugation’ and, particularly, two principles, ‘neither east nor west’ and ‘export of the 
revolution’ which became the primary goals of Iranian foreign policy. While the former principal 
can be characterized as pacific, the latter principal envisions activist goal, which have provoked 
Sunni states in the region. 
Without any doubt, the Iranian revolution initially created enthusiasm among many 
Muslim nations, but after a time, Khomeini’s call for Islamic upheaval did not appeal to Arab 
and Sunni Muslims. In light of Pew Research Center research, it can be said that the rift between 
Sunni and Shiite Islam does not originate simply from a different interpretation of Islam. There is 
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a longtime historical rivalry and hostility between them. While the acceptance of Sunnis as 
Muslims is very high even in Shiite dominant states, the acceptance of Shiites as Muslims is 
relatively low in the Muslim world. As noted in the survey, in 11 of the 23 majority Muslim 
countries, the acceptance of Shiites as Muslims is not higher than 50% of total respondents.128 
This figure is very important in understanding the rift between two sects. The Iran–Iraq war was 
another factor which deepened the rift, particularly among Arabs. The war emphasized 
nationalist goals, in the sense of ‘Persians against Arabs.’  
In the meantime, Iran understood the limits of expansionist policies because of the latent 
hostility of Sunni Arab states for religious reasons and the psychological barrier of Arab versus 
Persian nationalism. Nevertheless, Iran supplemented a rational and pragmatic foreign policy 
pre-revolution with more ideologically driven policies. Iran chose to support indigenous Shiite 
movements in other states to amplify its influence in the region. Due to Iran’s dominant states in 
the Shiite world, and because it is religiously well-institutionalized and organized, Iran sees itself 
as the natural leader of the Shiites. Although rational and pragmatic policies are deployed by the 
ruling elites, the presumption of Shiite Islamic leadership and deeply held anti-Western, anti-US 
and anti-Israel beliefs will continue to have a significant impact on Iranian foreign policy. 
                                                




CONCEPTUALIZING IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY 
GOALS 
Introduction  
Hill defines foreign policy as a “purposive action with the view towards promoting the 
interests of a single political community or state.”1  This “purposive action” may be a product of 
a state’s internal agenda, as well as a response to other actors’ actions in the external world. As 
stated by Hunter, there are two determinants of purposive action: internal and external. The 
interaction between state’s domestic needs and realities, and the features of the external 
environment within which they operate, determines the pattern of a state’s external behavior; to 
wit, the state’s foreign policy.2 
This chapter will discuss the characteristics and determinants of Iran’s foreign policy, as 
well as its foreign policy goals.  To this end, the chapter is divided into the following sections; 
-­‐ Foreign policy decision-making: key individuals and bodies. This section 
introduces key individuals and bodies in charge of Iran’s foreign policy making, 
including their functions, responsibilities, and limits.      
-­‐ Evolution of Iranian foreign policy and the emergence of factions.  This section 
deals with the evolution of Iran’s foreign policy since the revolution and the 
factions that have emerged under the rule of two supreme leaders (Khomeini 
(1980-1989) and Khamenei (1989-present)), and four presidents (Rafsanjani 
                                                
1 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Houndmills England  ; New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2003), 285. 
2 Shireen Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era  : Resisting the New International Order (Santa 
Barbara, Calif: Praeger, 2010), 17. 
59 
 
(1989-1997), Khatami (1997-2005), Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), and Rouhani 
(2013-present)). In this evolution, the roles of domestic, regional and global 
improvements, the roles of factions and the limits of ideology and pragmatism are 
examined. The Khomeini period is addressed as a whole period under Khomeini’s 
rule without inclusion of presidential periods during his rule because of 
Khomeini’s control of decision-making. 
-­‐ The characteristics of Iranian foreign policy and its foreign policy goals.  This 
final section describes the characteristics of Iran’s foreign policy and foreign 
policy goals.    
Foreign Policy Decision-Making and Key Individuals and Bodies in Charge of Foreign 
Policy 
Iranian foreign policy decision-making is complex and multi-faceted due to the dual 
structure of the state’s post-revolutionary political system. In addition to theocratic and 
republican features of the political system, the state’s formal and informal power centers create 
different and often conflicting goals in foreign policy making. The most important components 
of the formal power structure are the Supreme Leader, the President, the Foreign Minister, the 
Council of the Guardian, the Expediency Council, The Supreme National Security Council 
(SNSC), and the Parliament, which are responsible for Iranian foreign policy and impact 
decision-making. 
The Supreme Leader is constitutionally the ‘guardian jurist’ and ‘leader of the Islamic 
revolution,’ and ranks above the state’s President. Posch states that the Bureau of the Supreme 
Leader is regarded as the country’s real power center. The office is an active at all levels of 
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policy-making, including foreign policy.3 The Supreme Leader approves or disapproves foreign 
policy initiatives and has the final say in foreign policy decision-making. 
Although the Supreme Leader is the most prominent and powerful political figure in Iran, 
foreign policy-making also depends on the President. Particularly after 1989, on the basis of the 
constitution, the President and his office have gained an increased role in foreign policy making.4 
According to Article 125 of the Iranian constitution, “[t]he President or his legal representative 
has the authority to sign treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements concluded by the Iranian 
government with other governments, as well as agreements pertaining to international 
organizations, after obtaining the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly.”5  The only 
limitation is that the President must be in agreement with the Supreme Leader. This 
constitutional subordination to the Supreme Leader is the most serious structural impediment 
constraining the Iranian President’s powers.6  
The foreign minister is responsible for the conduct of Iran’s foreign policy and 
implementing decisions approved by the Supreme Leader, but has a very limited role in 
determining policies and strategies. 
The parliament (the Majlis) does not interfere in the executive’s foreign policy decision-
making. However, the parliament discusses foreign policies and deputies individually can make 
public statements on policies. Additionally, in order to sign international agreements, treaties, 
                                                
3 Walter Posch, The Third World, Global Islam and Pragmatism: The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy (Stiftung 
Wiss. und Politik, 2013), 11. 
4 Eva Patricia Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran  : A Study on the Iranian Political Elite from Khomeini 
to Ahmadinejad / by Eva Patricia Rakel., International Comparative Social Studies  ; v. 18 (Leiden  ; Boston: Brill, 
2009), 147. 
5 “The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran,” accessed August 17, 2015, 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution_ch09.php. 
6 Mahmood Monshipouri and Manochehr Dorraj, “Iran’s Foreign Policy: A Shifting Strategic Landscape,” Middle 
East Policy 20, no. 4 (2013): 134. 
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memoranda of understanding, etc., the government needs the approval of the Majlis.7  
The President and the parliament are constrained by the Guardian Council. The Guardian 
Council, which examines all laws passed by the parliament, is one of the most powerful bodies 
within the Iranian political structure. The council has the power to veto laws if it considers them 
inconsistent with the constitution and Islamic law.8 Thus, its role in foreign policy making is to 
ensure that foreign policy decisions are compatible with the constitution and Islamic law. Taking 
into account that half of the council’s members are appointed by the Supreme Leader, it is clear 
that the Supreme Leader’s influence on decision-making is not limited merely to 
‘approve/disapprove’ authorization. 
The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is another of the key institutions in 
which foreign policy is debated. Institutionally, the SNSC is responsible for coordinating, 
facilitating and streamlining activities on security and foreign policy.9 Article 176 of Iran’s 
Constitution gives emphasis to the following responsibilities: “safeguarding the national interests 
and preserving the Islamic Revolution, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty.”10 The 
SNSC is chaired by the President and includes the most important representatives of the military 
(the General Staff, the IRGC) and the secret service, the foreign minister, representatives of the 
Supreme Leader, and other ministers as required.11 12 The SNSC deals with highly sensitive 
security issues such as US-Iran relations and the nuclear dossier.  
Another body in charge of foreign policy making decision-making is the Expediency 
Council. It was set up in 1988 by Ayatollah Khomeini because of stalemates between Parliament 
                                                
7 Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran, 2009, 147. 
8 Buchta, Who Rules Iran?, 59. 
9 Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era, 30. 
10 “The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran.” 
11 Ibid. 
12 Posch, The Third World, Global Islam and Pragmatism, 9. 
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and the Guardian Council. It was charged with mediating disputes between the two bodies. In 
April 1989, Khomeini ordered the revision of the 1979 Constitution to address the issues of 
leadership and constitutional recognition of the new Expediency Council.13  
The Expediency Council is charged with the role of “determin[ing] expediency in cases 
in which there is a conflict between parliamentary legislation and the opinion of the Guardian 
Council.” The Expediency Council also responsible for “determining the general policies of the 
System” and “solving the challenges of the country,” as well as consulting on important issues 
that “are referred to it by the Leader” and “in consideration of the complete set of regulations 
outlined in the Constitution” as a “supreme consultative council for the Leadership of the System 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”14  
As an advisory body to the Supreme Leader and a mediator between the Guardian 
Council and the Parliament, the Expediency Council “designs the Grand Strategy for the Iranian 
regime, and proposes guidelines for foreign policy.”15  
Foreign policy in Iran is not formulated and conducted only by the President, his cabinet, 
and the Foreign Ministry. As stated by Warnaar, foreign policy “is a product of negotiation and 
competition among various powerful individuals and institutions.”16 At present, at least seven 
power centers can be identified as having input on foreign policy decision-making; the Supreme 
Leader, the President, the Foreign Minister, the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, the 
SNSC, and the Parliament. While the most influential of these is the Supreme Leader (who must 
approve any final foreign policy decision), the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and 
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the Expediency Council also have significant influence on the basic direction of Iran's foreign 
policy and key foreign policy issues.  
In this complex structure of foreign policy decision-making, the Supreme Leader 
occupies a central role. Posch explains the foreign policy decision-making mechanism as 
follows:   
-­‐ Foreign policy analysis and the real opinion-forming process take place within the 
formal institutions.  
-­‐ The decision-making process takes place formally (institutions) and informally 
(political networks) within the political elites, to which not only active but also 
former politicians belong, as do “non-political” clerics.  
-­‐ The final decision is formulated by the Supreme Leader as a consensus reached 
by the political elite.17  
As Posch states, in addition to the formal power structure, there are also informal power 
centers that impact the direction of Iran's foreign policy. In Iran’s political system, there are no 
conventional legal political parties. It is instead a system in which different political factions of 
the political elite represent different approaches to foreign policy. 
The elaborate system of checks and balances, the inter-agency and factional rivalries, the 
veto power of the Supreme Leader, and ideological precepts make foreign policy decision-
making inherently complicated and difficult to execute.18 19 
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Evolution of Iranian Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Factions  
Since the mid-1980s, the Iranian political elite has gradually factionalized. Different 
approaches to policy-making and rivalries for power have created these factions. Saikal 
maintains that by 1987, three very loosely bonded factions, representing different approaches to 
policies, economics, sociocultural issues, and foreign relations, emerged on the scene: 
conservative, reformist and pragmatist.20 As noted by Smith, this degree of political diversity did 
not disturb Khomeini, so long as the factions remained loyal to him and to certain fundamental 
principles of revolutionary Iran. Even after the death of Khomeini, the factions refrained from 
violating these principles. They have been aware that “their survival depended on the continuity 
of the regime and that their differences in approach to Iran’s Islamic transformation had to take 
secondary importance.”21 Thus, while there is a consensus on these principles among the 
factions, their differences stem from how they view how the principles should be put into 
practice. 
The factions have emerged and transformed under the rule of two Supreme Leaders, 
Khomeini (1980-1989) and Khamenei (1989-present), and four presidents; Rafsanjani (1989-
1997), Khatami (1997-2005), Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), and Rouhani (2013-present). Three 
factions have emerged on the scene. Factionalism in Iranian politics and its effects on policy-
making is addressed under the leadership periods in the remaining section.  
 Khomeini Period  
Walt argues that revolutionary foreign policy is primarily “a result of the ideology of the 
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revolutionary movement.”22 Without a doubt, the 1979 Iranian Constitution reflects the 
worldview of its founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This worldview is responsible for the 
revolutionary aspects of the state ideology and subsequently the revolutionary foreign policy. 
Following the revolution, due to an ideology that is a blend of Persian nationalism and 
Khomeini’s interpretation of Shiism, Iranian foreign policy moved from a status quo pro-western 
ideology to an ideologically and revolutionary anti-western one. The key revolutionary aspects 
that have shaped Iran’s foreign policy can be traced through the following statements in the 
constitution; 
-­‐ Framing the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, 
-­‐ The expansion and strengthening of Islamic brotherhood and public cooperation 
among all the people, 
-­‐ The complete elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign influence, 
-­‐ All Muslims form a single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran has the duty of formulating its general policies with a view to cultivating the 
friendship and unity of all Muslim peoples, 
-­‐ Rejection of all forms of domination,  
-­‐ The preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its 
territorial integrity,  
-­‐ The defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the 
hegemonic superpowers,  
-­‐ The maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States, 
-­‐ Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural resources, 
                                                




economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of national life, 
is forbidden, 
-­‐ The attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of justice and truth to be the 
right of all people of the world. Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from 
all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just 
struggles of the mustad'afun (oppressed) against the mustakbirun (oppressors) in 
every corner of the globe.23  
In the light of these key aspects of the constitution, the key characteristics of Iran’s 
revolutionary foreign policy can be listed briefly as follows: rejection of all forms of domination, 
preservation of independence, non-alignment, equality, resistance, anti-imperialism, nationalism, 
self-sufficiency, establishment of relations with peace-seeking states, Islamic unity and 
responsibility for other Muslim and ‘oppressed’ nations.  
In the early days of the Islamic Revolution, these characteristics were crystallized as two 
main policies; ‘Neither East nor West’ and the ‘Export of the Revolution.’ The former policy did 
not mean only being an independent foreign policy-maker, but also non-involvement in the 
expensive military/security struggle between the East and the West and the improvement of 
relationships with Muslim and non-Muslim regional neighbors.24 Thus, Iran positioned itself in 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) where it could pursue these post-revolutionary goals.  
However, several unpredictable post-Revolution events deeply impacted the 
implementation of the aforementioned policies; namely, the American hostage crisis, the Iran–
Iraq war, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As a result of these events, Iran’s relations with 
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the United States and the West has become a defining paradigm of Iranian foreign policy. 25  
The US/West’s attitudes during Iran–Iraq war, including the West’s “closed eyes” to 
Iraq’s chemical weapon usage, the US’s attacks on Iranian oil rigs in the Persian Gulf in 1987, 
and the shooting down of an Iranian civilian commercial airliner in 1988, created a measure of 
distrust and anger in Iran toward the United States and the West that has never dissipated. 
Furthermore, the Cold War conditions and ‘Neither East nor West’ policy totally isolated Iran at 
the regional and global level.  
Likewise, the policy of the ‘Export of the Islamic Revolution’ failed too. The revolution 
initially created enthusiasm among Muslim nations, but after a time the call for Islamic upheaval 
did not resonate with the Muslim world.  Rakel argues that there are two main reasons for the 
failure:  
(1) The mainly Sunni populations in the Persian Gulf states had no interest in 
following the Iranian Shi’ite Islamic revolution; 
(2) Iran’s interest in overthrowing other governments declined, due to its own 
problems, such as the war with Iraq and the domestic economic crisis.26  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Sunni–Shiite divide is not simply due to a 
different interpretation of Islam.  There also is a deep rift in mutual acceptance between Sunnis 
and Shiites. This divide deepened as a result of Iran’s ambition to spread its revolution into 
Muslim states and its assertion of Muslims unity under its own leadership.  The commencement 
of the Iran–Iraq war in 1980,which created a sense of ‘Persians against Arabs,’ further deepened 
the split. These policies and events have fueled sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites, 
creating a hostile environment for Iran and increasing its isolation.   
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In the meantime, Khomeini and the ruling elite realized the impracticability of these 
expansionist and ideological policies. These political failures, combined with economic 
challenges, gradually pushed Iran to adopt a more pragmatist approach in foreign policy making.  
According to Ehteshami, there were two main political factions during the first decade of 
the revolution: the Conservative faction and the Radical Left.27 With Khomeini’s elimination of 
the secular and liberal Islamic social forces from power, the Radical left faction became 
dominant just after the revolution. It held the view of a very strict isolationist policy towards the 
West, a dogmatic policy based on state-controlled and egalitarian economic policy and export of 
the Revolution.28  
In the mid-1980s, a more pragmatic domestic and foreign policy orientation gradually 
emerged because of the pressure of economic strain, the collapse in oil prices, the question of 
whether the revolution could still be exported by Iran without conflict, and harsh conditions of 
the war with Iraq. Therefore, as stated by Sadri “from 1985 to the death of Khomeini in 1989, the 
Islamic Republic held more talks with both the East and the West and began to increase 
economic relations without compromising its overall commitment to self-reliance and 
determination.”29  
The transition from ideologically driven foreign policy to pragmatism can be exemplified 
in the case of Iran’s arms deal with the United States and recognition of UN Resolution 598 
in1988 (calling for a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq). As noted by Ramazani, the secret 
purchase of arms from the United States and Israel was the most striking example of pragmatism 
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trumping ideology in Iran's foreign policy during Khomeini's lifetime.30 To defend Iran against 
Iraqi aggression and to meet Iran’s arms needs, Khomeini believed that a deal with even the ‘the 
Great Satan’ (the US) and ‘the lesser Satan’ (Israel) was advisable.31  
The realities of international politics, and the need for foreign capital and technical 
expertise to carry out economic reconstruction, convinced Khomeini to temper the ideological 
principles of the early days of the Islamic Republic, which were mainly isolationist, 
confrontational, and influenced by his own interpretation of Shiite doctrine.  
The end of the costly Iran–Iraq war, the death of Khomeini, the collapse of the bipolar 
international system, and the failure of expansionist policies pushed Iran to reevaluate its 
domestic and foreign policy orientation. Pragmatists and reformists’ measures were proposed 
against revolutionary policies in order to enhance domestic and regional stability and to integrate 
Iran into the international system. However, anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism and the 
presumption of leadership in Muslim world (at least in rhetoric) have remained important pillars 
of Iranian state ideology as a heritage of the first decade of the revolution.  
 Khamenei Period 
After Khomeini’s death, the Assembly of Experts appointed the Supreme Leader Ali 
Khamenei, who played an important role in the Revolution and served as the president for two 
successive terms from 1981 to 1989.32  
Khamenei is not as charismatic and powerful as Ayatollah Khomeini, but has substantial 
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influence in the government. Constitutionally, his power is undebatable, and the dominance of 
the Supreme Leader in Iranian politics has continued. He continues to control important 
institutions such as the courts, military, and media by appointing the heads of the judiciary, state 
radio and television, the regular armed forces and the IRGC. Moreover, he is still very influential 
on the Guardian Council, which has authority over parliamentary decisions and the selection of 
electoral candidates. These constitutional powers make the power of the Supreme Leader 
unchallengeable, whomever is appointed to this position. 
Since becoming the Supreme Leader, Khamenei has tended to follow Khomeini’s 
principles instead of initiating his own. While he has been trying to balance ideology and the 
realities of international politics, he has avoided both confrontation and accommodation with the 
West in general.  
When he was president, Khamenei launched an ‘open door’ policy in 1984 and stated, 
“Iran seeks to have rational, sound and healthy relations with all countries.”33 Khamenei’s 
primary criteria for good relations were reciprocity and mutual respect. As stated by Ganji, 
without any doubt he is quite rational; however his deeply rooted views and suspicion of the 
US’s intentions toward the Islamic Republic have been an obstacle to any serious improvement 
in the relationship between Iran and West, particularly with the United States.34  
Despite Khamenei’s rooted anti–Western and anti-imperial views, pragmatist approaches 
have been employed during his Supreme Leadership. In order to achieve foreign policy goals, 
this was inevitable. Accordingly, Islamic ideology has become less significant in policy-making.  
Khamenei’s lack of authority has affected domestic political improvements as well as 
foreign policymaking. He was not able to suppress different factional approaches and impose 
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consensus. Thus, Khamenei followed Khomeini's tendency to seek conciliation among factions. 
Particularly with the election of Khatami, his reformist domestic and foreign policies during his 
presidency were seen as threats to the ideological basis of the regime by the Supreme Leader and 
conservatives. This concern was doubled with regional developments. Khatami period 
developments will be addressed broadly in the following section.   
Rafsanjani Period 
In 1989, Hashemi Rafsanjani won the presidential election and became the first President 
of Khamenei’s era. Following the death of Khomeini, Rafsanjani has been one of the most 
influential actors in Iranian politics. The 1989 amendment of the Iranian constitution that gave 
the President more decision–making power and made him an important actor in setting the 
direction of Iranian foreign policy.  
President Rafsanjani abandoned Khomeini’s foreign policy and its adherence to 
isolationism. According to Soltani and Amiri, Rafsanjani’s foreign policy had two pillars:  
-­‐ Solving economic problems that the Iran-Iraq war had caused. 
-­‐ Improving Iran’s relations with other countries.35  
These two pillars were interconnected. The reconstruction of Iran’s economy necessitated 
improving Iran relations with other countries in order to get more foreign investments to develop 
the Iranian economy. To balance the traditional principles of Iran and the necessities and realities 
of international politics, he followed a pragmatist policy.  
Therefore, during his presidency, Rafsanjani attempted to improve Iran’s relationship 
with European countries that had two permanent members on the UN Security Council. He 
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aimed to make Iran’s economy open to European countries. He also tried to improve hostile 
relations with Sunni Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the 
smaller Gulf monarchies. Moreover, Iran expanded relations with Russia, as well as the newly 
independent republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus after the fall of Soviet Union. Ramazani 
states that “with no ideological baggage he emphasized Iran’s common interests in culture, 
economic development and trade with these states.”36 Additionally he moderated pressures on 
Iranian society in domestic politics. All these policies have been seen as the constructive 
improvements by West.37  
In general, it can be said that Iran’s foreign policy under Rafsanjani was based on 
pragmatic approaches that took into account geopolitical necessities and Iran’s economic and 
socio-cultural needs.  
During Rafsanjani presidency, as Rakel states, a power struggle existed between three 
factions, the Conservative faction, the Radical left faction, and the Pragmatist faction that had 
parted from the Conservative faction. In time, the Radical Left faction was eliminated from 
power and the rivalry remained only between the Conservative and the Pragmatist factions. The 
Conservative faction accepted liberal economic measures, but opposed Rafsanjani’s pragmatic 
foreign policy and liberal approaches on socio-economic issues.38 Liberal socio-economic 
measures and a pragmatic foreign policy did not cause much concern for Khamenei; instead he 
took a mediator role between the factions. 
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In the May 1997 elections, Mohammad Khatami was elected President of the Islamic 
Republic. He kept Rafsanjani’s pragmatist foreign policy approach and focused more on 
domestic issues. Khatami, as the leading actor of the Reformist faction, attempted to avoid past 
ideological priorities. Instead he tried to improve basic principles of a democratic political 
system, such as freedom of speech, the rule of law, civil society and pluralism.39 Needless to say, 
his reformist agenda that advocated these democratic values was “an unprecedented bid for 
reintegration of the Iranian society into the modern international system.”40 In Ramazani’s words 
“democracy at home and peace abroad were two sides of the same coin.”41  
In addition to political reforms in domestic affairs, Khatami’s presidency inaugurated 
important changes in Iranian foreign policy. The post-Soviet and post-Iran–Iraq war environment 
was the main reason for this policy reorientation. Afghanistan and Pakistan were in chaos and 
challenged by Wahhabist religious fanaticism.  The newly independent states of Central Asia and 
the Caucasus were trying to overcome weak social, political and economic conditions. Iraq was 
suffering from sectarian and ethnic tensions. There were very hostile relations with pro-
American Sunni regimes.42 Last and most importantly, there was the growing US presence in the 
region.   
To minimize uncertainties in this chaotic environment, Khatami promoted a strategy for 
improving Iran’s regional and international relations. According to Ramazani, this strategy 
consisted of three general components, “decontainment, deterrence, and détente.” In Ramazani’s 
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Decontainment aims at circumventing the American policy of isolating Iran 
economically, diplomatically, and militarily across the world. Deterrence aims at 
sufficient military capability to deter any other act of aggression such as Iraq’s 
against Iran, especially in its now even more dangerous neighborhood,” to use 
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright’s words. India, Israel, and Pakistan are three 
nuclear powers in the vicinity of Iran. And detente aims not only at assisting the other 
two goals of Iranian foreign policy but also at overcoming the deepening pains of 
what President Khatami calls Iran’s ‘sick economy.’43  
On the basis of this strategy, Khatami tried to behave less ideologically and promote 
relations with European countries, the stability of the region, and active participation in 
international organizations.  
According to Soltani and Amiri “[d]etente policy caused European countries to change 
their policy towards Iran; they tried to convince the United States to change its offensive policy. 
Changing European attitudes toward Iran strengthened Iran’s position and power in the region… 
.”44  Khatami’s government also initiated additional efforts to improve relations with the US. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, within hours after the attacks by al-Qaeda extremists, Khatami 
condemned the attack. As noted by Ramazani “Khamenei was the first cleric in the Muslim 
world to call for ‘holy war’ (jihad) against terrorism as a ‘global scourge,’ and many Iranians 
held candlelight vigils for the American victims of terrorism.”45 The Khatami government 
cooperated with the US against the Taliban regime, which had harbored the anti-American al-
Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan. Relations between the United States and Iran seemed to be 
warming up. However, following President Bush’s 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech in which “the 
U.S. charges Iran with sponsoring terrorism, pursuing weapons of mass destruction, exerting a 
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destabilizing influence in western Afghanistan, and possibly harboring Al Qaeda fugitives,”46 
Khatami’s moderate domestic and international stance received its first major setback and 
opened a new era in Iran’s international relations. After the speech, US–Iran relations entered a 
long period of stalemate.47  
Until 2005, the end of Khatami’s second term, thanks to Khatami’s moderate domestic 
and international stance and despite the “Axis of Evil” speech, the Khatami administration 
skillfully managed to handle the nuclear issue by negotiating with European powers. No 
additional sanctions were imposed on Iran. These policies produced economic growth to some 
extent. 
From 1997 to 2005, during Khatami’s two terms, rivalries took place among the 
Conservative faction, the Pragmatist faction, and the Reformist faction. Khatami institutionalized 
the Reformist faction that had emerged out of the Radical Left faction when it had ceased to 
exist. During his presidency, his preferences were to improve basic principles of the democratic 
political system, reintegrate Iranian society into the modern international system, and 
subsequently to save Iran from economic crisis by focusing on the expansion of trade, co-
operative security measures, and diplomatic dialogue. While the Conservatives priorities were to 
preserve and even strengthen the regime, the Reformists were mainly concerned with improving 
the country’s position in the global economy and international system.48 
However, Khatami could not be successful in continuing his moderate domestic and 
foreign policy, and he lost the support of the Iranian population despite a modest economic 
recovery, mainly because of resistance to these reforms by the Conservative faction. The 
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Conservative faction feared losing its power and thought the regime was under threat and thus 
supported Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the presidential elections of 2005. 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
Since the end of the Iran–Iraq War, Iran’s foreign policy switched to one that prioritized 
cooperation and interaction with the West from one that was isolationist. Economic-political 
realities and civil society demands necessitated this transition during the Rafsanjani (1989-1997) 
and Khatami (1997-2005) administrations.  
When President Ahmadinejad won the presidential election in 2005, he introduced a new 
tone in Iranian foreign policy orientation that rejected the foreign policy based on cooperation 
and interaction with the West that was followed by the two previous Presidents of Iran. Instead, 
he adopted a foreign policy based on confrontation with the West and interaction with other 
states.  
His confrontationist approach aggressively criticized the status quo of the international 
system, the dominant powers of this system (the West, particularly Israel and the United States). 
According to him, during the Cold War international organizations were tools of the superpowers 
for shaping the international environment according to their interests, and the end of the Cold 
War did not change the nature of the international system.49, 50  
Ahmadinejad also tried to create a balance against the heavy US presence in the region, 
and its alliance with Israel. He tried to improve diplomatic and friendly relations with Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf countries, continued the strategic alliance with Syria, and supported 
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Hezbollah in Lebanon. To these ends, he intensely used anti-Israel rhetoric. 
In addition to neighboring states, he aimed for active interaction with Islamic and Third 
World countries.51 He tried to strengthen ties with Latin American and African states such as 
“Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, by signing important 
cooperation, commercial and strategic contracts.”52  
Furthermore, Iran joined as an observer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), which aims to promote regional intergovernmental security. The goal of this policy was 
to improve closer ties with major countries like China and Russia, which are two permanent 
members of the UN Security Council. Iran’s involvement in the SCO, and subsequently 
improving good political and economic relations with China and Russia, empowered it in the UN 
and helped it to overcome the challenges confronting Iran resulting from Western-imposed 
economic sanctions.53  
During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, relations with Israel and debates on Iran’s nuclear 
program became prevailing topics. These two issues also shaped relations with the US. Needless 
to say, Israel has been viewed as an enemy of Iran since the Islamic Revolution; however, 
Ahmadinejad increased tensions radically and aggressively. He officially denied the Holocaust 
and announced “the plan of wiping Israel off from the map.” He criticized the restrictions placed 
on Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and declared that Iran would continue its nuclear 
programs.54  
The US’s setbacks in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the emergence of strong world 
criticisms of the US invasion of Iraq strengthened the Iranian regional position. After the 2005 
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election, the rise of pro-Iranian Shiites to power in Iraq paved the way for gaining regional 
dominance.  
During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran’s foreign policy resembled the policies of the 
Revolution’s early years. He seemed to be “a hardliner á la Khomeini and used a very hostile 
tone, especially against the US and Europe, and also Israel.”55 Ahmadinejad adopted a more 
confrontational, assertive and active foreign policy in order for Iran to become a regional 
hegemon. The IRGC was a very influential actor in this strategy. The IRGC’s role in these 
developments was indisputably important and undeniable.    
However, this new strategy not only deepened hostile relations with the US and Israel but 
also provoked Sunni-Arab states who were concerned about Ahmadinejad’s nuclear ambitions 
and support for Shiite groups.   
With Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the faction of Neo-Conservatives came to the power.56 
Ahmadinejad presented himself as the true follower of Khomeini and revitalized the conservative 
faction in a new form. During the past four periods under the leaderships of Rafsanjani and 
Khatami (who were the heads of the Pragmatist and Reformist factions), the conservatives’ 
influence waned.  However, for the first time since Khomeini’s death, the Neo-Conservatives –
the new form of the conservative faction– seized power. According to Saikal, by “claiming that 
the United States and its allies, especially Israel, were determined to destroy the Islamic regime,” 
Ahmadinejad tried to build Iran’s military and nuclear power and maintain support for Iran’s 
partners, including Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and proxies in Iraq.57  
Despite his confrontational and aggressive foreign policy populism, rising inflation and 
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unemployment, UN sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program, discontent with the regime’s tight 
rule, and Khamenei’s turning a “blind eye” to Ahmadinejad’s policies, resulted in criticisms of 
Ahmadinejad by the Pragmatist and Reformist factions. Saikal argues that “as his factional 
opponents intensified their criticism, Ahmadinejad adopted a more authoritarian attitude, 
pursuing more populist measures and treating his critics with disdain.”58  
Rouhani Period 
Ahmadinejad’s chronic combative rhetoric with the West, the government’s increasing 
pressures on society and the erosion of basic rights and freedoms, Iran’s ailing economy caused 
by the imposition of sanctions by the West and the government’s inability to manage the 
economy effectively resulted in bitterness and unhappiness among the Iranian people. Thus, 
public discontent prepared the way for Rouhani’s victory in the 2013 election. According to 
Monshipouri;  
Rouhani’s victory in Iran’s 2013 presidential election is a clear protest vote against 
his predecessor’s management of the country’s relations with the Western world. 
Although Rouhani’s support for broader social freedoms, as well as his advocacy for 
women’s rights, rendered him a favorite candidate for change, undoubtedly economic 
insecurity – caused by the imposition of sanctions by the Western world in reaction to 
Iran’s nuclear program – was a key factor in his victory.59  
Rouhani won 51 percent of all the votes cast in the first round against five conservative 
rivals.60 His election was a reaffirmation of the demand for a more moderate and sensible course 
in both domestic and foreign policy. Rouhani embraced reformist rhetoric during his campaign 
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as “[h]e questioned the necessity of the expanding security state and the constant oversight of 
student and civil society associations by the security agencies. He spoke of the need for greater 
freedom of press and speech and devoted attention to women’s rights issues.”61  
Since Hassan Rouhani came to power in summer 2013, Iranian foreign policy has 
undergone a significant shift. Significant progress on nuclear talks and a noticeable detente with 
the West and the region has been observed so far. 
According to Zarif, the Foreign Minister of Rouhani administration, the new foreign 
policy of Iran can be described as follows: 
Rouhani’s foreign policy platform was based on a principled, sober, and wise critique 
of the conduct of foreign relations during the preceding eight years under the previous 
administration. Rouhani promised to remedy the unacceptable state of affairs through 
a major overhaul of the country’s foreign policy. The changes he proposed 
demonstrated a realistic understanding of the contemporary international order, the 
current external challenges facing the Islamic Republic, and what it will take to 
restore Iran’s relations with the world to a state of normalcy. Rouhani also called for a 
discourse of ‘prudent moderation.’ This vision aims to move Iran away from 
confrontation and toward dialogue, constructive interaction, and understanding, all 
with an eye to safeguarding national security, elevating the stature of Iran, and 
achieving long-term comprehensive development. …. Prudent moderation is an 
approach based on realism, self-confidence, realistic idealism, and constructive 
engagement.62  
Even though Rouhani, as stated by Maloney, is “a blunt pragmatist with plenty of 
experience maneuvering within Iran’s theocratic system,”63 he seems more visible and active in 
policy making.  Nevertheless, it is still the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, who has the final word 
on important foreign policy decisions. 
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Factions and their Worldview 
 Conservatives 
According to Saikal, the conservatives advocated “a patriarchal Islamic government; 
consolidation of the revolution’s gains; preservation of a traditional style of life; promotion of 
self-sufficiency, with no dependence on the outside world; cultural purity; and social 
conformity.”64 Preservation of the current political system and consolidation of the revolution’s 
gains have been the primary objectives for the Conservatives. Conservatives have seen the West 
as the primary threat to their ideology and viewed it as antithetical to the West. They strictly 
reject what they perceive to be defining principles of Western culture: “materialism, secularism, 
immorality, and the separation of religion from politics”65 For the conservatives, their opposition 
the West has been at the core of their ideology. 
As the oldest and founding faction, the Conservative faction of the political elite has 
dominated the most influential positions in Iran’s political, the military, and the economic 
system.66 
Pragmatists 
As stated by Ramazani, pragmatism is the “opposite of principle,” whether it is religious, 
moral or ideological.67 In this sense, there is no absolute right and wrong, good and evil, in 
pragmatism. Worth is determined by desired practical consequences.   
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The pragmatist camp, which stood between the conservative and reformist factions, 
includes elitist groups organized around former President Hashemi Rafsanjani.68 While the 
Pragmatists were close to the Conservatives in their socio-cultural ideas, in contrast to the 
Conservatives, they believe in economic modernization from above, and favor technical and 
economic relations with the West, including the United States.6970 They do not have serious 
interest in the democratization of politics, and take hard-line positions on sensitive ideological 
issues such as Iran–US relations and the Arab–Israeli issue.71 In terms of foreign policy issues, 
they have a more moderate stance than the Conservative faction.   
 Reformists 
The reformist faction, which coalesced around Khatami, advocated “promotion of civil 
society, relaxation of political and social control, economic openness, cultural renaissance and 
more interaction with the outside world.”72 They emphasized the necessity of a pluralist and 
democratic Islamic political system. According to Khatami, reformists’ core political goal was to 
“introduce to the world the model of religious democracy.”73 Reformists have been “questioning 
the entire concept of Iran being in conflict with the West and demand a limit to religious 
authorities’ interference in political affairs.”74 However, these demands do not mean that 
reformists are liberals in the Western sense. According to Haas, reformists “are trying to find a 
balance between liberal values and the Islamist system that has existed in Iran since 1979,” and 
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“[t]he ideological distance dividing reformists from Western regimes, however, is much smaller 
than the ideological gap separating Iranian conservatives from these states.”75  
All in all, in terms of foreign policy, two main groups can be identified. The first group is 
the Conservatives who strictly follow Khomeini’s ideology and reject the concept of improving 
relations with the West. The second group, which comprises the Pragmatist and Reformist 
factions, has a pragmatic foreign policy approach. Instead of an absolutely ideologically driven 
foreign policy, this group advocates softening the radical tone, improving relations with the 
West, and integrating into the international system.    
The Limits of Ideology and Pragmatism 
Revolutionary governments in their early days have a strong tendency toward ideological 
approaches to domestic and foreign policy. Walt cites from North’s Structure and Change in 
Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981, p.53) that ideology serves "to energize groups to 
behave contrary to a simple, hedonistic individual calculus of costs and benefits . . . since neither 
maintenance of the existing order nor its overthrow is possible without such behavior."76  To this 
end, according to Walt, revolutionary ideologies tend to emphasize three key themes.  
-­‐ Revolutionary groups usually portray their opponents as intrinsically evil and 
incapable of meaningful reform.  
-­‐ Victory is inevitable. 
-­‐ Our Revolution has universal meaning.77  
We can observe each of these three themes in statements by Khomeini in the early 
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periods of the Iranian revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini used these themes to consolidate the 
revolution. The first theme was initially used against the Shah at the domestic level, and then the 
US and Israel became the next “evils” at the global and regional levels. 
In terms of foreign policy, the third theme was particularly constituted in one of two 
pillars of Khomeini’s policies, which were “Export of the Revolution” and “Neither East nor 
West.” 
Walt argues that “[i]n the extreme case, the ideology may go so far as to reject the nation-
state as a legitimate political unit and call for the eventual elimination of the state-system itself. 
… Khomeini's version of Shiite theology foresaw the eventual establishment of a global Muslim 
community (ummah) following the abolition of the ‘un-Islamic’ nation-state system.”78 The 
structure of the international system was perceived to be unjust, and needed to be replaced by a 
true Islamic order, which would be (by definition) just, fair and virtuous.79 Thus, the regime was 
founded on Khomeini’s version of Shiism, and the basis of the new state was ideological.  
With the second policy, “Neither East nor West”, the Regime challenged both 
superpowers of the Cold War period, the USSR, and the US. This policy did not mean only being 
an independent foreign policy maker, but also avoiding involvement in the expensive 
military/security struggle between the East and the West and improving relationships with 
Muslim and non-Muslim regional neighbors. 
Both policies were reflections of key aspects of the foreign policy rooted in the 
revolutionary Constitution. These key aspects of Iran’s revolutionary foreign policy can 
concisely be listed as follows: non-domination, independence, non-alignment, equality, 
resistance, anti-imperialism, nationalism, self-sufficiency, establishment of relations with peace-
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seeking states, Islamic unity and responsibility for other Muslim and “oppressed” nations. 
Independence has been the basic feature of foreign policy; it can be said that it has been an 
obsession to some extent. According to Moshirzadeh, Iranian ambition for independence is based 
on three major resources: “Iran’s glorious past; historical victimization by the invaders; and 
(semi)-colonial/imperial encounters”80 These motivations based on experiences throughout its 
history caused an overemphasizing of the characteristics of non-domination, anti-imperialism, 
self-sufficiency, and non-alignment in the early days of the revolution. However, while most of 
these aspects are shared by most states, overemphasizing them did not fit the realities of the 
outside world, particularly the aspects which originated from the ideological basis of the Regime. 
These overemphasized characteristics isolated Iran from the international system and blocked 
integration into it. 
In the meantime, Iran began to suffer from the results of these policies and understand 
their inapplicability. In the mid-1980s, a more pragmatic domestic and foreign policy orientation 
gradually emerged because of the pressures of economic strain, the question of whether the 
revolution could still be exported by Iran without conflict, and the harsh conditions of the war 
with Iraq.  
According to Ramazani, the secret purchase of arms from the United States and Israel 
was the most striking example of shifting to pragmatic policies over ideological influences in 
Iran's foreign policy during Khomeini's lifetime.81  
The following cases also illustrate how pragmatism has gradually become one of the 
basic characters of Iranian foreign policy: 
-­‐ Khomeini’s decision to end the war based on the UN Security Council’s cease-
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fire, Resolution 598, in 1988.  
-­‐ Iran’s cooperation with the United States to remove the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan and later to topple the Saddam regime in Iraq.  
-­‐ Iran’s condemnation of the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001. 
“Khamenei was the first cleric in the Muslim world to call for ‘holy war’ (jihad) 
against terrorism as a ‘global scourge,’ and many Iranians held candlelight vigils 
for the American victims of terrorism.”82  
-­‐ “Formally and publicly withdrawing Iran’s support for the fatwa on the author of 
the Satanic Verses.”83   
-­‐ “Iran’s mediation in the civil war between the Islamist opposition and the Russian 
backed government of Tajikistan.”84  
-­‐ The policy of neutrality in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia, a 
Christian state, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, an Islamic state with a Shi‘a 
majority.85  
-­‐ Iran’s disregard of the Chechen struggles against Russia. 
Sadjadpour’s following words also clearly shows the level of pragmatism: 
Though justice, Islamic solidarity, and independence are invoked to defend the 
Palestinian cause, the Chechen cause is studiously ignored for fear of antagonizing 
Russia. Muslim unity is invoked to support Hamas and Hizbollah, yet Iran supported 
Christian Armenia in its war against Shi’i Muslim Azerbaijan. Iran denounces the 
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United States for its ‘godlessness’ and lax social values, yet forms close alliances 
with socialist governments in Venezuela and Cuba.86 
Domestic pressures and geopolitical factors convinced Iranian leaders to balance their 
ideological and pragmatist approaches to foreign policy.  
In the adoption of pragmatism, domestic challenges, which mostly originated from 
economic conditions, were a motivating factor as well. In addition to the cost of an eight-year 
war, Iran’s ideologically international isolation affected the Iranian economy desperately. This 
situation deteriorated with decreasing oil prices.  According to Maloney; 
The costs were enormous: Productivity plummeted. Urban poverty doubled. Real per 
capita income dropped by 45 percent since the revolution. And price controls and 
strict rationing of basic consumer goods failed to prevent rampant inflation. 
Meanwhile, the factional battles over the economy polarized the political 
environment and eroded what was left of the private sector.87 
The deteriorating economy explains Khomeini’s acceptance of ceasefire Resolution 598 
in 1988 and the tempering of Khamenei’s ideological approach. Thus, the cease-fire and 
Khomeini's death in 1989 facilitated a major shift in Iran's domestic and foreign policies. 
Rafsanjani, as an influential actor of the post-Khomeini period, loudly emphasized the necessity 
of integration in the international system and the fundamental reorientation and liberalization of 
Iran's economy.88  
The death of Khomeini opened more room for pragmatist maneuvers not only for 
Rafsanjani but also for the following presidents.  As noted by Ramazani,  
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Rafsanjani did not hesitate to forego Islamic doctrines if it were practically necessary, 
Khatami struck relative balance between the two, and although Ahmadinejad has 
produced an image of recalcitrance, he has not been able to disregard the imperative 
of practical necessity, or, in other words, to ignore the institutional imperatives of 
complex domestic politics or the demands of the international constituency.89 
Besides domestic factors, geopolitical improvements also pushed Iranian leaders to revise 
the ideological basis of their strategic outlook. The following cases increased threat perceptions, 
as well as opportunities for Iran: 
-­‐ The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991, 
-­‐ The Kuwaiti crisis leading to the Gulf War and a larger US military presence in 
the region since 1990, 
-­‐ Overthrow of Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 1991, 
-­‐ The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. 
Iran readjusted its foreign policy according to this new world and regional order. While 
the increasing US presence in the region caused a great hesitation because of Iran’s conventional 
military weakness and potentially being the next target of the US, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam regimes also created an opportunity for 
expanding its sphere of influence.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran realized that outreach to the newly 
independent states situated to the north of Iran that have Shiite populations could minimize Iran’s 
political isolation. Additionally, the overthrow of Saddam and the Taliban regime by the US 
eliminated Iran’s two most immediate sworn enemies that confine its east and west borders. On 
the other hand, after the removal of these two regimes, because of the presence of the US 
military in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran felt like ‘a cat on a hot tin roof.’ Although Iran cooperated 
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with the US against the two regimes, Iranian policymakers felt concerned that their country 
would be the next target of the US for a regime change. 
Along these lines, regional changes and feeling vulnerable forced the Rafsanjani and 
Khatami administrations to adopt a coalition-making policy and conciliatory tone. Dehghani 
states that “in this period, Iran tried to find some friends in the international scene and develop its 
relations with other countries, particularly its neighbors, so that it could diminish its external 
threats.”90 Needless to say, economic recovery efforts were also a significant factor in improving 
relations with other countries. It meant “to slowly start getting back into international trade and 
the globalization world order.”91 During the Hashemi and Khatami Administrations, Khamenei 
did not oppose their policies, for the sake of national interest, internal stability, the recovery of 
Iran’s economy, and balancing external threats.   
Despite the “axis of evil” speech, Khatami did not end efforts to improve relations with 
the US.  However, a permanent conciliation between them could not be achieved.  For the US, 
the Hostage Crisis; for Iran, the US/West siding with Iraq during Iran–Iraq war, the US attacking 
Iranian oil rigs in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and shooting down an Iranian passenger plane in 
1988, the west’s closed eyes to Iraq’s chemical weapon usage, and lastly being labeled as a 
member of ‘axis of evil,’ were deeply rooted in the memories of both sides. Furthermore, U.S. 
relations with Israel has been one of the main obstacles to Iran-US rapprochement. 
With Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iranian foreign policy shifted to an aggressive tone. He 
condemned the policies of his predecessors. Although Ahmadinejad followed the same goals as 
his predecessors, he preferred a more radical, aggressive and an alternative approach. In alliance-
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making policy, he chose China and Russia in lieu of the West. He also tried to develop good 
relations with regional actors, as well as South American and African states, as an alternative 
strategy. During his presidency, relations with Israel and debates on Iran’s nuclear program 
became prevailing topics. He did not step back on the nuclear issues and the sponsorship of 
terrorism. These strategies were a reaction to increasing presence of the US in the region and 
regime change debates, and aimed to deter a possible Israel-US attack. He also tried to minimize 
Iran’s isolation through improving good relations with other states.  It was a way of bypassing 
the US hegemony. 
During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, his foreign policy orientation was mostly rational in 
its own right. Ahmadinejad’s confrontational, assertive and active foreign policy aimed to 
preserve Iran’s survival and security in the region and to increase Iran’s visibility at the 
international level. Ahmadinejad’s approach also deeply affected the domestic dynamics, which 
will be addressed broadly in the following chapters.  
Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy was more consistent with Khamenei’s approach, and in-
line with the conservative faction.  
Iran’s abandonment of its claim of be the leader of all Muslims as well as the 
abandonment of its policy of ‘Export of the Revolution’  Iran expanding its sphere of influence 
through intensifying its relations with Shiite groups, Syria, and Iraq.  After the withdrawal of US 
troops, the subsequent power vacuum that emerged in the region gave this opportunity to Iran 
during Ahmadinejad administration.  
The economic and social results of Ahmadinejad’s confrontational and assertive foreign 
policy were no longer sustainable. Thus, Rouhani won the 2013 election against five 
conservative rivals. Since Hassan Rouhani came to power, Iranian foreign policy has undergone 
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a significant shift. In the conduct of foreign relations, the Rouhani administration has adopted an 
approach of “prudent moderation” that is based on realism, self-confidence, realistic idealism, 
and constructive engagement.  Very significant progress has been made on nuclear talks, and 
there has been a noticeable detente with the West and the region. “On July 14, 2015, after 20 
months of negotiations, Iran and six states led by the United States reached a historic accord to 
significantly limit Tehran’s nuclear ability for more than a decade in return for lifting 
international oil and financial sanctions.”92    
Perhaps this recent improvement in relations can be viewed as the second most important 
example of Iran’s pragmatist policies (after the secret purchase of arms from the United States 
and Israel during Iran–Iraq war). Iran sat at the same table and reached a deal with the “Great 
Satan.” The Supreme Leader, Khamenei, justified this policy as follows:  
We do not negotiate with the U.S. about different global and regional issues, … We 
do not negotiate about bilateral issues. Sometimes, in some exceptional cases, like the 
nuclear case, and due to the expediency, we may negotiate.93 
Before Khomeini died, his supreme political position provided him with an opportunity 
to institutionalize “expediency” as the main operational principle guiding Iran’s domestic and 
foreign policy decision-making.  He ordered the establishment of 'The Expedience Council’ in 
1988 to operationalize the principle of expediency. This principle then has become a 
“justification for the often extreme means used by the regime to stay in power.”94 In this respect, 
according to the expediency principle, when an incompatibility arises, political considerations 
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take priority over religious precepts.  
Ghobadzadeh states that “Iran's ruling clergy opted to overlook religious precepts in 
favor of political considerations. … Regardless of different approaches, there has been a 
consensus regarding the two overarching categorizations: 'constant precepts' and 'variable 
precepts'. As the titles suggest, while the former refers to those precepts which are applicable to 
every place and era, the latter represents those which can be adjusted based on different 
circumstances. Khomeini bypassed this traditional categorization by authorizing the state to 
change each and every one of the religious precepts.”95 
In Khomeini’s conceptualization of expediency, we can see the limits, which are broader 
than what we think, in his own words;  
A government which is a branch of the Prophet Mohammad's absolute guardianship 
is one of the primary Islamic precepts and takes priority over all subsidiary precepts, 
even over praying, fasting and pilgrimage ... if necessary, [a] governor can close or 
destroy mosques ... the government can unilaterally terminate its religious agreements 
with the people if an agreement violates the expedience of the country or Islam. And 
[it] can abandon every commandment- both worshipping and non-worshipping 
precepts- which is against the expedience of Islam.96  
According to Khomeini’s expediency principle, even fundamental religious practices 
such as worshipping can be excluded. Thus, in contrast to common belief, gradually Iran’s 
radical ideology has been replaced with the pragmatism that is still “driven by the cold 
calculations of regime survival and national interests”97 as stated by Nasr. However, this does not 
mean that ideology has totally been disregarded.     
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In Lieu of a Conclusion: The Characteristics of Iranian Foreign Policy and Iran’s Foreign 
Policy Goals 
Iran’s foreign policy is generally labeled as ideological, irrational, unpredictable and 
offensive. However, if we take into account all the internal and external determinants of Iran’s 
foreign policy, it is difficult to justify these descriptions.  
Iran’s geographical and demographic realities, historical experiences (lessons learned), 
post-revolutionary ideology which is a blend of nationalism and Khomeini’s interpretation of 
Shiism (beliefs held), post-revolutionary political structure and decision-making process, 
national interests, immediate domestic needs, ruling elites’ priorities (ideological/individual), 
regional improvements and threat perceptions directly or indirectly impact Iran’s external actions 
and behavior. 
The Characteristics of Iranian Foreign Policy 
The characteristics of Iran's foreign policy can be summarized as followings: 
Regime Survival - The Sine Qua Non 
In either domestic or foreign policy decision-making, ensuring ‘regime survival’ is the 
top priority and supreme value the revolutionary Iran. This is the most important goal of 
Khomeini’s ideology and the political system created by Khomeini. As stated earlier, this 
priority was defined in Khomeini’s words as follows; “[a] government which is a branch of the 
Prophet Mohammad's absolute guardianship is one of the primary Islamic precepts and takes 
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priority over all subsidiary precepts, even over praying, fasting and pilgrimage...” 98  
In the words of Stanley, Khomeini’s formulation regarding the survival of the regime is 
as follows: “the regime is the embodiment of Shia Islam’s authority on Earth and to abandon it 
would be to abandon the will of God. Thus, the survival of this government and its form is an 
existential imperative as well as an expression of self-interest and Iranian nationalism.”99 
Pre-revolutionary experiences, as well as geopolitical and demographic circumstances, 
have been important in defining this priority. In short, some of those are set forth below:   
-­‐ Being an ethnic and religious minority in the Muslim world, 
-­‐ Powerful external threats (living under the shadow of stronger powers like the 
Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and the Russian Empire) 
-­‐ Colonial policies, and foreign interventions in domestic politics (the strategic 
rivalry and conflict in Iran between the British and Russian empires before World 
War I, the occupation of Iran during World War II, removing the democratically-
elected Iranian Prime Minister by a 1953 CIA/MI6-sponsored coup.)  
-­‐ Iran’s heterogeneous population. 
Among these, the overthrow of the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister by a 
1953 CIA/MI6-sponsored coup particularly affected the collective memory of Iranians.   
Furthermore, post-revolutionary domestic and external events (such as ethnic uprisings, 
coup attempts, factionalism, the Iran–Iraq War, the West’s support for Iraq during the war, 
relations with the US and Israel, the US’s increasing presence in the region and potential US 
military intervention, and regime change debates) fueled hypersensitivity about the survival of 
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the regime. Despite the institutionalization of the revolution to some extent after the mid -1980s, 
regime survival has always remained as the top priority of the ruling elites, and this priority has 
deeply influenced foreign and domestic policy making.  
Decision-Making, Key Individuals and Bodies in Charge of Foreign Policy Making 
Hunter states that “the character of states’ political systems and their decision-making 
apparatus and processes greatly influence their external behavior.”100  
The Iranian political system is designed to prevent any individual, institution, or faction 
from dominating the system, and to insulate the regime against internal and external threats. The 
task of the preservation of the regime is the raison d’être of the Supreme Leader, the IRGC, the 
Guardian Council, and the Expediency Council. The power of the Supreme Leader and these 
institutions’ influence on decision-making creates an elaborate system of checks and balances, 
which seeks to ensure the regime’s survival and to maintain the status quo.  
The establishment of the Expediency Council was a strong sign of Khomeini’s efforts to 
structure the system according to this priority. To prevent a potential political dispute that might 
harm the regime’s legitimacy, Khomeini established the Expediency Council in 1988 to mediate 
disputes between the Parliament and the Guardian Council.  
There are at least seven power centers in the system of checks and balances that have an 
influence on foreign policy making; the Supreme Leader, the President, the Foreign Minister, the 
Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), 
and the Parliament.  While the most influential of these is the Supreme Leader who confirms the 
final decisions on foreign policy issues, The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the 
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Expediency Council also have significant influence on the basic direction of Iran's foreign policy 
and key foreign policy issues. 
Factions 
Factions as a form of political diversity did not disturb Khomeini, so long as they 
remained loyal to him and to certain fundamental principles of his ideology. Khamenei followed 
this approach in the post-Khomeini period. However, after the election of Khatami in 1997, his 
reformist domestic and foreign policies were perceived as a threat to the regime, and viewed as 
potentially eroding ideological precepts of the revolution.  
The unprecedented character of the 2009 election and its immediate aftermath when 
hundreds of thousands of protestors occupied the streets to protest the manipulation of the 
election results, showed how factional disputes can destabilize the system, and ironically how the 
most powerful faction – which appeared to be the Conservatives- was the least institutionally 
organized of the factions.101 The consensus among the factions on the revolutionary precepts did 
not seem to the conservatives as sufficient protection for the regime’s survival. The factional 
disputes were viewed as a potential threat to the regime unless the conservatives were powerful 
enough as to control and shape domestic politics. Thus, this led to the conservatives’ efforts to 
concentrate their power. 
Currently, in terms of foreign policy, two main groups can be distinguished. The first 
group is the Conservatives who strictly follow Khomeini’s ideology. The second group, which 
comprises the Pragmatist and Reformist factions, has a more pragmatic foreign policy approach. 
Instead of absolute ideologically driven foreign policy, this group advocates to soften the radical 
                                                




tone, to improve the relations with the West, and integrate Iran into the international system. On 
the other hand, as the oldest faction, the Conservatives have dominated the most influential 
positions in the political structure. At the same time, this faction’s worldview overlaps with the 
Supreme Leader, Khamenei. Taken together, the Conservatives are still the most influential 
faction in decision-making.  
The Degree of Ideology and Pragmatism 
The 1979 Revolution completely transformed Iran’s foreign policy and international 
standing. In addition to Khomeini’s interpretation of Shiism, pre-revolutionary historical 
experiences, geopolitical and domestic circumstances had been influential in shaping ideological 
views. Iran’s new constitution was prepared in this framework of ‘lessons learned’ and ‘beliefs 
held.’  The new regime’s fundamental constitutional principles are crafted as follows: rejection 
of all forms of domination, preservation of independence, non-alignment, equality, resistance, 
anti-imperialism, nationalism, self-sufficiency, the establishment of relations with peace-seeker 
states, and Islamic unity and responsibility of other Muslim and ‘oppressed’ nations. In the early 
days of the Islamic Revolution, these principles were crystallized as two primary policies; 
‘Neither East nor West’ and ‘Export of the Revolution.’ However, these policies resulted in 
isolation from the international system and poor conflictual relations with the Sunni Arab states, 
which also subsequently increased Iran’s isolation. Domestic and international events, such as 
the high cost of the Iran–Iraq war, the death of Khomeini, the collapse of the bipolar 
international system, the need for foreign capital and technical expertise to carry out economic 
reconstruction, combined with the poor results of these policies, pushed Iran to reevaluate its 
foreign policy orientation. The regime abandoned some of its more unrealistic ideological 
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policies. Iranian rulers tried to find a middle path between realism and ideology. In the words of 
Ehteshami and Zweiri “[t]he tension between realism and idealism leads to pragmatism, which 
provides a middle path to explain foreign policies. It breaks down the realist-idealist dichotomy 
and emphasizes the necessity for states to respond to the realities of world politics.”102 
Pragmatists and reformists measures were proposed to enhance domestic and regional stability 
and to integrate Iran into the international system. Thus, Iran would enable to overcome the 
pressure of economic strain. 
Hunter states that “[i]n ideological systems, the fortunes of the leadership are based on 
the maintenance of the ideology, hence the need to justify all decisions in ideological terms.” 103 
In this sense, just before the death of Khomeini, the expediency principle was institutionalized to 
take the role of justification of decisions that contradicted ideology. With respect to this, there 
are many important decisions in which it can be observed that Iran adopted a more pragmatic and 
expediency-oriented approach to meet the requirements of the international system.  
In a nutshell, in contrast to common belief, Iran’s radical ideology gradually has been 
replaced with a pragmatism that is “driven by the cold calculations of regime survival and 
national interests”104 as stated by Nasr. However, it does not mean ideology has totally been 
disregarded. Anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism and the presumption of leadership in the Muslim 
world (at least in rhetoric) have remained as important pillars of Iranian state ideology and as a 
heritage of Khomeini. Along these lines, although ideology has ceased to play a dominant role in 
Iran's foreign policy making, ideological considerations and rhetoric still can be observed in both 
domestic and foreign policy-making to the extent they serve the regime’s interests.  
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Reactionary Foreign Policy 
Iranian foreign policy making has been sensitive and responsive to domestic, regional 
and global improvements. Economic challenges and social demands have always been influential 
in the country’s policy shifts. We can observe this in two of the regime’s most important 
decisions;  
-­‐ The acceptance of ceasefire resolution 598 in 1988 
-­‐ (due to the unbearable economic and social consequences of the Iran–Iraq war)  
-­‐ Nuclear agreement in 2015.  
-­‐ (The economic and social results of Ahmadinejad’s confrontational and assertive 
foreign policy prepared the victory of the reformist Rouhani, and subsequently the 
nuclear agreement.) 
In both decisions, economic strains and public reactions had an impact. In this sense, it 
can be said that as the cost of ideological policies became unbearable, changes become inevitable 
in Iran’s policy-making.    
Besides domestic factors, global and regional events such as a larger US military 
presence in the region since 1990, the overthrow of the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan in 2001, 
and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, showed how Iran’s 
foreign policy is reactionary. Iranian rulers have always been alert to regional developments. 
Besides taking measures against immediate threats, Iranian rulers are quick to take advantage of 
a power vacuum to enlarge the country’s sphere of influence.    
For instance, the West’s turning a “blind eye” to Iraq’s chemical weapon usage during 
the Iran–Iraq War pushed Iran to reevaluate its approach to WMD. Although Khomeini stated 
that WMD were immoral and that they violated the Koran’s prohibition against the use of 
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poison, he sought to ensure that Iran did not remain as vulnerable as it was during Iraq’s 
chemical attacks against Iran. The speaker of the Majlis and commander-in-chief of Iran’s 
military at that time, Rafsanjani, at the end of the war (October 1988) said that; 
Chemical and biological weapons are poor man’s atomic bombs and can easily be 
produced. We should at least consider them for our defense. Although the use of such 
weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that international laws are only scraps of 
paper. With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it 
was made very clear during the [Iran–Iraq] war that these weapons are very decisive. 
It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world are not very effective 
when war reaches a serious stage and the world does not respect its own resolutions 
and closes its eyes to the violations and all the aggressions which are committed on 
the battlefield. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive 
use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on you should 
make use of the opportunity and perform this task.105 
To sum up, Iran’s foreign policy is a product of many factors; revolutionary ideology, 
interagency and factional rivalry, ruler’s threat perceptions, national interests, regional and 
global improvements, and public opinion. Iranian leaders’ employment of balance-of-threat and 
balance-of-power calculations can be viewed as a reactionary foreign policy. While increasing 
US presence in the region caused great anxiety because of Iran’s conventional military weakness 
and potentially being the next target of the US; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam Regimes created the opportunity for expanding Iran’s 
sphere of influence. In reaction to these developments, Iran pursued alliance-making and 
deterrent measures including nuclear weapon and ballistic missiles program; on the other hand, 
Iran never neglected to take advantage a power vacuum to expand its sphere of influence through 
Shiite proxies.  
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 Implications for Iran’s Foreign Policy Goals 
As discussed above, the forces that impact Iran’s foreign policy-making can be identified 
as follows: the design of the political structure, key individuals and bodies in charge of foreign 
policy-making, the constitutional framework of foreign policy, core ideological principles, 
factions’ approaches to foreign affairs, and Iranian leaders’ statements and reactions to internal 
and external events based on threat perceptions and national interests. 
Based on all these internal and external determinants of Iran’s foreign policy making that 
are addressed earlier in this chapter, Iran’s foreign policy goals can be summarized as follows:   
-­‐ Regime survival, which is an indispensable goal of Iranian foreign policy,  
-­‐ State security and survival (the defense of Iranian territory against external 
threats), 
-­‐ Projecting power and becoming the dominant power in the region. 
Iran’s aspiration of being a regional hegemon is not a new phenomenon. Thaler states 
that “[t]he elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran perceive Iran as the natural, indispensable, and 
leading power of the Middle East, even of the Muslim world.”106 The strong sense of identity 
originates from its grand imperial past and civilization.  In pre and post-revolutionary periods, a 
combination of the strong sense of Shiite and Persian identity, the colonial policies and 
interventions of the Great Powers and feelings of victimization and insecurity provoked the 
Iranian quest to become a regional power. As officially outlined in Iran’s “Twenty-Year Vision 
Document,” by 2025, Iran aims to be the leading nation in the region as an economic and 
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THE IRGC’S EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTIVITIES: LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH AND 
SHIITE GROUPS IN POST-2003 OCCUPIED IRAQ 
Introduction 
Iran employs a number of different tools in attaining its foreign policy goals. Among 
them, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC- Pasdaran Enqelab-e-Islam) and Quds 
Force (IRGC-QF) occupy a crucial place. In the post-revolutionary era, the Iranian military is 
composed of two main segments: regular (conventional) forces and revolutionary forces. The 
latter actively took the roles of securing and consolidating the revolution at home, and achieving 
ideological and strategic goals abroad. The IRGC’s roots depended on the militias that actively 
supported the revolution and had unquestionable loyalty to Khomeini. Over time, the IRGC has 
been transformed into a type of regular military entity with a navy, ground forces, air force, 
headquarters, hierarchical structure and different levels of military training centers. Today, the 
IRGC is domestically an economic and political power and also has been Iran’s primary 
mechanism for extraterritorial activities which is very uncommon in terms of the usual ‘use of 
military force.’  
In this chapter, Iran’s use of the IRGC (including the IRGC-QF) in attaining its foreign 
policy goals will be addressed through two cases: its relations with Lebanese Hezbollah and 
Shiite groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq.  
By giving birth and with a wide scope of support ranging from finance, know-how, 
military logistics, ideological and military training, Iran’s ideological original motives regarding 
the Lebanese Hezbollah were replaced with strategic calculations over time. Despite the fact that 
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there is no geographical connection with Lebanon, Iran’s most successful foreign involvement 
has been with the Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran’s engagement with Lebanese Hezbollah functioned 
as a laboratory and provided crucial experiments, which were later used in post-2003 occupied 
Iraq.  
In both case studies, the focus will be on Iran’s motivations and desired strategic 
outcomes for these foreign engagements and the level and characteristics of IRGC’s 
involvements in them. Given this focus, this chapter is outlined as follows; 
-­‐ The Military in Post-Revolutionary Iran, the IRGC’s establishment, structure, and 
responsibilities, 
-­‐ Case-1: Lebanese Hezbollah, 
-­‐ Case-2: Shiite groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq.  
The Military in Revolutionary Iran 
Successful institutionalization of the Islamic Revolution has extended the life of the 
revolution up to the present. In this success, the up-to-bottom network in Khomeini's faction 
played a significant role. According to Ostovar, this network had three key components; “1) 
Ayatollah Khomeini as the leader and moral authority of the revolution; 2) the clerical leaders of 
the Islamic Republic Party; 3) the IRGC and other pro-Khomeini militias.”1  
One of the most significant and influential institutions that the revolution produced is the 
IRGC. The nucleus of the IRGC contains unorganized revolutionary committees (komitehs) 
which were formed by many of the Islamic militants around mosques to handle local security 
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and enforce their interpretation of Islamic law.2  
Despite the Imperial Army’s declaration of neutrality, Khomeini could not risk 
revolutionary success. Early days in the revolution, the immediate need to establish an 
alternative unified military power was due to several reasons;  
-­‐ Control of the streets and to ensure internal security during the revolutionary 
turmoil, 
-­‐ Distrust of leftist guerillas,  
-­‐ Fear of a U.S.-backed military coup conducted by the remaining members of the 
Shah’s army, counterweight to regular Imperial Armed Forces, 
-­‐ Potential competition between the multiple guards who were loyal to Khomeini 
and clerics would leave the revolutionary regime vulnerable to coup attempts, 
-­‐ To consolidate and improve the clerics’ power in the newly established regime 
and to advance the Khomeinist ideology in state and society. 3, 4, 5, 6  
To attain these goals, in May 1979, the IRGC was established by a decree from Khomeini 
as a primary instrument for promoting the goals of the Khomeini revolutionary regime.7 In 
Article 150 of the 1979 Constitution, the primary function of the IRGC is stated as ‘guarding the 
Revolution and its achievements.’8  
Alfoneh states that, according to the statute of the IRGC, which was ratified on April 25, 
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1979, and passed by the parliament with slight changes to the original on September 6, 1982, the 
goals of the IRGC were defined as follows; 
-­‐ Guarding the Islamic revolution in Iran,  
-­‐ Expanding the Revolution abroad according to the pure Islamic ideology and 
executing the will of the Islamic Republic,  
-­‐ Defending the country in the face of or during the presence of foreign occupiers 
within the country,  
-­‐ Cooperating with the government in police and security affairs, pursuit and arrest 
of counterrevolutionary elements at a time of weakness of without established 
police forces in order to counter armed counter-revolutionary currents,  
-­‐ Collecting intelligence,   
-­‐ Assisting liberation and justice-seeking movements of the oppressed,  
-­‐ Relief and rescue missions in the case of natural disasters.9 
The IRGC took an important role in consolidating the power of the newly-established 
regime, particularly in the revolution’s initial days. As stated by Buchta, the IRGC was the 
revolutionary clergy’s strongest weapon in suppressing the opposition and uprisings of separatist 
minorities such as Kurds, Beluchis, and Turkmen between 1979 and 1982.10  
In addition to its internal tasks, the IRGC was also responsible for exporting the 
revolution. According to Katzman, this task was different from the others. While internal 
activities were mostly reactive, this task was proactive. Katzman states that “[t]he Guard 
developed this function to implement Khomeini’s vision of a revived Islamic Ummah (unified 
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Islamic nation), headquartered in Tehran and led by Khomeini.”11 Thus, while the regular 
military is responsible for defending Iran’s borders, the IRGC was primarily an ideological-
military network, which could consolidate the new regime’s power inside and ideological 
ambitions outside. As stated by Eisenstadt, however, in practice, the distinctions between 
different responsibilities are not so clear-cut. Notably, the Iran–Iraq war caused them to blur; the 
regular military (Artesh), the IRGC and other paramilitary organizations fought side-by-side 
against Iraqi forces. 12  
In addition to the IRGC, two more paramilitary organizations were established just after 
the revolution; Basij (“Mobilization of the Oppressed” in Farsi) and the Law Enforcement Forces 
(LEF). Today, according to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the armed forces consist of 
three main components; 
-­‐ The regular military (Artesh);  
-­‐ The Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). 
-­‐ The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Forces (IRGC)–with its paramilitary Basij 
militia.  
The Artesh, and the IRGC, which also controls the Basij are headed by a joint 
headquarters. 
The establishment of the regular military dates back to the 1920s. Both Pahlavi leaders 
tried to create a European-style modern army. Especially after the 1953 coup d’état, with the 
arrival of vast numbers of US-military advisors, relations between the US and Iranian Army 
intensified. According to Buchta, before the 1979 revolution, more than 20,000 American 
                                                
11 Katzman, The Warriors of Islam, 95. 
12 Michael Eisenstadt, “The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment,” The Middle East 




military advisors were in charge of the Shah’s army, and the navy and the air force were 
equipped with advanced US-weaponry. 13 
Following the revolution, although the Imperial Army declared its ‘neutrality’ in a public 
statement,14 its close relationship with the US and the army’s association with the deposed Shah 
were regarded as a counterrevolutionary threat to the new regime by Khomeini and the clergy 
around him. After Khomeini took power, Buchta states that the structure of the army was 
unchanged; however, most of its generals and almost 17,000 officers were dismissed by 1986. 
Instead, lower-ranking soldiers and those with a background of religious and revolutionary 
militancy were appointed to influential posts. Trust was extremely important in the early period 
of the revolution. Satisfactory indoctrination of the army took fifteen years, until the clerical 
leadership gradually overcame their mistrust of the army.15 This indoctrination process was 
carried out by an organization named the Ideological-Political Directorate of the Armed Forces 
(IPD). The IPD integrated Khomeinist ideological propaganda into every level of military 
training. 16 
Up to now, the regular army had not posed any threat to the regime. Its focus has been on 
national security issues, weapons acquisition, training and military exercises.17 Today, the 
regular Army comprises roughly 350,000 men and possesses ground, air, and naval forces.18 The 
constitutional mission of Artesh, as for every conventional regular army, is to defend Iran’s 
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borders against external aggression.19   
The Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) is a kind of revolutionary police. It was established 
in 1990 by integrating three separate domestic security forces; the police, the gendarmerie (rural 
police) and the revolutionary committees.20 In the new organization, the regular Shah-trained 
police force was dismissed and those former committee members who were undoubtedly loyal to 
the regime were assigned to influential positions in the LEF. As stated by Buchta, official figure 
is not available regarding the number of LEF personnel, but it is estimated that roughly 100,000 
to 120,000 men play a crucial role in the maintenance of internal security.  21 
The Basij, the second most powerful paramilitary organization in Iran, was founded by a 
decree of Khomeini in November 1979, in which he ordered the establishment of an "Army of 
Twenty Million." 22 As a popular militia and reserve component for the Guards, the Basij was 
known for human wave attacks during the Iran–Iraq war. Basically, the Basij has had two 
responsibilities;  
1. Upholding security in major urban areas as the regime’s urban shock troops 
against the domestic enemies of the revolution.  
2. Providing a large pool of reservists during the Iran–Iraq war.23 
Today, the Basij is under the command of the IRGC and comprises approximately 90,000 
active armed men 24 and around a 1 million reserve force —most of whom have received some 
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military training or served at war fronts in the 1980s.25 
After the Iran–Iraq war, the demobilization of Basij members created a significant 
problem for the regime. Byman states that two policies were adopted to solve this problem; to 
use the Basij for nonmilitary national reconstruction work, and to use the Basij as the principle 
force responsible for upholding Islamic norms in society. Thus, with each passing year, the Basij 
became less of a military factor and lost its status as a third military pillar, which cannot be 
compared with the IRGC’s level of professionalism.26 
Compared with Artesh, at its inception, the IRGC was an unprofessional and relatively 
weak military force, numbering about 10,000. Its initial activities were restoring public order and 
supporting the new regime’s monopoly on power. 27 Over time, its power and size expanded 
significantly and has become one of the strongest security pillars of the Islamic Republic without 
losing its ideological zeal. Uprisings of separatist minorities and particularly Saddam’s invasion 
of Iran in 1980 forced the regime to transform the IRGC from an unprofessional irregular mass 
infantry force into proper military units. According to Byman, the war also forced the regime 
into expand the IRGC dramatically from 10,000 troops in 1980 to around 450,000 in 1987.28 
The professionalization of the IRGC continued during and after the Iran–Iraq war. In 
1982, an Operational Area Command and a joint Command Council were established, which 
created organizational contact between the commanders of the IRGC and their counterparts in 
the regular armed forces (Artesh).29 In 1985, the IRGC set up its naval and air force units in 
addition to its ground troops.30 It was put in charge of the surface-to-surface missile (SSM) force 
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and non-conventional activities.31 The IRGC also enjoyed representation and an influential voice 
in the Supreme Defense Council, the highest military decision-making body.32 Byman states that, 
as these reforms were enacted, not only were the professionalization and integration of the 
various elements of the IRGC  improved, but joint capabilities between the IRGC and the Artesh 
also developed through regular military exercises and sharing command and control systems.33 
There are still differences between the two forces, however. 
Figure 8: Organization Chart of the IRGC 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the information in Buchta’s Who Rules Iran.34  
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Today the IRGC has about 120,000 men on active duty.35 This number is significantly 
less than what the regular army has. The Artesh, however, is equipped with largely outdated 
equipment. It can be observed that the IRGC is the more powerful institution among Iran’s 
military forces, and the strategic priority has always been given to the IRGC, which is a capable 
organization well versed in a variety of different tasks.36 Though the Artesh and the IRGC have 
overlapping tasks in practice, the latter is less conventional in terms of its activities. 
In Article 150 of the 1979 constitution, and unlike the regular armed forces, the primary 
function of the IRGC is stated as ‘guarding the Revolution and its achievements.’37 This broad 
responsibility in turn broadened the focus of the IRGC into all aspects of Iranian life and 
extraterritorial engagements. Thus, this function, which includes both internal and external 
threats and interests that consolidate the ideological agenda of the regime, makes it a political-
military organization. If we take into account the practices and the aforementioned statute of the 
IRGC, the scope of the tasks and responsibilities of the IRGC can be outlined under two 
categories, internal and external, as follows; 
 Internal Responsibilities 
Guarding the Islamic revolution in Iran,  
The implementation of the regime’s ideology, 
Cooperating with police and security forces against all kinds of counterrevolutionary 
elements (There are IRGC installations in all of Iran’s major cities organized into Quick 
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Reaction Groups that serve as a reserve against unrest.38), 
Gathering intelligence regarding the security of the revolution, 
The ideological indoctrination and training of IRGC personnel,39, 40  
Security 
Safeguarding internal security particularly in rural regions (in conjunction with the Law 
Enforcement Forces); border security, stopping smuggling, and illegal drug trafficking (in 
conjunction with the Law Enforcement Forces), assisting in the execution of judicial decisions 
and providing public safety,41, 42, 43 
Humanitarian assistance in the event of natural disasters and unexpected catastrophes 
such as floods and earthquakes,44, 45 
 Extraterritorial Responsibilities 
Supporting foreign liberation movements and struggle for the rights of oppressed people, 
Exporting the revolution, (in time this task has been replaced by expanding the sphere of 
influence through Shiite groups) 
Defending the country against any kind of foreign intervention and attacks inside the 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, regime survival is valued above everything for 
Iran, and the IRGC is chief executor of this goal. The scope of the duties and the missions of the 
IRGC have been designed according to the regime’s ideological agenda. In this line, to 
implement the regime’s agenda, the IRGC has improved unconventional and asymmetric 
strategies included in the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities. According to the IRGC’s commander 
Yahya Rahim Safavi who served as the chief commander of the IRGC between 1997 and 2007, 
“[t]he IRGC has no geographical border. The Islamic revolution is the border of the IRGC.”47 
The IRGC’s extraterritorial activities have not been limited by goals of supporting foreign 
liberation movements and exporting the revolution. Over time, these tasks transformed into 
sustaining and expanding its sphere of influence, and conducting counter activities against Iran’s 
perceived enemies through unconventional and asymmetric methods. The IRGC’s extraterritorial 
activities date back to 1982 when its first contingent arrived in Lebanon.48 Owing to Iran’s eight-
year war with Iraq, extraterritorial activities decreased. However, with the end of the war, the 
IRGC again took a more active role outside Iran’s borders. 
The IRGC Quds Force (IRGC-QF) was established under the command of IRGC in 
1990.49 In a 1990 interview, Mohsen Rezai, one of the IRGC’s senior leaders and chief 
commander of the IRGC before Yahya Rahim Safavi between 1981 and 1997, explained the 
reasoning behind the Quds Force’s establishment and its areas of responsibility:  
[T]he Qods Force, stands for assisting Muslims, Islamic states or Islamic 
governments, should they ask for help in training or advice. That is now a global 
                                                
46 Bayram Sinkaya, The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations (Routledge, 2015), 
45. 
47 Byman et al., Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 54. 
48 Kenneth Katzman, “The Pasdaran: Institutionalization of Revolutionary Armed Force,” Iranian Studies 26, no. 
3/4 (July 1, 1993): 397. 
49 Sinkaya, The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics, 51. 
115 
 
custom. If an Islamic state, government or people need to be put through some 
training, well, the corps will go there and give them training; it will take measures to 
provide training support for world Muslims or Islamic states. There was a need for a 
force to perform this task, and the Eminent Leader commanded the corps to set it up. 
This force is now being set up and is mainly for helping Islamic governments and 
Islamic nations when there is a need to train them and transfer experience to them.50 
In the meantime, the IRGC-QF has become an intelligence and unconventional warfare 
component of about 5,000 men that centralized the IRGC’s extraterritorial operations under a 
single command.51 Besides the Palestinian struggle, the IRGC-QF expanded its activities into 
new areas beyond the Muslim world; “Iraq, Lebanon, Central Asia, Europe, and the Americas.”52 
With these activities, the IRGC and its Quds Force have been a tool of foreign policy. 
According to an Iraqi intelligence study which discusses the foundation of the Quds 
Force after the end of the Iranian-Iraqi war and Khomeini’s death, the IRGC-QF has four main 
command centers to direct its intelligence and operational activities in neighboring countries in 
order to achieve its goals in these countries: 
1. Ramadan Headquarters (1st Corps) is responsible for Iraq, 
2. Nabi Al-Akram Command Center (2nd Corps) is dedicated to Pakistan, 
3. Al-Hamzah Command Center (3rd Corps) is focused on Turkey and the Kurdish 
issue, 
4. Al-Ansar Command Center (4th Corps) is intended for Afghanistan and Central 
Asia.53 
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Besides these main command centers, the document indicates that there are also six corps 
for each country or area in which they operate;54 
Table 3: The Countries and Areas in Which the IRGC Operates 
Corp Responsible for 
Fifth Corps Turkish territory 
Sixth Corps Emirates and the Gulf countries 
Seventh Corps 
Lebanon (affiliated with the Lebanese Hezbollah, the 
Islamic Jihad, and Al-Amal Islamic Organization) 
Ninth Corp Europe, America, and east Asian countries 
Bosnian Corps Bosnia 
  Source: CTC, West Point 55 
Since 2007, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, because of its 
extraterritorial activities, the IRGC-QF has been named as a terrorism-supporting entity under 
Executive Order 13224 which targets terrorists and their supporters.56 
According to ‘Executive Order 13224’57, the IRGC-QF provides lethal support to the 
Taliban, Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC); considered the primary instrument for 
providing weapons (small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar 
rounds, 107mm rockets, plastic explosives, and probably man-portable defense systems) and 
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financial support to anti-U.S. and anti-Coalition activity in Afghanistan. This support 
contravenes Chapter VII UN Security Council obligations.58 Additionally, Executive Order 
13224 states that the IRGC-QF has provided guidance, funding, weapons, intelligence, and 
logistical support to Hezbollah's military, paramilitary, and terrorist activities. Additionally, 
select groups of Iraqi Shiite militants that targetted and killed Coalition and Iraqi forces and 
innocent Iraqi civilians have received support in the form of weapons, training, funding, and 
guidance from the IRGC-QF. 
Including the commander of the IRGC-QF, Qasem Soleimani, Iranian military 
individuals have been listed on ‘the Annex of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1737’59 and ‘UNSCR 1747,’60 and on the Specially Designated National (SDN) list 
maintained by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
pursuant to ‘Executive Order 13382’61 and ‘13438’62 on the basis of their relationship to the 
IRGC and the IRGC-QF. Iranian military individuals who are listed in UNSCRs and Executive 
Orders are shown below: 
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Table 4: UNSCRs and Executive Orders that Include Iranian Military Individuals 
UNSCRs and 
Executive Orders 
Designated Iranian Military Individuals 
UNSCR 1737  
Executive Order 13382 
General Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force/IRGC 
UNSCR 1737  Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, IRGC 
UNSCR 1747 
Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Commander of 
IRGC Ground Forces 
Rear Admiral Morteza Safari, Commander of IRGC Navy 
General Zolqadr, IRGC officer, Deputy Interior Minister for 
Security Affairs 
UNSCR 1747  
Executive Order 13382 
Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie, Deputy Commander of 
IRGC 
Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Chief of IRGC Joint Staff 
Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi, Commander of Bassij 
resistance force 
Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani, Commander of Quds 
force 
Executive Order 13438  
Abdul Reza Shahlai, Deputy commander in the IRGC–Quds 
Force 
Ahmed Foruzandeh, Brigadier General in the IRGC-QF 
Source: Compiled by the Author from the Aforementioned Sources 
According to claims, the IRGC and its Quds Force branch have been involved in different 
forms of extraterritorial activities: Hostage taking, assassinations, subversion, bombings, aircraft 
hijackings, as well as providing financial support, military assistance, social services, ideological 
supports to its proxies. Owing to some of these activities, Iran has been designated as a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism. 
Iran’s extraterritorial activities are not limited to Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. The 
IRGC has also taken very active roles in Yemen and Syria. As an indication of Iran’s military 
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extraterritorial engagement, solely in Syria, Alfoneh states that 254 people, most of whom were 
affiliated with the IRGC-QF, have been killed between January 2013 and August 2015 according 
to open source data collected from Persian-language accounts of funerals in Iran.63 In addition to 
Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups, the IRGC’s name is affiliated with Hamas, 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 
Command (PFLP-GC). 
Needless to say, Iranian ruling elites pursue political ends with the IRGC’s extraterritorial 
activities. Although the secretive nature of these activities is an obstacle for research the IRGC’s 
relations with Hezbollah and activities in Iraq are relatively well documented. Thus both cases 
are very valuable for observing Iran’s motivations, as well as the extent and character of IRGC’s 
involvement in these engagements. In this context, the remaining part of this chapter covers two 
case studies; the IRGC’s relations with Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite groups in post-2003 
occupied Iraq.  
The IRGC’s Relations with Lebanese Hezbollah 
Lebanon achieved its political independence from France in 1943. The modern state of 
Lebanon comprises many different religions and ethnic groups. Two main clusters, Muslims and 
Christians, include 18 officially recognized sects. Among them, Maronite Christians, Sunni 
Muslims, and Shiite Muslims constitute the three major sects. According to the 1932 census, 
which was the only official census conducted in Lebanon under the French Mandate, Christian 
Maronites (28.8%) had the largest population, followed by the Sunni Muslims (22.4%) then the 
                                                





Shiite Muslims (19.6%). The census with dubious reliability comprised the statistical basis for 
the distribution of political power among the major religious sects with their numerical sizes in 
proportion to their respective sizes.64  
Accordingly, the Christian Maronites were accorded the presidency, the Sunni Muslims 
were granted the premiership, and the Shiite Muslims were awarded the speakership of the 
parliament. Although the Shiites perceived their speakership as politically far weaker than either 
the presidency or the premiership, this political resolution based on the distribution of population 
worked well until significant demographic shifts took place in the 1970s, as a result of higher 
birth rates in the Muslim community and the influx of Muslim immigrants from Syria and 
Palestine. 65 Since then, unease has grown about the status given based on the 1932 census, 
particularly among Shiites, who were historically a rural and poor population located primarily in 
the South and the Bekaa Valley. 
In addition to its effects on the demographic shift, the Palestinian implantation during the 
1970's created a new environment that led to the civil war and foreign intervention (Israel 
operations and Syria’s military support for the Christians, so as to prevent the war spilling across 
its border). 
According to Wege, this new environment had a dual impact on the Lebanese political 
system: 
First, the dominant Maronites construed Palestinian refugees as a demographic, 
religious, and political threat and acted accordingly.  
                                                
64 Muhammad A. Faour, “Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon,” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 6 
(November 1, 2007): 909, doi:10.1080/00263200701568279. 
65 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton University Press, 2014), 12. 
121 
 
Second, Palestinians competed with the Shiites for scarce resources in the 
underdeveloped south, and (after the 1974 Melkart Protocol) Palestinian military 
operations brought Israeli military strikes to Shi'a population centers.66 
A conjuncture of domestic conflicts and foreign interventions prepared the politicization 
and mobilization of Lebanese Shiites. 
Particularly, a 1969 meeting in Najaf, one of the most important Shiite religious centers, 
constituted the origin of the mobilization of the Shiites. Among participants in the meeting, Musa 
al-Sadr, an Iranian-born cleric who moved to Lebanon in 1960, would be the most influential 
actor in the establishment of Hezbollah67 by gaining great popularity through his outreach efforts 
and social activism.68  
Musa al-Sadr prepared the conditions that preceded Hezbollah. In 1969, al-Sadr 
established the Shiite Higher Council as a lobbying force for the Shiite community in Lebanon. 
Five years later, in 1974, he initiated the Movement of the Deprived (Al-Harakat al-Mahrumin) 
to amplify Shiite activism for economic and social development in Shiite villages. 69 After the 
outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, Sadr organized the first major Shiite militia called 
Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya, Lebanese Resistance Battalions).70 Sadr's Amal was 
the seedbed for Hezbollah.71 In the meantime, several critical developments precipitated the 
emergence of Hezbollah; 
-­‐ The disappearance of Musa al-Sadr in Libya in August 1978, which became a 
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major focus and rallying point for the community, 
-­‐ Israel's invasions of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, 
-­‐ The establishment of a Shiite Islamic state in Iran in 1979.72, 73 
After the disappearance of Sadr, the shift in approaches of the new leadership represented 
by Nabih Berri led to splits among Lebanese Shiites. The more religious members,  some of 
whom would go on to leadership positions in Hezbollah, opposed the adoption of more secular 
policies and tolerance toward Israel’s advance.74 Husayn al-Musawi, one of the Amal’s leaders, 
called for Shiites to resist the invasion in the name of Islam.75 
On July 6, 1982, the Israeli army invaded Lebanon as part of its wider ‘Peace of the 
Galilee’ operation; Qassem -who is the second in command of Hezbollah with the title of deputy 
secretary-general- states that the reason of the so-called ‘terrorist’ attacks emanating from 
Lebanon was not the main purpose behind the operation.76 According to Norton, the true 
objectives were “to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a significant political 
force and to install a friendly government in Beirut.”77 Among other developments, the invasion 
became a seminal event and not only triggered further radicalization of Lebanese Shi'ites, but 
also paved the way for Iran’s direct involvement. 
Hezbollah emerged basically in three geographic regions: the Bekaa which was the 
movement's primary politico-military foundation; the southern suburbs of Beirut, its secondary 
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area of strength; and certain areas of South Lebanon, its tertiary foundation.78 Among them, the 
Bekaa became the center of Iran’s and Syria’s support. 
The third crucial event was the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The revolution had a stimulating 
effect on Lebanese Shiites. Iran saw the Lebanese Shiites as a natural proxy. The convergence of 
mutual interest and ideological affinity has been the root of Iran’s most prominent, and most 
well-known relationship with the Lebanese group, Hezbollah. As stated by Norton, although 
‘1982’ was referred as the establishment year of Hezbollah, it existed as a cabal rather than a 
coherent organization until the mid-1980s.79 Iran’s wide range of ideological and material 
support was a vital instrument in the movement's improvement and emergence as a well-
established organization. 
Iran’s ideological Influence on Hezbollah 
The most noted example of Iran’s efforts to export the revolution beyond its own borders 
was its active involvement in Hezbollah’s establishment and development. Although the 
revolution took place a long distance away from Lebanon, since its inception, the Revolutionary 
Regime has had its greatest impact on Lebanese Shiites, by virtue of mutual religious and 
cultural affinities, profound historical connections and shared political interests.  
Notably, the Hezbollah leadership’s adherence to the thought of Twelver Shiism, 
adoption of the concept of Velayat-e Faqih and embrace of Ayatollah Khomeini as the supreme 
political and religious authority contributed to the success of the enduring strong Iran-Hezbollah 
relationship.  
Personal relationships between some Iranian clerics and Hezbollah's command leadership 
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in Shiite spiritual centers such as Najaf, Qom and as well as Lebanon were another facilitator in 
the rapid growth and expansion of Hezbollah.80  
In the late 1960s and the 1970s, some Iranian revolutionaries were trained in Lebanon; 
Lebanese clerics also studied in Najaf and Qom with Iranian counterparts who would later be 
involved with the revolution.81 
Qassem -deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah- asserts clearly the reasons that lay 
behind the success of Iran-Hezbollah relations as follows: 
-­‐ Both Iran and Hezbollah believe in the jurisdiction of the Jurist-Theologian, and 
that Imam Khomeini was himself that leader -the embodiment of this jurisdiction 
in our times. Iran and the Party thus met within one framework of international 
leadership legitimacy. 
-­‐ Iran’s choice of an Islamic republican system of government coincided with the 
Islamic principles held by Hezbollah. 
-­‐ Political concord also existed on the issue of Iran’s absolute rejection of 
superpower hegemony, the safeguarding of independence, and support for all the 
liberation movements, especially those aimed at resisting Israeli occupation. Such 
was the view held by Hezbollah, with a priority awarded to the confrontation of 
Israeli occupation and whatever that entails regarding opposing powers or projects 
of domination.82 
In addition to the reasons stated by Qassem, the ‘Open Letter’ of 1985 addressed by the 
Hezbollah to the downtrodden in Lebanon and the world explicitly and officially shows the 
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ideological closeness and the leadership role assigned to Iran: 
We, the sons of Hezbullah's nation, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran 
and which has established the nucleus of the world's central Islamic state, abide by 
the orders of a single wise and just command currently embodied in the supreme 
Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini.83 
To adopt Khomeini as the leader of the Shiite world and his concept of velayat-e faqih 
gave Iran tremendous influence within Hezbollah. This allowed Iran to expand its influence in 
Lebanon’s domestic and foreign affairs.  
Apart from ideological familiarity and close personal relationships, Iran’s direct 
involvement through a variety of channels and institutions, such as the IRGC, Iran’s 
representatives in Syria and Lebanon to Iran's Foreign Ministry, Iranian Intelligence services and 
the Martyr's Foundation, institutionalized the relations and consolidated the establishment and 
the development of Hezbollah.84 Among these, particularly the IRGC’s efforts occupied a very 
important place.  
Following Israel’s 1982 invasion, Iran immediately advised Syria to allow the 
deployment of a small Iranian contingent to Lebanon. The imminent threat posed by Israel and 
Syria’s alliance with Iran in the Iran–Iraq war easily made this demand possible and Tehran 
seized the opportunity through a military agreement signed between Iran and Syria in June 
1982.85 
After the parliamentary vote, Iran initially deployed a contingent of 500 or so IRGC 
members (there is no specific number regarding the first unit, the number ranges from 300 to 
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500). In a short time, this number gradually reached 1,500, distributed throughout some smaller 
villages in the Bekaa Valley.86, 87, 88 Additionally, Syria allowed a supply line of support to run 
from Iran through Syria to Lebanese Shiites.89  
The IRGC intensified its efforts to create Hezbollah through working with Iranian 
intelligence and Iranian diplomats as well as Syrian officials.90 Deeb states that “[i]n fact until 
the arrival of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards, …. Hezbullah had previously existed 
simply as an idea in the writings of Muhammad Husain Fadlallah.”91 The IRGC’s influence 
became evident in a short time. 
The IRGC served as a conduit for all kind of Iranian support and the IRGC’s activities in 
Lebanon included numerous forms of assistance. In particular, fostering a revolutionary spirit 
among the Lebanese Shiites and then the militarization of Shiite activism were the net effects of 
Iran’s presence in Lebanon. As stated by Byman, “[w]hen the IRGC initially arrived in Lebanon, 
its base in the Baalbeck area of the Bekaa Valley became a microcosm of revolutionary Iran.”92 
Kramer describes this transformation very well in quoting the experience of co-founder 
and Hezbollah’s secretary-general Abbas al-Musavi who took the first training course offered by 
the Revolutionary Guards in 1982:93 
                                                
86 Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon  : The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis / Magnus Ranstorp  ; 
Foreword by Terry Waite. (New York: StMartin’s Press, 1997), 34–36. 
87 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections  : States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge, UK  ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 82. 
88 Eric Sander Lob, “An Institutional History of the Iranian Construction Jihad: From Inception to 
Institutionalization (1979--2011).” (PhD Thesis, Princeton University, 2013), 134. 
89 Martin Kramer, “Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 47, 
no. 8 (May 1, 1994): 26, doi:10.2307/3824797. 
90 Byman, Deadly Connections, 83. 
91 Deeb, “Shia Movements in Lebanon,” 692. 
92 Byman, Deadly Connections, 92. 
93 Abbas al-Musavi was an influential Lebanese Shia cleric, co-founder and Hezbollah’s secretary-general from 
1991 until his assassination by Israel in 1992. Ranstrop states that Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi occupied not only the 
most senior positions as spiritual leaders of the Hizbollah in the Bekaa but also acted as liaison with the Iranian 
Pasdaran Revolutionary Guards Corps and Iran while maintaining overall control over Hizbollah's irregular and 
semi-regular military units. (Ranstorp, “Hizbollah’s Command Leadership,” 305.) 
127 
 
I recall one of the sights I can never forget. We were awakened at night by the 
weeping of the brethren Guards during the night prayer. Is this not the greatest school 
from which one can graduate? I also recall when one of the brethren Guards gave a 
weapons lesson. Suddenly, after he had given all the explanations, he put the weapon 
aside and swore an oath saying: "All I have explained to you will not help you; only 
God can help you." He began to talk about belief and reliance on God.... When I 
joined the Guards and sat with the brethren in the first course they gave in the Bekaa 
Valley, I felt I derived immense benefit. I felt I had truly penetrated genuine Islam. If 
this is how I felt, as someone at an advanced level of schooling, then how must the 
other youths have felt who filled the ranks of the Guards?94 
Also, Kramer’s subsequent quote shows the IRGC’s successful indoctrination within a 
short span of time;  
The school of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard made the Muslim youths love 
martyrdom.…. We were not surprised at all when, shortly after the arrival of the 
Guards, a Muslim youth in Lebanon smiled at death while carrying with him 1,200 
kilograms of explosives.95 
Over time, Hezbollah gained power and spread to Beirut and southern Lebanon from the 
Bekaa Valley. Apart from Iran’s undeniable role in the rapid growth and popularity of Hezbollah 
in these three regions, Hezbollah leaders’ success in meeting the social and economic needs of 
the Shiite community in the absence of any efficient Lebanese authority and the establishment of 
efficient Hezbollah propaganda machinery played important roles.96 
In the 1980s, Hezbollah had around 5,000 armed members actively engaged in fighting 
against Israeli and Western targets. Byman states that the number of fighters gradually shrank as 
the years passed, but the fighters got more skilled and professionalized. In May 2000, by the time 
of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, the numbers of full time and part time fighters were 
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respectively 500, and 1000.97 Similarly the number of IRGC members in Lebanon shrank over 
time and decreased to roughly 150 fighters in the 1990s.98 
Since the beginning of its presence in Lebanon, the IRGC had not openly engaged in 
military operations. Ranstrop quotes from Qassem regarding the functionality of the IRGC as 
follows: “the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard does not fight in southern Lebanon. However, 
it is known that some of its members are present in the al-Biq’a area: they play an educational 
and training role and do not participate in other matters.”99 Ranstrop argues that “[t]he main 
nature of Iran’s mission was geared towards aiding the formation of an organizational basis and 
infrastructure for a new revolutionary Shi’a group through extensive military training and 
religious guidance.”100 
Due to several reasons, Iran-Hezbollah relations lost their initial intensity. Hezbollah over 
time became the strongest group in Lebanon and has participated in parliamentary politics since 
1992.101 As Hezbollah got stronger, the Hezbollah’s material and ideological dependency on Iran 
became weaker. For Iran, the cost of relations with Hezbollah and the eight-year war with Iraq 
had been the most influential factors in revising its policies. Over time, strategic reasons have 
come to the fore; the growing international pressure against Iran’s involvement in Lebanon and 
the war’s putting the regime's survival and the revolution's success at risk led Iran to shift its 
policy.102, 103 Additionally, another factor, as stated by Lob, the thought of satisfactory 
consolidation of power in the mid-1980s led the revolutionary regime to adopt a less radicalized 
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foreign policy.104 However, it did not mean Iran’s support for Hezbollah totally ended. 
Hezbollah's goals were outlined in the 1985 Open Letter as followings: 
(a) To expel the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon, 
putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land;  
(b) To submit the Phalanges to a just power and bring them all to justice for the 
crimes they have perpetrated against Muslims and Christians;  
(c) To permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to choose in 
liberty the form of government they desire. We call upon all of them to pick the 
option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice and 
liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative attempts of 
imperialistic infiltration into our country 105 
To attain these goals, Hezbollah pursued militant means against Israel and the West, and 
tried to consolidate and expand its power in Lebanese domestic politics. In 1989, the Taif Accord 
which “provided the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in 
Lebanon”106 and the death of Khomeini directly affected subsequent improvements. The accord 
brought the more equitable distribution of political power (on a 50-50 basis) and then paved the 
way for Hezbollah’s involvement in Lebanese domestic politics. Also, the accord called for the 
withdrawal of foreign troops in Lebanon.107 Parallel to improvements in Lebanon, after the death 
of Khomeini in 1989 and with the Rafsanjani presidency, revolutionary fervor was replaced by 
pragmatic policies. The immense cost of the Iraq war (economic and human), logistic needs and 
external political pressures regarding sponsoring Hezbollah caused this change of approach. 
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Thus, Iran’s initial active involvement gave way to a partly constrained sponsorship. 
In May 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon because of the increasing cost of 
military occupation. Hezbollah immediately presented Israel’s withdrawal as a victory and this 
amplified the group’s popularity amongst the Lebanese population. After a period of relative 
peace between 2000 and 2006, tension increased again because of Hezbollah’s kidnapping of 
two Israeli soldiers and killing eight others in July 2006. In response, Israel attacked Hezbollah. 
After the deaths of 164 Israelis (forty-five civilians), and over 1,100 Lebanese (mostly civilians) 
in 34 days, the fighting ended with a ceasefire. This ceasefire was also claimed as a victory by 
Hezbollah by declaring Israel’s incapability to destroy it.108, 109 
Overall, chiefly because of the following factors, Hezbollah began to be a more 
autonomous body; 
-­‐ The immense cost of the Iraq war and external pressures regarding Hezbollah 
sponsporship, 
-­‐ The death of Khomeini who was also Hezbollah’s ideological leader, 
-­‐ Iran’s adopting foreign policy approaches that aimed to integrate itself into the 
international system,  
-­‐ The Taif Accord that provided the basis for ending the civil war and the return to 
political normalcy in Lebanon, 
-­‐ Hezbollah’s increasing power in Lebanon’s domestic politics and new alliances 
with domestic actors, 
-­‐ Israel’s (2000) and Syria’s (2005) withdrawal from Lebanon.   
-­‐ Decreasing dependency on Iran because of the growth of Hezbollah’s own 
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independent funds, particularly from wealthy Shi‘ite merchants in Lebanon and 
from the sizable West African, South American, and U.S. Lebanese Shiite 
diaspora.110 (According to intelligence estimates, Hezbollah’s overall budget 
amounts to around US$500 million annually.111) 
Besides its militant activities, due to its involvement in politics and social services, there 
are debates about Hezbollah’s classification as to whether it is a terrorist organization or not. For 
instance, while the US, Canada, Israel classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, other 
countries like Russia do not. In the third category, countries like Australia and the United 
Kingdom distinguish between Hezbollah's guerilla and political wings, and classify its guerilla 
wing as a terrorist organization.112 
Since its inception, the organization has engaged in forms of violence through guerrilla 
warfare. According to the Global Terrorism Database, the number of Hezbollah or Hezbollah 
suspected fatalities is roughly 1200 between 1983 and 2014 in 398 incidents (including 
suspected incidents). The group is most actively in Lebanon and Israel. But it also executed 
violent activities in Argentine, Bahrein, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Iran, 
Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Niger, Saudi, Arabia, Spain, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey.113 
Hezbollah’s Major Attacks 
Instead of a day-by-day chronology of the violence employed by Hezbollah that would be 
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long, some major attacks of Hezbollah are listed below;114 













































6/14/1985 Greece Athens 1 
TWA Boeing 
727 Flight 847 
Hijacking 
7/11/1985 Kuwait Kuwait 11 




6/23/1986 Egypt Cairo 10 Property 
Bombing/ 
Explosion 














7/12/1988 Greece Aegina 10 














9/19/1989 Niger 171 
Airports and 
Aircraft 
























12 Israeli Citizens 
Bombing/ 
Explosion 







5/9/2008 Lebanon Beirut 11 




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
Most of the initial attacks aimed to get foreigners to retreat from Lebanon. For instance, 
in two separate attacks in 1983 and 1984 respectively; 86 people in an American Embassy 
bombing, 299 people in attacks on French Peacekeeping and the Marine Base Command Center 
were killed. Some attacks aimed to support Iran during the Iran–Iraq war. For example, to force 
Kuwait to abandon its support for Iraq, Hezbollah executed ten attacks in Kuwait and caused 16 
casualties. Other group attacks aimed to free members arrested by other countries such as the 
hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985. Furthermore, Hezbollah attacked rival movements to 
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minimize their influence on the Lebanese Shiite community.  As mentioned above, because of 
these activities Hezbollah was officially listed as a terrorist organization (at least its military 
wing) by eleven countries, including the EU. 
Types of the IRGC’s Support 
Among many forms of Iranian support, the IRGC’s role in the creation of Hezbollah can 
be defined as the most influential one. Besides military training and augmenting warfighting 
capabilities vital to the survival and the success of Hezbollah paramilitary activities, IRGC 
members also engaged in recruitment and indoctrination in which they preached the virtues of 
revolutionary ideology and stressed the value of martyrdom.115  
A very short time after the IRGC’s arrival in Lebanon, the Baalbeck area of the Bekaa 
Valley became a small revolutionary Iran. Byman states that “[w]omen wore veils, pictures of 
Ayatollah Khomeini were ubiquitous, and the debates in Iran were mirrored in Lebanon.”116 
Hezbollah accepted the doctrine of the velayet-e faqih, the leadership of Khomeini and adopted 
other Iranian views; such as “the division of the world into oppressors and the oppressed, enmity 
to Israel and to the United States, and the rejection of national boundaries in favor of religious 
identity.”117 Given this emphasis, Hezbollah followed the Iranian ideological line. 
Iran’s influence is also seen in Hezbollah’s organizational structure. The key decision-
making body of Hezbollah, Majlis al-Shura, included one or two high-ranking IRGC 
representatives or officials from the Iranian embassies in Beirut or Damascus.118, 119 These 
Iranian officials provided a direct link on matters that required strategic guidance or Iranian 
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assistance or arbitration.120 
Majidyar quotes from an interview with veteran Iranian diplomat Hossein Sheikh al-
Islam that “the IRGC’s Intelligence Directorate (which later became the Quds Force) and the 
Iranian Embassy in Damascus played an instrumental role in the creation and organization of 
Hezbollah.”121 
Based on intelligence estimates, Iran financed Hezbollah with roughly $100 million 
annually. 122, 123, 124, 125 This money, particularly in its initial period, enabled Hezbollah to sustain 
and expand its power. Hezbollah could “attract both veteran Shiite fighters formerly employed 
by Amal and Palestinian groups, and eager young recruits, by offering salaries of $150-200 per 
month.”126 In addition to monthly income, several special privileges were offered to these 
fighters such as cost-free education and medical treatment for them and their families.127  
This financial contribution not only financed the organization’s military activities 
(recruitment, weapons procurement, logistics, etc,) and the needs of militias, but also allowed 
Hezbollah to run “an array of social welfare and financial services for the Shi’a community, 
including religious schools, clinics and hospitals, as well as cash subsidies to Shi’ite families 
below the poverty line, which naturally boosted the popularity and growth of the pro-Iranian 
movement in the Beqaa.” 128 
Overall, the IRGC’s support for Hezbollah may be divided into the following main 
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-­‐ The IRGC’s indoctrination fueled Shiite consciousness and spread revolutionary 
values among the Lebanese Shiite community. The IRGC created a microcosm of 
revolutionary Iran in its Beqaa Valley base. This transformed the Lebanese Shiite 
community into a pro-Iranian Revolutionary stand. The ideological mobilization 
enabled Hezbollah to find human resource and material support from the 
Lebanese Shiite community and to sustain its longevity and flourishing. 
-­‐ Military training provided by the IRGC allowed Hezbollah to attain its goals 
through violent activities and subsequently made it one of the most influential 
actors in Lebanon. 
-­‐ Providing safe havens allowed Hezbollah to improve organizational structure, to 
establish training centers, to have a long range strategy and to plan paramilitary 
and political activities.  
-­‐ Material aid (financial, weaponry and logistical) provided by Iran empowered 
both Hezbollah’s military and political wings. 
-­‐ By joining in decision-making, the IRGC not only contributed to Hezbollah’s 
organizational/structural establishment, but also to its strategy-making through 
know-how and intelligence. 
Consequently, taken as a whole, Iranian support was essential to Hezbollah’s long-
standing life and success. 
Iran’s Motivations for Supporting Hezbollah  
Iran’s motivations for supporting Hezbollah were distilled from an interconnecting set of 
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ideological and strategic calculations. The first decade of Iran-Hezbollah relations was mostly 
shaped by Iran’s revolutionary ambitions. Iran tried to export the revolution to all Muslim 
communities, however, the initial enthusiasm of the Revolution did not take root in Sunni and 
Shiite minority communities. Hezbollah was the first group that allowed  Iran to export its 
ideology and influence, which is why, in the words of Byman,  “none is more important to 
Tehran than the Lebanese Hezbollah”129 among proxies. Iran exercised almost complete control 
over the organization by shaping its ideology, structure and joining its decision-making. 
However, over time, as Hezbollah gained power and its dependency on Iran decreased and as 
Iran adopted more rational policies in place of ideological ones, Hezbollah became for Iran a 
strategic tool for Iranian foreign policy goals rather than an idealistic phenomenon. 
Although Iran’s motivations for supporting Hezbollah have varied in strength over time, 
supporting Hezbollah served as a strategic tool in two main goals;  
-­‐ A Tool of Deterrence and a Bargaining Chip 
Since its inception, revolutionary Iran has primarily been concerned with regime survival 
and this deeply influenced its strategies. Alfoneh reveals the thinking of Mohammad Montazeri, 
who was one of the founders of the IRGC, regarding the strategy behind the use of Hezbollah in 
regime survival:   
In order to achieve ideological, political, security and economic self-reliance we have 
no other choice than to mobilize all forces loyal to the Islamic Revolution, and 
through this mobilization, plant such a terror in the hearts of the enemies that they 
abandon the thought of an offensive and annihilation of our revolution…. If our 
revolution does not have an offensive and internationalist dimension, the enemies of 
Islam will again enslave us culturally, politically, and the like, and they will not 
abstain from plunder and looting.130  
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Fulton asserts that “by demonstrating a capability to strike U.S. and Israeli interests 
anywhere in the world, or creating a perception of this capability, Iran’s leaders hoped to stave 
off a military strike, or at least make it extremely costly for their foes.”131 
In this context, Hezbollah has been seen as a deterrence and retaliatory force against 
Iran’s adversaries. Especially for the US and Israel which are disproportionately powerful in 
terms of conventional military capabilities, Hezbollah stands as “a useful pressure point or 
eventually becomes a bargaining chip.”132 During the Iran–Iraq war, Hezbollah targeted 
countries that were directly providing military, financial, or logistical support to Iraq. Chubin 
states that “Iran’s direct interventions to expand Hezbollah’s targeting helped the Iranian 
government achieve such important foreign policy objectives as obtaining American weapons, 
persuading France to expel the regime’s opponents and strengthening Syria’s hold on 
Lebanon.133  
-­‐ Project power 
In addition to being a deterrent and retaliatory force that targeted the adversaries of Iran, 
Hezbollah also allowed Iran to project power to sustain and expand its sphere of influence by 
becoming a greater voice in regional affairs. Signaling Hezbollah as a forward base for Iran to 
punish the enemies of Islam and protect Muslim’s rights, allowed Iran to project its power to the 
Muslim world where it appointed itself as leader despite being religiously Shiite and ethnically 
Persian. Furthermore, the execution of active anti-US and Israel policies through Hezbollah 
aimed to gain prestige not only in the Arab world, but also among anti-US states and groups 
(South America).  
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Norton defines Hezbollah as a stalking horse for Iranian interests, which offered a degree 
of deniability when confronted with international pressure over Hezbollah activities.134 Iran has 
not had any direct involvement in conflict with Israel and enjoyed hostility without direct 
engagement.135 Thus, Iran was able to achieve its interests without provoking military retaliation 
and without paying the consequences that more direct involvement might entail.136  
Furthermore, Iran’s influence in Lebanese domestic politics and pressures on both the US 
and Israel also consolidated the revolutionary regime’s power in its domestic politics. 
The IRGC’s activities in Lebanon were Iran’s first and most successful extraterritorial 
engagement. It may be seen as a laboratory for its future foreign engagements in post-2003 
occupied Iraq and the 2011 Syrian civil war. In this success, shared religious and ideological 
doctrines, preexisting networks between leaders and clerics, mutual interest and needs, and the 
power vacuum in Lebanon. Besides these factors, the IRGC’s status in Iran’s power structure 
was a defining point in the success. Although the level of involvement was questioned by 
different factions in Iranian Politics, the IRGC’s autonomy from the civilian leadership and its 
own independent economic infrastructure deepened this relation and made it durable.  
Τhe IRGC’s Relations with Shiite Groups in Post-2003 Occupied Iraq 
Since the 1979 revolution, Iraq has been one of Iran’s main foreign policy concerns. Just 
after the revolution, to take advantage of Iran's demoralized regular army, thinking it would be 
ineffective, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in September 1980. According to Foran 
and Goodwin, the following motivations were behind this decision;  
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-­‐ The fear of export of the revolution to Iraq's large Shi'a population; 
-­‐ Seeking to become the political leader in the Arab world;  
-­‐ The thought of supporting of Iran's own Arab minority in the oil-rich Khuzistan 
province.137 
Although after several months, Iraqi forces were repelled and Iraq switched to a 
defensive position, Iranians could not immediately achieve a decisive victory. The war lasted 
eight years. When the war ended after Iran’s acceptance of UN decision number 598, there were 
not significant territorial changes, but very high costs. As stated by Foran and Goodwin, “[i]ran 
had suffered at least 160,000 dead (other estimates claim 300,000 or more) and some $450 
billion in damage to cities, villages, ports, and oil facilities.”138 The Iran–Iraq war strengthened 
the regime at home. However, it limited its influence outside of Iran’s borders. Instead of 
pursuing its ideological agenda, the cost of war pushed Iran to adopt more pragmatic policies.  
Until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran adopted a more cautious foreign policy for the 
sake of improving good relations with the West and with regional actors. Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait on August 2, 1990 offered several unexpected benefits for Iran. Iran condemned the 
invasion and voted for the UN decision that obligate to withdraw its forces immediately without 
conditions. Increasing pressures, costs and isolation convinced Saddam to retreat. Iraq promised 
to recognize the Iranian border and to redeploy the troops in the Iranian and Kuwaiti fronts.139 
The 9/11 attacks changed the course of relations in the Middle East. The Bush 
administration’s first significant reaction to the attacks was to emphasize the need to combat 
states that harbored and supported terrorists. Particularly three states, Iran, Iraq and North Korea, 
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were targeted and called the ‘axis of evil.’ After the ‘axis of evil’ speech, the toppling of the 
Saddam's regime in Iraq and the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan by the US created a very 
complex situation for Iran. On one hand, the fear of being the next target as a member of the 
‘axis of evil’, on the other, the removal of sworn enemies surrounding it on the east and west. 
For both issues, while Iran sought means to counter US presence in the region, it also tried to 
take advantage of the ensuing power vacuum by supporting proxies, deterrent activities and 
keeping the nuclear issue on the table. The IRGC’s roles in both strategies are unquestionable. In 
this context, the following section will address the IRGC’s activities to implement its goals in 
post-Saddam Iraq. 
Iraq’s Importance to Iran 
Iran’s relations with Iraq have been very complicated and problematic. There is no exact 
figure that shows the proportion of Shiites in Iraq’s total population.  According to the few 
available surveys regarding religious identity in Iraq, more than half of the country’s population 
is Arab originated Shiite. This figure ranges from 47% to 65% according to different sources. 
However, 60 percent is the widely accepted proportion in the literature.140, 141 Thus, Iran 
naturally saw Iraq in its potential sphere of influence and tried to promote its religious influence 
and propagate velayat-e faqih. Despite the large Shiite population, the Iraqi Sunni-dominated 
government was an obstacle to Iran’s determination to spread its revolution next door.  
Both states have historically competed for regional hegemony rather than an ideological 
struggle, but this competition culminated in the eight-year war. As indicated by Ehteshami, 
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“personality clashes, geopolitical rivalries, regime types, and deep suspicion at the leadership 
level combined to escalate a manageable border dispute into a more general conflict, which 
resulted in all-encompassing interstate war. … The war was ultimately about territory, influence, 
and survival—it was not about religion or some historically rooted difference.”142  
Apart from Iraq, Iran was geographically surrounded by potential and already existing 
rivals and threats; Turkey was a NATO member and a long-time US ally; Azerbaijan, despite its 
Shiite dominance, had close relations with the US; the south Arab states, namely the Saudis, 
were already in conflict with Iran. Additionally, with the invasions of Afghanistan in 2002 and 
Iraq in 2003, countries on both Iran’s eastern and western borders were vulnerable to the US. In 
this environment, Iran felt under pressure. Since the 1979 revolution, Iraq has been one of the 
Islamic Republic's main foreign policy challenges. Iraq not only challenged Iran’s hegemonic 
ambitions by isolating it from the Arab world, but also posed a direct security threat to its 
territory, economy, and population.143 The US invasion of Iraq and the ensuing destruction of the 
Saddam regime fundamentally altered the regional balance of power. The invasion encapsulated 
both opportunities and threats for Iran.  
Depending on the level of Iran’s capabilities to shape post-Saddam Iraq, an allied Iraqi 
government would provide a number of benefits in favor of Iran; 
-­‐ An ally Iraqi government would guarantee its western border and then allow 
Tehran to concentrate on its south where a possible U.S. invasion would probably 
be launched.  
-­‐ In addition to Syria and Lebanon, an ally Iraqi government would allow Iran to 
augment its penetration of the Arab world. Iran also would find the opportunity to 
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extend its influence in Lebanon without any obstacle. 
-­‐ It would tilt the balance of power in the Persian Gulf in favor of Iran; a friendly 
Iraq could join Iran, Syria and Lebanon in an alliance against Israel and other 
Sunni rivals.  
-­‐ Lastly, an ally Iraqi government would place Iran in a stronger bargaining 
position and weaken the U.S. strategy of containing Iran. Thus Iran’s position 
would be strengthened in a wide variety of ways, including negotiations on Iran’s 
nuclear program.144 
On the other hand, after removing the Baath regime and ensuing occupation of Iraq by 
the US, Iran would become sole arbiter in the post-Saddam Iraq. A permanent US existence or a 
client regime in Baghdad would pose a great threat in Iran’s calculations; 
-­‐ The presence of the US in its two neighbors caused Iran to think of itself as the 
next target. Bush administration’s preemptive doctrine was an influential factor in 
this thought.  
-­‐ As the new neighbor, the US might easily influence Iran’s domestic affairs and 
intensify its efforts to change its regime. Iran always considered the economic and 
military sanctions that the United States had imposed on it and its supports for the 
opponents of the regime as a part of this goal. 
-­‐ The US, as sole authority in Iraq, might install a client regime in Baghdad instead 
of directly governing Iraq, which is more probable in terms of taking international 
reactions into account. This would also be detrimental to Iran’s national security. 
In this scenario, Iran might experience both invasion and regime change options.  
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Either a permanent US presence or a client regime in Baghdad would not only prevent 
Iran from acquiring the aforementioned benefits, but would also force Iran to be on the alert 
against the world’s most powerful military. 
Since the beginning of the crisis, Iran tried to shape improvements and adopted a strategy 
that included numerous steps. At the outset, in order to satisfy the international community and 
keep all its options open, Tehran declared its policy to be ‘active neutrality’ and stated its 
willingness to play an active role in resolving the crisis. The Iranian foreign minister summarized 
Tehran’s position to the Iranian Parliament as ‘neutral but not indifferent.’145 
Iran’s preliminary preference was to keep Saddam in power. A weak Saddam would be 
better than a pro-American government in Baghdad according to Iranian leaders. To avert the 
invasion, Iran opted for diplomacy. Before the US attack, Iran made every effort to prevent the 
US invasion of Iraq. Iranian leadership tried to convince Iraqi authorities to comply with UN 
resolutions so as to deprive Washington of reasons and began a diplomatic campaign to rally 
Russia, China and EU members as well as regional countries against the war.146 However, these 
efforts were fruitless. 
Following the occupation of Iraq, the victory of the coalition forces and the removal of 
Saddam did not take long. Iranians perceived the invasion of Iraq as a prelude to an offensive 
against themselves. Tehran carried out all its capabilities to defuse the threats resulting from the 
U.S. presence next to Iran’s boundaries. Iran aimed to prevent a possible US attack on Iran, 
shorten the US presence in Iraq, and prevent the United States from establishing a client state or 
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a body composed of Americans to rule Iraq.147, 148, 149  
To these ends, Iran first entertained the idea of a friendly Shiite dominated regime in Iraq 
without the US presence. Thus, Iran tried to directly shape Iraq’s domestic politics through using 
its influence on Shiites. Maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, the restoration of peace and 
stability in Iraq was an essential precondition for the holding of elections. In this context, while 
Iran tried to ensure that the Shiite-inhabited areas of southern and central Iraq remained calm, it 
also urged the more radical leaders of the Iraqi Shiite community to exercise restraint in their 
dealings with the coalition.150 According to Iranian leaders’ calculation, as stated by Takeyh, a 
degree of stability may remove the reasons behind the existence of coalition forces in Iraq.151 On 
the contrary, as stated by Barzegar, “instability in Iraq will not only increase security costs for 
Iran; it will also expose the region to more interference by foreign forces. This will have 
damaging consequences for regional power relations and any security arrangements.”152 Thus, 
Iran adopted a policy of building close relations with all Shiite factions for shaping Iraq’s 
domestic politics in favor of its interests.  Additionally, in parallel with shaping Iraq’s internal 
politics, Iran had also militarily harbored, organized, trained and armed Shiite groups through the 
IRGC and its Quds Force as previously practiced in Lebanon, to repel a possible attack in case of 
any post-invasion eventuality. Iran signaled an asymmetrical striking capability in order to deter 
a possible U.S. and Israel attack and to prevent the institutionalization of a U.S. presence in Iraq. 
In the case of Iraq, Iran’s primary means of attaining its goals was to support the Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, formerly the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
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(SCIRI)) and its military wing Badr organization; Dawah party and conditionally Muqtada al-
Sadr movement and its Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militant group. Iran’s relations with most of these 
Shiite groups had been intensified particularly since the beginning of the Iran–Iraq war. Iran 
supported and sheltered these groups and supported their leaders’ efforts to form political 
movements and militias.153 After the 2003 occupation, relations between Iran and these groups 
regained its strategic importance. 
The Shiite Groups Supported by Iran  
The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, formerly the supreme Council of Islamic Revolution 
in Iraq (SCIRI)) 
The SCIRI has been the closest Iraqi Shiite faction to Iran, which had a military wing 
known as the Badr Corps trained and equipped by the Revolutionary Guards.154 The long-
established relations between Iran and the ISCI date back to the early 1980s. The SCIRI was 
organized by Iran as an umbrella organization including various Iraqi Shiite groups to undermine 
the Saddam regime. Many SCIRI leaders were in exile in Iran during Saddam’s regime. The 
SCIRI was formed under the Sayyid Hadi al-Mudarassi leadership in 1982. Subsequently, during 
the Iran–Iraq war, SCIRI was based in Tehran under the leadership of Mohammad Baqir al-
Hakim. It promoted the idea of installing an Iranian-style government in Iraq and agreed with 
Khomeini’s concept of velayet-e faqih.155  
The group fought with Iran against the Saddam regime, and then supported the Shiite 
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uprising that started with the 1991 Gulf War. When Saddam Hussein succeeded in crushing the 
uprising, the Badr Brigades retreated into Iran.156 
After the overthrow of the Saddam regime, the group quickly tried to empower its 
position in Iraq. Taremi states that when the United States invaded Iraq, the Badr Corps had 
about 16,000 men who had also served throughout the Iran–Iraq War and were a battle-tested 
force.157 
Then the SCIRI made several significant changes; it intensified its efforts to become a 
political actor rather than an armed opposition. It participated in the 2005 elections and won 30 
of the 128 seats designated to the United Iraqi Alliance. On the other hand, it also continued to 
resist Sunni parties through the Badr Corps. In 2007, the SCIRI changed its name to ISCI; 
dropped “revolution” from their name to disassociate itself from militancy. Furthermore, the 
Badr organization officially separated from the ISCI to become an autonomous political party led 
by Hadi al-Amiri.158 Under his leadership, the Badr Corps started to become stronger; while the 
ISCI was getting weaker. In 2009, the ISCI's leader Abdulaziz al-Hakim died and was succeeded 
by his son, Ammar al-Hakim. However, he did not command the same degree of authority and 
respect.159 Over time, ISCI lost its central role in Shiite politics. 
 
Da’wa Party: 
Da’wa is Iraq’s longest surviving Shiite political party.  The actual date of its emergence 
is unclear. Its emergence is placed as occurring in 1958 by most academic scholars, although 
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according to al-Jihad (the Iraqi Islamic movement's weekly newspaper), the party was organized 
in October 1957.160 By late 1979, Da'wa had formed a military wing (later called Shahid as-
Sadr).161 
The ideological outlook of the party owes much to the intellectual work of Muhammad 
Baqir as-Sadr.162 Da’wa, along with other Shiite groups, came together to form the SCIRI (ISCI) 
in Tehran in 1982, after the increasing tensions between Iran and Iraq. During the war, Iran 
backed Da’wa against Saddam’s regime. However, within two years, Da’wa acknowledged its 
dissimilar ideological stance by rejecting the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini and questioning 
the concept of velayet-e faqih and then began to distance itself from the SCIRI.163 Since then this 
improvement has led to splits not only within the Iraqi Shiite opposition and but also within 
Da’wa itself.164  
The SCIRI (ISCI) chairman Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was a supporter of Khomeini’s 
velayet-e faqih concept, thus consequently established very close relations with the Iranian 
regime. While many Da’wa members followed al-Hakim’s lead, others refused him and sought 
to maintain their independence from Iranian political and ideological control. 
Most Da’wa members remained in exile in Iran until the American invasion in 2003. The 
US invasion of Iraq presented Da’wa with an opportunity to join in power-sharing in Iraq that it 
had pursued for over 40 years.165 Following the invasion, Da’wa joined the political process. 
Although its potential was limited due to the lack of an armed militia, through the support of 
powerful groups such as ISCI and Sadrists, Nouri al-Maliki was selected as prime minister in 
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2005 as a compromise choice.166 Since then, all Iraqi prime ministers have been members of the 
Da'wa Party, although Nouri al-Maliki eventually formed a new organization called the State of 
Law without changing his ties to Iran or his sectarian inclinations.167 Da’wa and the ISCI have 
retained close ties to Iran, although they have different approaches. As stated by Takeyh 
“although both parties have no inclination to act as Iran's surrogates, they are likely to provide 
Tehran with a sympathetic audience, and even an alliance that, like all such arrangements, will 
not be free of tension and difficulty.”168  
Muqtada al-Sadr and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) 
As stated by Bruno, Muqtada al-Sadr, who has since emerged as one of the most 
prominent Shiite leaders in the country, had been virtually unknown before the collapse of the 
Saddam regime.169 He comes from a line of extremely influential Iraqi Shiite clerics. His father 
is Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, the founder of the Sadrist Movement in the 
1980s.170 
Sadr was opposed to the invasion and the presence of coalition forces in Iraq. In response 
to the invasion, Muqtada al-Sadr formed the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militant group, also known 
as the Mahdi Army, in 2003 to use violence for expelling coalition forces. Like other Shiite 
militant groups, the Sadr movement and the Mahdi Army flourished in a power vacuum that 
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existed due to political destabilization after the invasion.171 Sadr tried to take the advantage of 
this power vacuum. 
The Mahdi Army was relatively unknown until its clashes with the US forces. “One of 
the earliest occurred in Najaf and Karbala in April 2004, and again in Najaf in August 2004, 
where a standoff around the Imam Ali Mosque left hundreds of Iraqis and nearly a dozen U.S. 
soldiers dead.”172  
Soon after the clashes in 2004, thinking that violence alone could not accomplish his 
goals, Sadr increased his efforts in Iraq’s political arena. He followed the pattern of Hezbollah; 
he used the Mahdi Army to increase visibility and engage in social works. This led the Sadrist 
movement to win 32 of 275 parliamentary seats in December 2005 national elections.173 Since 
then, the Sadrist movement has become one of the most influential actors in Iraqi politics. 
Sadr and his Mahdi Army are followers of Twelver Shiism. In addition to its strong 
Shiite identity, the movement is vehemently Arab nationalist and populist. Sadr believes that 
“Iraq’s Shiite Arabs are the rightful leaders of the Iraqi Shiite community and thus assert that 
Iraq’s government should put Iraqi interests first.” 174 Thus, Sadr kept his distance from the 
Iranian regime and opposed its interventions. For Iran, although Sadr and the Mahdi Army were 
unreliable proxies, Iran had also found them useful for achieving its conditional purposes. Thus, 
Iran likely provided organizational know-how and material aid. For example, Iran provided Sadr 
a safe haven and allowed him to run Mahdi Army operations from their territory between 2007 
and 2011. Furthermore, the IRGC had assisted him in reorganizing the Mahdi Army during his 
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exile in Iran.175  
In addition to the above-mentioned prominent Shiite groups, Iran also organized and used 
the Special Groups, such as Kataib Hizb Allah 176, Asaib Ahl al-Haq177 and the Promised Day 
Brigades 178, for attaining its goals in post-2003 occupied Iraq.  
Apart from political influence-building in Iraq, Iran used paramilitary activities to shape 
the environment against other actors within Iraq: the Coalition Forces, Sunni and other ethnic 
groups. The IRGC and IRGC-QF played a very active roles in this process.179 On September 10, 
2007 Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, stated that “Iran plays a 
harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively 
undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state.”180 The same day, 
General David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, stated in testimony that 
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“[i]t is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the 
Iranian Republic Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi‘ite militia extremists into a 
Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and 
coalition forces in Iraq.”181 
The unclassified documents based on the Harmony Program, launched by the Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) in 2005, clearly show the level of the IRGC and the 
IRGC-QF involvement in Iraqi affairs. These documents contain captured Iraqi intelligence 
reports, working papers, captured Iranian documents in Iraq, and U.S. intelligence reports 
paraphrasing a former Shiite groups and organizations members’ descriptions of their 
activities.182 To show the level and nature of the IRGC/IRGC-QF involvement in Iraq, all 
documents regarding the IRGC’s activities were evaluated in depth. The title and summary of the 
documents are shown below: 
Table 6: Harmony Documents that Show the IRGC's Activities in Iraq 





This document includes numerous Iraqi intelligence reports 
dated as 11 Jul 2001 and 25 Jul 2001. Document describes the 
following Iranian activities; 
- The Iranian regime’s supplies for its agents and Badr 
Corps including significant quantities of explosives, 107 
mm and 122 mm rockets mines, guided missiles, 
launchers, timing devices and pistols with silencers to 
carry out sabotage activities in Iraq. 
- Sabotage activities in Baghdad on orders from the 
Iranian Regime.   
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Document ID & Title Summary 
- Badr Corp recruits from the Iraqi volunteers in Iran. 
Also, the criminal, Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim, 
increased the salaries of their agents.  
- Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim’s coordination with the 
Iranian regime to print 10,000 pamphlets (small booklets 
and a flyer) urging citizens to revolt against the state. 
Redacted Intelligence 
Report 001-028  




There are 28 U.S. intelligence reports that paraphrase former 
Special Group members’ description of their trips to Iran, Syria 
and Lebanon and the details of training given by the members 
of the IRGC, IRGC-QF, and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH). 
Detainee reporting includes following issues in general: 
Daily details of traveling to Iran; pre-travel coordination, 
meeting with other trainees in Iraq, legal/illegal ways and 
methods of crossing border, transportation details, maps and the 
descriptions of course areas, the organizational breakdown of 
the Iraq-based IRGC/LH paramilitary instructed trainer 
specialties, comparison of Lebanese and Iranian instructors (For 
instance; The SG trainees like and respect the Lebanese 
Hezbollah trainers because the Lebanese trainers speak Arabic 
and treat the SG trainees with respect. The Iranian trainers and 
the SG trainees did not get along during the SG training.) 
Regarding courses, detainees mention following issues; 
There were numerous courses conducted at the military 
facilities in Iran;  
Paramilitary instructor training 
Mortar Specialty Training Course  
IED Specialty Training Course  
Weapons Specialty Training Course  
Fighter Course  
Tactics Course 
The Engineer course 
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Document ID & Title Summary 
Support course 
Overall leader course 
Special Forces Training 
Air defense training 
Sniper training (Russian Draganov, German made 12.7,  and M-
16 rifle with a laser sight attached to it) 
In addition to course types, detainees identified following topics 
in these courses; 
Introduction to Tactics, 
How to guard an area, building and set up a perimeter, 
How to fill and stack sandbags to create a large sturdy structure 
that one can hide behind for cover, 
How to apply camouflage to hide, 
Types of terrain, 
The group practiced walking in different formations, 
Ambushes, respond to an ambush, 
The types of fighting that are used in urban environments, 
Small arms maintenance, 
Personal security, 
Operational security,  
Counter-Interrogation training,  
Physical surveillance,  
Detection of physical surveillance,  
Counter-surveillance,  
Use of maps,  
Live firing range day for small arms, 
Watching videos and pictures of successful Lebanese Hezbollah 
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operations.  
Furthermore, relations among Badr Organization, Da’wa Party, 
ISCI, Muqteda al-Sadr and Iran, the nature of relations, Iran’s 
material supports to these groups, and Lebanese Hezbollah 
activities in Iraq explicitly were stated in 28 documents. 
RLSP-2005-000618 
A Letter From the 
Office of the Iranian 
Supreme Leader 
The letter from the Office of Iran’s Supreme Leader to the 
Leader of the IRGC dated JAN 05, 2005 suggests that in case of 
an unexpected result in 2005 Iraqi elections that does not bring 
Iran’s allies to power in Baghdad, Quds Force should prepare 





This document includes Iraqi intelligence correspondence dated 
between 1993 and 1996. The correspondence contains following 
topics: 
Iranian influence in Iraq, 
Important Headquarters and Iranian Intelligence Stations, 
especially which follow Iraqi affairs, 
Information gathered from Iranian regime’s radio regarding 
Iraq, 
Mas'ud Al-Barzani’s visit to Iran,  
Iran’s intelligence activities in Northern Area of Iraq, 
Information source: Mujahidin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), 
an anti-Iranian terrorist organization. 
ISGP-2003-00023756 
Working Paper by the 
Iraqi Anti-Espionage 
Corps 
This working draft was prepared by the Anti-Espionage General 
Office at the Intelligence Service about ‘the disloyal Badr 
Corps.’ The content of document is as follows;  
Its beginning and formation, 
Organization of the Badr Corps (Headquarters, Composition of 
the Divisions, Locations, Formations of the Badr Corps), 
System for the Administrative Division of the Corps, 
Military operations carried out by the Badr Corps 9 against Iraq, 
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Document ID & Title Summary 
Iranian Administration of the disloyal Corps, 
Conflicts inside the Corps, 
Figures of the Corps, 
Its relations with Sadr and Da’wa party. 
ISGP-2003-00027262 
Iraqi Intelligence 
Reports (March 2003) 
This document contains series of Iraqi intelligence reports 
regarding the activities and locations of coalition forces in 
March/April 2003. Additionally, it includes discussion of Iraqi 




Study of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard 
Corps 
This document is a very detailed study on Quds Force. The 
content of the document is as follows; 
The Leadership, 
Goals and Duties, 
Staff Command and al-Quds Forces Command Centers, 
Forces and Corps Designated to Countries, 
Quds Elements in the Embassies, 
The Islamic Associations and Covert Companies, 




Report on Badr 9th Corps, 
Relationship and Correlation between Al-Malali Organization 
and Badr 9th. 
Among headquarters, Ramadan Headquarter (1st Corps) is 
responsible for Iraq. Additionally, Al-Hamzah Command 
Center (3rd Corps) is intended for Turkey and in charge of 
coordinating with anti-Turkish Kurdish groups, subduing the 
Iranian Kurds, as well as carrying-out terrorist operations 
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Document ID & Title Summary 
against the Iranian Kurdish groups in Iraq. 
Brigade Malik Ashtar was under the command of the Ramadan 
command center during the Iranian-Iraqi war. Following the 
completion of operations inside the Iraqi territories, the Brigade 
was attached to Al-Quds Force.  
The document also gives detailed information about Badr 
Corps, which is under the IRGC and mentions relations between 







This Iraqi intelligence document contains reports and 
correspondences that describe Iranian intelligence services, the 
IRGC and the IRGC-QF in detail. The document includes 
following topics; Duties of Headquarters and Corps, the 
leadership, extraterritorial activities of IRGC-QF such as in 
Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, and North Africa. 
ISGQ-2003-00052520  
Iraqi Intelligence 
Reports (2000 & 
2001) 
This document comprises numerous Iraqi intelligence service 
correspondences prepared in 2000-2001 aimed to urge Iraqi 
organizations and authorities regarding operations of Iranian 
intelligence services and groups supported by IRGC.  
ISGQ-2003-00032998 This document includes numerous Iraqi intelligence reports 
from the late 1990s, including the descriptions of fighting 
against Iraqi opposition groups such as the Badr Corps. The 
reports detail Iraq’s suspicions of Iranian support for Iraqi 
groups and describe various activities along the Iraq/Iran border. 
ISGQ-2005-00038283 
Iraqi Intelligence 
Study about the Badr 
Corps 
This document is a very detailed study of Iraqi intelligence that 
was prepared in 2002. The study is largely based on confessions 
made by two members of the Corps’ cadre arrested by the 
General Security Office. The document covers the following 
topics;   




Document ID & Title Summary 
Corps’ axes,  
Corps’ formations connected to the Chief of Staff of the Corps,  
Locations of some Corps’ formations,  
Corps’ fighting force, leading elements, armament, equipment, 
administrative affairs, financial resources, recruiting methods, 
Training and preparation,  
Privileges granted to the Corps’ elements,  
Facilities granted to the Corps’ elements,  
Law for the Purchase of the Service,  
Corps’ relationship with the sons of the fugitive tribes to Iran,  
Organizational activity on the inside and its method,  
Execution of the operations and Methods of infiltration,  
Transportation methods of weapons and missiles to Iraq  
Important meetings after September 11, 2001,  
Corps’ plans upon the occurrence of the crisis,  
Corps’ instructions for the Northern region.  
ISGQ-2004-02311818 
Statement by Badr 
Corps 
This 2007 document was prepared for Badr Corps members 
around the time of the coalition invasion of Iraq. The document 
enunciates strategies to act against Sunni groups and also to 
cooperate with the coalition forces in the belief that Badr 




This document includes a series of Iraqi Intelligence 
correspondence and reports prepared in 2003 including 
information about following topics;   
The conference held by the Intelligence Service to discuss the 
plan that was designed by the Ministry of Defense to deploy 
units of the Iranian National Liberation Army in case of any 
aggression against Iraq, 
The IRGC’s and Basij forces' maneuvers during December 
2002,  
The activities of the Iranian National Liberation Army, 
A meeting that was held with Mas’ud Rajawi, the Commander 
in Chief of the Iranian Liberation Army, to determine what 
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Document ID & Title Summary 
steps to take in case of an American attack on Iraq,  
The important activities of Iranian troops, 
Iranian traitor activities in the southern and middle sectors, 
Iranian Weapons Sources and a report about new arms deals 
made by Iran information about Iranian agents’ activities 
obtained from the field of operations. 
MNCI-2005-001140 
Iraqi Intelligence 
Report about the Quds 
Force Activities in 
Iraq 
This document is an Iraqi intelligence report about Quds Force 
activities in Iraq. The Document covers the following issues; 
The activities of Arkan Isnad al-Kawthar, which practices 
economic, construction, commerce, supply and passenger 
transportation openly.  It was established by Al-Quds force to 
create a suitable infrastructure for its intelligence officers in 
Iraq, on a large scale, in order to provide support to those 
groups who are loyal to Iran. The Guard General Mansur Haq is 
in the leadership of the Al-Kawthar organization, and he works 
under the direct supervision of Qasim Sulaymani, who is the 
General Commander of the Al-Quds Force. 
According to the document, assignments and responsibilities of 
Arkan Isnad al-Kawthar  are as follows: 
- To secure and support the Badr Corps, and the different 
groups belonging to Al-Quds force, such as the 
movement of Hezbollah, Sha’aban, Sayid al-Shuhada’ 
Movement, and Tharallah. 
- To distribute the food supply and products among the 
citizens to gain the support of the society. 
- To establish companies as a cover in order to transport 
the elements of the Al-Quds force into Iraq. 
- Coordination and supervision of the activities of all the 
economic and social organizations belonging to the 
Iranian regime in Iraq. 
NMEC-2007-624223 
Insurgent Group 
This document describes a large militant organization in 
southern Iraq. The document outlines the number of fighters and 
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political operatives available in numerous southern cities. The 
exact organization is not identified. 
MNCI-2005-001143 
Report on Tharallah 
(God’s Rebel’s) 
This document is a report prepared on Iraqi Tharallah group, 
which is active mostly near Iraq’s southern city of Basrah. The 
document describes the linkages between the Tharallah group 
and the Quds Force, the leadership, its illegal activities. 
Source: CTC-West Point. 
As understood from the unclassified Harmony documents project, launched by the 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC), the IRGC was very actively involved in Iraqi 
domestic affairs before and during the 2003 occupation of Iraq. As seen in the documents, the 
range of support to Iraqi Shiite groups by the IRGC is very broad. 
All in all, since the beginning of the crisis, there was a three level strategy that were 
gradually and reactively adopted by Iran: 
-­‐ Preventing the US invasion,  
-­‐ Preventing a permanent US presence or a client regime in Baghdad 
-­‐ Establishing a friendly Shi’ite dominated regime in Iraq 
To these ends, Iran followed subsequent strategies; 
-­‐ Diplomacy:  
Besides Afghanistan, the second front with the US seemed very risky to Iran. According 
to calculations of Iranian ruling elites, a weaker Saddam would be better than being surrounded 
by the US, which openly threated Iran with an attack and regime change. Iran tried to prevent the 
US invasion of Iraq and started a diplomatic campaign to rally Russia, China and EU members 
as well as other countries in the region against the US attack. 
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-­‐ Shaping Iraqi domestic politics:  
Iran encouraged, organized and coordinated all Shiite groups to establish an ally Shiite-
dominated regime. To this end, Iran tried to remove all obstacles to a stable Iraq. By this means, 
Tehran could accelerate the coalition forces’ withdrawal by eliminating the reasons for their 
presence in Iraq and could achieve the preconditions for holding elections, which would 
subsequently enable the establishment of a friendly Shiite-dominated government. 
-­‐ Controlled chaos for deterrence by using Shiite groups:  
With this strategy, Iran aimed to signal its asymmetrical striking capability to deter 
Coalition Forces, particularly the US, and to prevent the institutionalization of a U.S. presence in 
Iraq and a possible attack on Iran. Additionally, Iran also used this strategy against Sunni groups 
to suppress them. 
At the beginning of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iran’s Iraq policy was driven by a fear of 
U.S. intentions. Since the inception of the crisis, Iran systematically worked with Iraqi Shiite 
leaders and groups. Based on findings from resources and Harmony documents, it seems that the 
IRGC (including IRGC-QF) served as a node of Iran’s various forms of support for Iraqi Shiite 
groups, ranging from military training, harboring, providing military supply (explosives, 
ammunition, weapons) and intelligence, to organizing and coordinating the activities (including 
sabotage and attacks) of Shiite groups. With the 2005 elections, Iran reached the goal of 
establishing a friendly Shiite-dominated regime in Iraq.  
 Since the deployment of the IRGC contingent to Lebanon in the early 1980s, particularly 
the 2005 Iraqi elections, 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war, 2011 Syrian crisis, the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS)’s activities in Iraq have produced situations enhancing Iran and Shiite roles in 
the power structure of the region. 
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It is also worth noting that post-ISIS period Iran publicly confirmed the presence of the 
Quds force and the Quds Force Commander General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq, in contrast to the 
previous period. In June 2014, ISIS made considerable advances in Syria and Iraq, which are 
close allies of Iran. ISIS’s advances in both states were accepted as significant threats to Iran’s 
interests. Iran openly declared its concerns and emphasized the importance and safety of Shiite 
cities such as Karbala and Najaf, as well strategic cities such as Damascus, Baghdad and Irbil. 
Thus, Iran progressively increased its involvement in both states. To preserve its gains, Iran did 
not hesitate to show its activities against the common enemy, ISIS. Photos of Soleimani in Iraq 
engaging with various groups were actively shared in the social media. Soleimani, with 100 
Quds Force members, planned to create a volunteer militia similar to the National Defense Force 
in Syria to fight against ISIS alongside the weak and demoralized Iraqi army.183  
The Tikrit operation is a good illustration of IRGC-QF and Gen. Soleimani’s level of 
involvement in Iraqi affairs. In March 2015, a combination of 30,000 Iraqi militiamen and 
security forces launched a campaign to retake Tikrit from ISIS. Gen Soleimani has been pictured 
on the outskirts of the city in photos shared widely on social media. According to media reports, 
Gen Soleimani and members of the Guards and the Quds Force were actively involved in the 
operation.184, 185  
Lastly, although it is not the focus of this study, a brief mention of Iran’s activities in 
Syria would contribute to further understanding of the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities. With the 
beginning of the 2011 crisis in Syria, Iran faced losing its vital ally in the region. The toppling of 
                                                
183 Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, “Iran’s ISIS Policy,” International Affairs 91, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 8, 
doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12183. 
184 “Iraq Moves against Islamic State in Tikrit,” BBC News, accessed January 26, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31689433. 




the Assad regime and the institution of a new Sunni regime not only would cause the loss of a 
long-time ally, but would also block access to their most important proxy group, the Lebanese 
Hezbollah, among a scarcity of regional allies. Thus, as in Iraq, Tehran aimed to preserve Syria's 
territorial integrity and keep Bashar al-Assad in power. To this end, Iran politically, financially 
and militarily supported the Assad regime. Besides training, advising, intelligence gathering and 
analysis, the IRGC and the IRGC-QF members are believed to be fighting for Assad. As an 
indication of the IRGC’s current extraterritorial engagement, according to Terrill, between  
2012-2015, at least four high-ranking IRGC generals -Iranian Brigadier General Hasan Shateri 
who was from the Quds Force and whose funeral was attended by Major General Qasem 
Soleymani; Brigadier General Mohammad Jamali-Paqal‘eh, who is believed to have been 
commanding Quds Force units in Syria at the time, IRGC Brigadier General ‘Abdollah 
Eskandari (probably also of the Quds Force), and IRGC general Mohammad ‘Ali Allahdadi were 
killed in Syria.186 Moreover,  as stated by Alfoneh, 254 people, most of whom were affiliated 
with the IRGC-QF have been killed between January 2013 and August 2015, according to open 
source data collected from Persian-language accounts of funerals in Iran.187 
Additionally, as a last example showing clearly the involvement of IRGC members in the 
Syrian war, BBC news released captured tapes that had been filmed as part of a project 
conceived to help recruitment and other internal uses for the IRGC. From conversations in the 
footage, it is understood that they are somewhere to the south of the northern Syrian city of 
Aleppo. The Iranians seem to be in command of the group. The commander says that they are 
fighting as part of the National Defense Force. He also states that ‘Syrian fighters are friendly 
with their Iranian counterparts and at ease fighting alongside them because they were trained in 
                                                
186 W. Andrew Terrill, “Iran’s Strategy for Saving Asad,” The Middle East Journal 69, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 230–
231. 
187 Alfoneh, “Shiite Combat Casualties Show the Depth of Iran’s Involvement in Syria.” 
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Iran and are familiar with Iranians and their attitudes.’ According to the BBC research, the 
commander on camera is Ismail Haidari who is a senior commander of the IRGC.188 
In this chapter, the level and characteristics of the IRGC’s involvement in extraterritorial 
activities were addressed through two cases.  Findings from the two cases and the dynamics 
between Iranian foreign policy goals and the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities will be evaluated 
in the following chapters. 
 
                                                





ASSESSING THE IRGC’S EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTIVITIES 
Introduction 
In chapter two, the characteristics of Iran’s foreign policy and foreign policy goals were 
presented. In chapter three, the regime’s use of the IRGC (including the IRGC-QF) in attaining 
its foreign policy goals was analyzed through two cases; the IRGC’s relations with Lebanese 
Hezbollah and Shiite groups in post-2003 Iraq.  
In chapter two, Iran’s broad foreign policy goals are defined as follows;  
-­‐ Regime survival which is an indispensable (sine qua non) goal of Iran foreign 
policy above all else,  
-­‐ State security and survival (the defense of Iranian territory against external 
threats), 
-­‐ Projecting power and becoming the dominant power in the region. 
In chapter three, Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups in post-2003 Iraq cases 
showed how the IRGC has taken active roles in achieving these foreign policy goals.  
Since the deployment of the IRGC contingent to Lebanon in the early 1980s, the 
influence of IRGC’s activities have been seen in Lebanon, the Iran–Iraq war, the 2005 Iraqi 
elections, 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war and 2011 Syrian crisis, which produced situations 
enhancing Iranian and the Shiite influence in the region. 
In addition to these strategic gains, the IRGC has served as an asymmetrical striking 
capability to deter its enemies. Iran has intentionally avoided any conventional confrontation 
with its enemies. This strategy has made the IRGC an important tool in implementing national 
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and ideological interests, as well as against perceived threats. 
Iran’s use of the IRGC in extraterritorial activities leads to several questions: What is the 
basis of these activities in international law? Are these activities categorized as state sponsorship 
of terrorism? If so, what is the regime’s real motivation behind the decision to use the IRGC’s in 
extraterritorial activities, in spite of the risk of being labeled as a terrorism sponsor? 
Since the revolution, Iran has always prioritized internal security concerns above external 
ones. Iran's first priority has consistently remained the survival of the regime. Thus, other set of 
questions arises at this point: How have the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities served this end? 
How does the regime legitimize the IRGC’s activities? How does the IRGC contribute to the 
regime’s legitimacy? To answer these questions, this chapter will focus on how the IRGC’s 
extraterritorial activities contribute to the survival of the regime. This chapter is structured as 
follows: 
-­‐ International Law and the IRGC’s Extraterritorial Activities 
-­‐ State Sponsorship of Terrorism and the IRGC’s Extraterritorial Activities 
-­‐ Why do States Support Terrorism? 
-­‐ What is the difference between ‘regime survival’ and ‘state survival’? 
-­‐ Domestic and External Conditions that Made the Regime Survival the Obsession 
of the Ruling Elites 
-­‐ Analysis and Conclusion 
International Law and the IRGC’s Extraterritorial Activities 
"Armed forces" are defined in Article 43(1) of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva 
Conventions as comprising:  
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The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups 
and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its 
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not 
recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal 
disciplinary system which, ' inter alia ', shall enforce compliance with the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict.1 
The IRGC fits all above-mentioned descriptions and it is officially recognized as a branch 
of Iran's Armed Forces under Article 150 of the Iranian Constitution. According to Article 150, 
the scope of its duties and responsibilities are to be determined by law. The Chief Commander of 
the Guardians is appointed by the Supreme Leader. The IRGC has a hierarchical command 
structure that includes about 120,000 uniformed men on active duty, naval and air force units in 
addition to its ground troops, and it has its own statute. 
Initially, the scope of the duties and the missions of the IRGC have been designed 
according to the regime’s ideological agenda. However, in the meantime because of domestic 
and external pressures, Iran has adopted more pragmatic policies that are driven by strategic 
calculations instead of ideological ones. Afterward, the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities have not 
been limited by goals of supporting foreign liberation movements and exporting the revolution, 
over time these tasks have been transformed to sustaining and expanding its sphere of influence, 
and conducting counter activities against Iran’s perceived enemies. 
While the IRGC has the characteristics of regular conventional armed forces, the Regime 
has unconventionally and asymmetrically used it in Lebanon and post-2003 occupied Iraq. The 
UN Charter defines the conditions of legitimate use of armed forces. The following statements 
define the frame of legitimate uses of armed forces; 
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Article 2(3) provides that  
[a]ll members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.2 
Article 2(4) contains an encompassing prohibition against the use of military force: 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of force 
against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 3 
There are two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of armed force: 
-­‐ According to Article 39, under an authorization by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, in response to “any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace or act of aggression… in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.” Article 41 proposes “the Security 
Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed” As a last option, in case of inadequacy of measures provided for in 
Article 41, according to Article 42, the Security Council may decide to use of 
military force.4   
-­‐ In a case of self-defense under Article 51: 
-­‐ Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of 
                                                
2 “Charter of the United Nations Chapter I,” United Nations, accessed February 19, 2016, 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/. 
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self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not 
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.5  
In addition to the above-mentioned conditions, ‘intervention by invitation’ and 
‘humanitarian intervention’ are other possible legal justifications for the use of force, which are 
based largely on customary international law. In circumstance of ‘intervention by invitation’, 
“the government of a State is entitled to request assistance from other States in the suppression of 
rebel groups.” 6 The last condition is “a developing customary international law right of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention – that is an intervention, for humanitarian purposes, which 
has not been authorized by the Security Council.”7 
Given the conditions of the use of military force, in both the Lebanese Hezbollah and 
post-2003 occupied Iraq cases, the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities are out of the above-
mentioned legal frame of use of force. Furthermore, following major resolutions condemn the 
state participation in acts of international terrorism; 
-­‐ General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of 
irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory 
of another State;8 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 Michael Byers, “Terrorism, The Use of Force and International Law After 11 September,” International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 51, no. 02 (April 2002): 158, doi:10.1093/iclq/51.2.401. 
7 Ibid. 
8 “General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV)  Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” UN Documents, 
October 24, 1970, http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm. 
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organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, 
when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force;9 
-­‐ General Assembly Resolution 42/22 of 18 November 1987: 
States shall fulfil their obligations under international law to refrain from organizing, 
instigating, or assisting or participating in paramilitary, terrorist or subversive acts, 
including acts of mercenaries, in other States, or acquiescing in organized activities 
within their territory directed towards the commission of such acts.10 
Despite their non-binding nature, these resolutions, under customary international law, 
created shared values to refrain any states from supporting terrorist activities. 
The IRGC’s support for Hezbollah has been crucial for Hezbollah’s long-standing life 
and its success. Iran provided the organization with a wide range of support; the IRGC’s 
indoctrination-fueled Shiite consciousness and the spread of revolutionary values among 
Lebanese Shiite community. The ideological mobilization enabled Hezbollah to find human 
resources and material support from the Lebanese Shiite community and to sustain its longevity 
and flourish. Military training given by the IRGC allowed Hezbollah to attain its goals through 
violent activities and subsequently made it one of the most influential actors in Lebanon. By 
providing safe havens, Iran allowed Hezbollah to improve its organizational structure, to 
establish training centers, to have a long-range strategy and to plan all paramilitary and political 
activities. Iran’s material aid (financial, weaponry and logistics aid) empowered both 
Hezbollah’s military and political wings. By participating in decision-making, the IRGC not only 
contributed to Hezbollah’s organizational/structural establishment but also to its strategy-making 
through its know-how and intelligence providing.  
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According to the Global Terrorism Database, the number of Hezbollah or Hezbollah 
suspected fatalities is roughly 1200 between 1983 and 2014. Because of such activities, the 
organization is designated as a terrorist organization by the states mentioned in the previous 
chapter.  
In post-2003 occupied Iraq, Iran adopted a multi-layered strategy; Iran adopted a policy 
of building close relations with all Shiite factions for shaping Iraq’s domestic politics in favor of 
its interests.  Additionally, in parallel with shaping Iraq’s internal politics, Iran had also used the 
IRGC and its Quds Force as previously practiced in Lebanon to repel a possible attack in case of 
any post-invasion eventuality. Iran signaled an asymmetrical striking capability to deter a 
possible U.S. and Israel attack and to prevent the institutionalization of a U.S. presence in Iraq. 
Additionally Iran also aimed to suppress all Iraqi rivals, particularly Sunnis that potentially posed 
threats to its interests.  
Based on the Harmony documents mentioned in previous chapter, it is clear that the 
IRGC and IRGC-QF served as a node of Iran’s support for Iraqi Shiite groups, which ranges 
from the broad spectrum of military training, harboring, providing military supply (explosives, 
ammunition, weapons) and intelligence, to organizing and coordinating the activities (including 
sabotage and attacks) of Shiite groups. With the 2005 elections, Iran has reached the goal of 
establishing a friendly Shiite dominated regime in Iraq. 
High-ranking US officials, Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, and General 
David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, explicitly condemned Iran’s 
activities in Iraq. Both stated that Iran provided lethal capabilities to the Shiite groups and sought 
to create a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests. 
Taken together, both cases, the activities of the IRGC and the IRGC-QF, do not fit 
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regular use of army and these activities are widely accepted as the state sponsorship of terrorism. 
This raises questions about the ‘state sponsorship of terrorism’ and Iran’s classification as such. 
Thus, in the section that follows, the state sponsorship of terrorism will be briefly examined. 
State Sponsorship of Terrorism and the IRGC’s Extraterritorial Activities  
State-sponsored terrorism is a sub-topic of terrorism. Davis and Jenkins divide the actors 
of a ‘terrorist system’ into the following categories; “top leaders, lieutenants, foot soldiers, 
recruiters, external suppliers and facilitators, and heads of supportive states.”11 In this actor 
categorization, state-sponsored terrorism can be found in the categories of ‘external suppliers and 
facilitators, and heads of supportive states.’ As can be understood from the name of phenomena, 
there are two components of the topic; terrorism and state behavior. In the following section 
concentration will be on both components.  
Rapoport posited four distinct waves of modern terrorism. The first wave is ‘anarchist’ 
(1880s-1920s), the second is ‘anti-colonial’ (1920s-1960s), the third wave is ‘new left wing’ that 
ended in the 1990s, and the fourth and most recently is ‘religious wave’ which began in 1979 
with the Iranian Revolution.12 In modern terrorism history, the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 was the watershed which was also end of the Ropoport’s first wave. 
Rather than the assassination, the suspicion of rival state involvement in the sponsorship of the 
killing catalyzed the major powers into taking violent action and caused World War I. Taking 
into account the results of this suspicion, although it was a turning point in history, this early 
example of state-sponsored terrorism does not characterize today’s state-sponsored terrorism. 
                                                
11 Paul K. Davis and Brian M. Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism a Component in the War on Al 
Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, ©2002, 2002), 15. 
12 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” Anthropoetics: The Journal of 
Generative Anthropolgy, Spring / Summer 2002, http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror.htm. 
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The height of state-sponsored terrorism was represented by the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. 
As a result of technological advances and subsequently dramatic explosion of international 
media influence, terrorism gained a firmly international character during the 1970s and 1980s.13 
Cronin explains the progression of the relations between national causes and terrorist 
organizations during and after these periods;  
Individual, scattered national causes began to develop into international organizations 
with links and activities increasingly across borders and among differing causes. This 
development was greatly facilitated by the covert sponsorship of states such as Iran, 
Libya, and North Korea, and of course the Soviet Union, which found the 
underwriting of terrorist organizations an attractive tool for accomplishing 
clandestine goals while avoiding potential retaliation for the terrorist attacks.14 
This interaction between states and terrorist organizations has created the phenomena of 
state sponsorship of terrorism. 
The term ‘terrorism’ has no precise or a widely accepted definition in academic and 
policy environments. Simon states that there are more than 200 definitions of terrorism.15 What 
is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one’s point of view. As stated by Cronin, “Terrorism 
is intended to be a matter of perception and is thus seen differently by different observers.”16 In 
literature, according to Richard Jackson, there are several approaches to determine terrorism; 
first approach is defining terror as a an ideology, the second is an actor-based approach that 
defines terrorism as a particular form of political violence committed by non-state actors who 
attack civilians, the third and most common approach defines terrorism as a violent strategy or 
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tactic that actors employ in pursuit of particular political goals.17 At this point I find fruitless to 
argue which definition explains the phenomena of ‘terrorism.’ 
Richard Jackson’s perspective on definitional ambiguity is explanatory; 
Most definitions of terrorism by leading scholars for example, describe it as a form of 
illegitimate violence directed towards innocent civilians that is intended to intimidate 
or terrify an audience for political purposes. The question of what makes an act of 
violence legitimate or not, who is considered a civilian, how innocence can be 
measured, what the real intentions of often clandestine actors might be and what 
counts as a political aim, are all highly contested and subject to competing claims.18 
As we can understand from this perspective, it is not easy to create a widely-accepted 
definition of terrorism, but we know it when we see it thanks to its well-known characteristics. 
Thus, instead of being busy with questions of definition, I find focusing on common 
characteristics of terrorism more useful in understanding it. Hoffman defines terrorism as having 
five distinguishing characteristics:  
-­‐ Ineluctably political in aims and motives  
-­‐ Violent – or, equally important, threatens violence  
-­‐ Designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate 
victim or target  
-­‐ Conducted by an organization and  
-­‐ Perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.19 
There is a strong link between definition of terrorism and its goals. As goals of terrorism 
have varied overtime, we have faced the new versions of the definition. Andrew H. Kydd and 
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Barbara F. Walter state that despite the changing nature of terrorism, five goals have remained 
valid; “regime change, policy change, territorial change, social control, and status quo 
maintenance.”20 In Walter and Kydd’s words; 
Regime Change is the overthrow of a government and its replacement with one led by 
the terrorists or at least one more to their liking. Policy Change Policy change is a 
broader category of lesser demands, such as al-Qaida’s demand that the United States 
drop its support for Israel and corrupt Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia. Territorial 
Change is taking territory away from a state either to establish a new state or to join 
another state. Social control constrains the behavior of individuals, rather than the 
state. Finally, status quo maintenance is the support of an existing regime or a 
territorial arrangement against political groups that seek to change it.21 
In order to analyze the range of goals and their relative frequency, Kydd and Walter 
examine forty-two terrorist organizations, which are designated as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTOs) by the U.S. State Department. Of the forty-two groups, “thirty-one seek 
regime change, nineteen seek territorial change, four seek policy change, one seeks to maintain 
the status quo.”22 These goals of terrorism, to some extent, may overlap with states’ political 
objectives against a target state and that may allow them to move together against a common 
target. This is the point where ‘state sponsorship of terrorism’ emerges.  
As in ‘terrorism’, definitional ambiguity also exists for the term of ‘state-sponsored 
terrorism.’ Before asserting the definition, it is important to clarify at the outset what the 
expression of state sponsorship does not include. Firstly, the term "state sponsorship" does not 
cover domestic state terrorism that can be practiced against a regime’s own population for 
different reasons. Second, the term does not include instances of state terrorism that occur during 
war. Each of these conditions has different political and legal meaning. 
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According to the U.S. State Department, state sponsors of terrorism are described as 
“countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism.”23 This definition refers to three laws which explicitly designate only one 
form of sponsorship; “the recurring use of any part of the territory of the country as a sanctuary 
for terrorists and terrorist organizations.”24 However, the spectrum of state sponsorship of 
terrorism is not as limited as it is in this definition. 
State sponsorship is generally defined as any country’s deliberate support of terrorist 
groups for achieving a desired political or strategic objective against another country. This 
deliberate support can be implemented by providing funds, weapons, logistics, training, 
intelligence and bases. One prominent feature of this definition is ‘a desired political or strategic 
objective’ of sponsor state. In this approach, overlapping of ‘desired political or strategic 
objectives’ and ‘the goals of terrorist groups’ establish the origin of this phenomenon in the most 
of the cases; however, in the some forms of sponsorship, this overlapping may not exist. 
Among many definitional approaches, Daniel Byman’s definition has a particular 
explanatory power. Byman, who has authored some of the most recent works on state-sponsored 
terrorism, defines state sponsorship of terrorism as “a government’s intentional assistance to a 
terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities or sustain the organization.”25 
In his definition, he defines state sponsorship by eliminating sponsor states’ political objectives 
for extending its spectrum.  
Although, in recent history, many authors have examined state-sponsored terrorism in 
specific cases, such as Iran, Soviet Union, and Pakistan’s support for terrorism, there has not 
                                                
23 Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, “State Sponsors of 
Terrorism,” January 20, 2009, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Byman, Deadly Connections, 63. 
177 
 
been improved broad generalization and a specific definition. 
In addition to the changing nature of terrorism over time, the absence of generalization 
mostly originates from the varieties of the methods of state support, the sponsor state’s level of 
involvement, and the sponsor state’s objectives for providing support. Unsurprisingly, most 
authors tend to address the issue in the context of the sponsor state’s level of involvement. In 
terms of the legal consequences of complicity, this perspective makes sense.  
Richard Erickson, in his book Legitimate Use of Military Force against State-Sponsored 
International Terrorism, identifies four levels of state involvement “from greatest to least: 
sponsorship, support, toleration, and inaction through inability to act.”26 Erickson’s 
categorization of the level of involvement ranges from sponsorship where a state directly 
controls international terrorism as a means of gaining strategic advantage, to inaction where “the 
state does not wish to ignore international terrorists within its borders but lacks the ability to 
respond effectively.”27 In ‘support’ the state does not control the terrorists, but the activities of 
the terrorists which serve the interests of the state are encouraged, and the state provides 
expertise and material aid to the terrorists. In ‘toleration,’ the state neither actively supports 
terrorists, nor impedes its activities.28 
While Jenkins and Hoffman have researched the subject in depth, they have not broadly 
focused on defining levels of involvement. Hofmann, in Inside Terrorism, states that sponsor 
state supplies the “resources of an established nation state’s entire diplomatic, military, and 
intelligence apparatus”29 to terrorist organizations. Jenkins, in Defense against Terrorism, 
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mentions that states contribute to organizations “money, sophisticated munitions, intelligence, 
and technical expertise.”30 As seen, for these two authors, there is no specific categorization of 
the level of involvement.  
Byman performs a comprehensive analysis of the topic in his book ‘Deadly Connections: 
States That Sponsor Terrorism.’ Byman identifies six specific types of state sponsorship: 
-­‐ Strong Supporters, 
Strong supporters decisively support the terrorist group and are capable of providing 
broad range of state resources to this group.  
-­‐ Weak Supporters, 
Weak supporters have desire to support the terrorist organization, but not the capacity to 
offer necessary resources.  
-­‐ Lukewarm Supporters, 
In this category, states seem rhetorically support the terrorist group, but do little actual 
tangible support.  
-­‐ Antagonistic Supporters, 
Antagonistic supporters appear to be supporting the terrorist group in search of 
controlling it or weakening its cause.    
-­‐ Passive Supporters, 
Passive supporters do not directly provide aid to the terrorist group but intentionally turn 
a blind eye to its activities.  
-­‐ Unwilling Hosts. 
In this category, states are incapable of stopping terrorists, thus unwillingly allow their 
territory and resources to them. In Byman words, “such hosts are not ‘supporters’ of terrorism 
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but rather its victims.31  
Byman attempts to take this argument further in an analysis paper entitled “The 
Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism.”32 In it, he describes ‘a spectrum of 
sponsorship’ that ranges from ‘direct control to support through incapacity.’33 He introduces two 
new sub categories; active and passive support. In Passive Support of Terrorism, according to 
Byman, “active state sponsorship involves a deliberate regime decision to assist a terrorist group, 
often in the form of arms, money, training or sanctuary.”34 
Byman identifies three types of active state sponsorship of terrorism: 
a) Control: Some states directly control the terrorist groups they support: the 
group is in essence a cat’s paw of the state.  
b) Coordination: Absolute control is rare, but states often try to coordinate 
the activities of terrorist groups to best serve the state’s interests. These 
groups, however, have their own agendas and operate with some degree of 
independence from their sponsors.  
c) Contact: States are regularly in contact with terrorist groups, at times 
engaging in minor tactical coordination or simply trying to keep channels 
open for possible future coordination.35 
In passive sponsorship, “a regime can be said to be guilty of passive support if it 
knowingly allows a terrorist group to raise money, enjoy a sanctuary, recruit or otherwise 
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flourish without interference, but does not directly aid the group itself.”36 Byman’s passive 
sponsorship is characterized as: 
The regime in question itself does not provide assistance but knowingly allows other 
actors in the country to aid a terrorist group; the regime has the capacity to stop this 
assistance or has chosen not to develop this capacity; and often passive support is 
given by political parties, wealthy merchants or other actors in society that have no 
formal affiliation with the government.37 
Passive state sponsored terrorism, argues Byman, also manifests itself in three different 
forms: 
a) Knowing toleration: Some governments may make a policy decision not to 
interfere with a terrorist group that is raising money, recruiting, or otherwise 
exploiting its territory. In essence, the regime wants the group to flourish and 
believes that by not acting it can help it do so.  
b) Unconcern or ignorance: Some states may not seek to further a terrorist group’s 
activities, but they may not bother to stop it, either because they do not believe its 
activities are extensive or because they do not believe the group’s activities affect 
the state’s interest.  
c) Incapacity: Some states do not fully control their territory or the government is 
too weak vis-à-vis key domestic actors that do support terrorism to stop the 
activities.38 
According to Byman, a state’s level of involvement depends on two parameters; State 
policy (it ranges from support to oppose), and State capacity (it ranges from high to low.) 
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Figure 9: A Notional Spectrum of State Support 
 
Source: Deadly Connections; States that Sponsor Terrorism, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1139 
In the scope of Figure 9 rather than suggesting state support as an “all-or-nothing” 
classification, it is more accurate to describe it as a spectrum. In terms of two parameters, figure 
one depicts the spectrum of involvement between the state and the terrorist organization. The 
lowest level of involvement is ‘incapacity’ in which the state possesses no capability to assist or 
impede the terrorist organization that is operating within its borders, and the highest level of the 
involvement is ‘direct Control’ in which the state exercises complete control over the 
organization, to include ideology and operations.  
Why do States Support Terrorism? 
As mentioned earlier, there are several levels of state involvement. The lowest level of 
involvement is ‘incapacity’ which generally originates from the sponsor state’s failing or failed 
state character. James A. Piazza, in Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote 
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Transnational Terrorism?, defines failed and failing states as “the states that due to severe 
challenges cannot monopolize the use of force vis-a-vis other non-state actors in society and are 
therefore incapable of fully projecting power within their national boundaries.”40 Due to the lack 
of the ability to project power throughout their national territory and having incompetent and 
corrupt law enforcement capacities, failed and failing states provide opportunities and suitable 
conditions for terrorist groups to organize, train, generate revenue, and set up logistics and 
communications beyond those afforded by the network of safe houses in non-failed states.41 
Bruce Hoffman, in Inside Terrorism, also addresses some states’ relatively weak position 
and their relations with terrorist organizations. According to him they are economically, 
politically weak and their conventional military forces are obsolete and outclassed by their 
adversaries. “Using terrorist proxies rather than government agents allows a degree of deniability 
to them, which in turn reduces the chances of retaliation from more powerful states that possess 
stronger economies and militaries. [italic added]”42 Bruce Hoffman’s perspective evokes the 
asymmetry debate. “The term ‘asymmetric strategies’ is often used to label approaches that 
underdogs might employ to avoid direct military confrontation; and to focus instead on 
exploiting key political and military vulnerabilities such as the perceived Western sensitivity to 
casualties and collateral damage.”43 The growing technological gap in conventional military 
capabilities between weak and a strong state pushes the weak state to attempt to circumvent the 
strong state’s conventional superiority in order to avoid a force on-force military confrontation. 
Therefore, the high possibility of defeat in case of a war with a stronger state, and in order to 
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deny its role as an aggressor, avoid retaliation, a weaker state can sponsor terrorism covertly 
Richardson also looks at the issue through the same lenses; 
State sponsorship of terrorism has had relatively low risk because it is so difficult to 
prove and may serve to achieve a state's foreign policy objectives. If it does not, it is 
easily deniable. Moreover, the primacy placed on human life by Western, 
democracies leaves them very vulnerable to attack through their individual citizens 
because there are so many of them in so many places. So state sponsorship is often 
low cost, easy to deny, and difficult to prove, and has potential for a high payoff. It 
should come as no surprise that relatlvely weak states resort to the support of 
terrorists to strike against their more powerful enemies.44  
Audrey Kurth Cronin ties this perspective to globalization. According to her; “the 
objectives of international terrorism have also changed as a result of globalization. Foreign 
intrusions and growing awareness of shrinking global space have created incentives to use the 
ideal asymmetrical weapon, terrorism, for more ambitious purposes.”45 
Byman makes a comprehensive categorization in terms of states’ motivations behind 
their support for terrorist groups. According to him, “understanding motivations is vital both for 
predicting when a state might support a terrorist group and for determining how to end this 
backing.”46 He examines the motivations of nine states’ sponsorship in 38 instances. The 
motivations are divided into three categories; strategic, ideological, and domestic. All three 
categories of motivations and their sub categories are shown below; 
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Table 7: Categorization of States Motivations in Support for Terrorist Groups 
Strategic Ideological Domestic 
Destabilize or weaken 
neighbor 
Enhance international prestige Aid kin 
Project power 




Changing a regime   
Shaping an opposition   
Source: Deadly Connections; States that Sponsor Terrorism, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21-5047 
In order to advance the security and power that are core concerns for any state, strategic 
motivations are the most common in contrast to domestic and ideological concerns. In this 
category, the use of terrorists “becomes war and politics by another means, enabling a state to 
destabilize, or even topple, its rivals, and to shape politics in a neighboring country or one farther 
way.”48 
In addition to strategy, Byman states that exporting an ideology is also a common reason 
for states that support terrorist groups. “Many states seek to export their ideology and political 
system and use terrorist groups as a proxy to this end.”49 It is a way of creating sphere of 
influence. Prestige also serves to this end, enhancing their political status at home and their 
influence abroad.  
Byman’s last category is Domestic Politics. This category is particularly common “when 
the regime seeks to demonstrate its support for causes that its own people see as representing 
their ‘kin,’ be they ethnic or religious.”50 This support in turn strengthens a regime’s political 
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position at home through bolstering its own popularity domestically. Another sub category is 
‘Military or operational aid.’ “More rarely, regimes use a terrorist group to gain military aid or 
other forms of assistance in the state’s own struggles in a civil war or against regime 
dissidents.”51 
If we look at both cases, we can observe that Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite groups in 
post-2003 occupied Iraq have Hoffman’s terrorism characteristics; ineluctably political in aims 
and motives; violent – or, equally important, threatening violence; designed to have far-reaching 
psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted by an 
organization; and perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.52 
Additionally, Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite Groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq had the 
following goals, using violence to attain these goals.  
Table 8: The Goals of Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite Groups in post-2003 Occupied Iraq 
Lebanese Hezbollah Shiite Groups in post-2003 occupied Iraq 
To expel all foreigners that they saw as 
threat to themselves 
To change political system in which 
Shiites perceived their position as far 
weaker 
The social control of Lebanese people  
Regime Change (to establish an Iran-like 
regime) 
To end presence of Coalition Force, namely 
the US Forces in neighbor Iraq 
To suppress other groups 
To gain power in political system  
To establish a new regime in which Shiites 
have decisive authority 
Source: Created by the Author 
These goals recall Kydd and Walter’s five goals of terrorism; regime change, policy 
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change, territorial change, social control and status quo maintenance. Three of five goals, regime 
change, policy change and social control clearly can be seen in Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi 
Shiite groups’ goals. 
In Lebanon and Iraq, groups aimed to gradually overthrow the existing regime and 
replace it with one led by Shiites. To this end, groups followed two strategies; First, following 
militant activities for expelling foreign forces in order to create room for themselves to maneuver 
and suppressing opposition groups in order to shape domestic politics in favor of themselves; 
second, joining political activities to become the dominant, decisive power in a political system. 
These activities and its ends undoubtedly served Iran’s foreign policy goals. Iran 
deliberately supported Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups and provided a broad range of 
state resources in the form of ideological direction, organizational assistance, diplomatic 
backing, training, operational direction, money, arms, logistics and sanctuary.53  
The convergence of mutual interest, ideological closeness and these groups’ ideological, 
financial, military, and operational needs has been the basis of Iran’s relations with these groups. 
If we look at Iran’s motivations through Byman’s categorization, Iran unquestionably supported 
Lebanese and Shiite groups for all three reasons; strategic, ideological, and domestic. 
Initially, Iran used the IRGC in extraterritorial activities to spread its ideology and 
revolution. However, the realities of international politics, the costly Iran–Iraq war, the 
inapplicability of expansionist policies and the need for foreign capital and technical expertise to 
carry out economic reconstruction forced Iranian leaders to temper ideological foreign policy. 
Pragmatist and reformist measures were proposed against revolutionary policies in order to 
enhance domestic and regional stability and to integrate Iran into the international system. But 
Iran has always kept ideological rhetoric and reasons on the table, in case of a potential future 
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need. Since then, instead of explicit support, Iran has covertly and more professionally supported 
its proxies. 
The regime proclaimed itself as the protector of Muslims and all oppressed people. By 
supporting Lebanese and Iraqi Shiite groups, the regime also considered domestic public 
opinion, consolidating its legitimacy at home by tying it to a popular cause.  
In terms of strategic ambitions, we can observe all sub-categories of strategic ambition in 
the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities; Destabilizing or weakening a neighbor, projecting power, 
changing a regime, and shaping an opposition. By organizing and providing a broad range of 
support to Lebanese Hezbollah and Shiite groups in Iraq, Iran targeted all actors who were 
potential threats to their success.  
By creating room to maneuver for their political wings, Iran tried to shape opposition, 
including rival Shiite groups, Sunnis and foreign forces who posed a potential threat to its goals. 
At the same time, Iran tried to change regimes and bring friendly ones into power in 
Lebanon and Iraq, which would expand its sphere of influence and create the opportunity of 
being a regional power. 
Iran also aimed to project its power by supporting these groups. ‘Power projection’ is 
briefly defined as the ability of a state to apply its power components beyond its borders.  In the 
past, power projection denoted the use of naval power. Under Eisenhower, the US navy practiced 
“gunboat diplomacy.” Hagan describes gunboat diplomacy as, “the finite application of force to 
effect discrete political ends in distant places.”54 As stated by Hagan, the US used the aircraft 
carrier and the Marine Corps for this purpose.55 Over time, the means of power projection 
expanded beyond hard power applications because of new characteristics of the international 
                                                




system. In other words, after WWII, the post-colonial and post–cold war environment forced 
states to act within international norms. In proportion to their capabilities, major states began to 
use new means such as substantial networks of economic and military aid, arms sales 
agreements, and explicit and de facto alliances in order to sustain or develop their worldwide 
interests.56 
The lack of hard and soft power capabilities made proxies the sole means for Iran to 
influence discrete political ends beyond its borders. With this capability, Iran tried to signal itself 
as being in the same category as the major powers. In addition to political ends, Iran’s capability 
to shape Lebanese and Iraqi domestic politics in favor of Shiites, and to be influential on policies 
of the US and Israel consolidate its popularity at home, self-professed status as the defender and 
leader of Muslim world, and its sympathy and prestige in the anti-US bloc. 
Iran also used these groups to extort its sworn enemies; the US, Israel and Iraq. Since the 
revolution, Iran had very problematic relations with the US, Israel and the Saddam regime in 
Iraq, which had a considerable effect on Iran’s immediate threat perceptions and did not allow 
Iranians to live in peace. By destabilizing and weakening them, Iran tried to guarantee state 
survival. 
Iran’s relations with Iraq have been complicated and problematic. Both states have 
historically competed for regional hegemony. With the Iran–Iraq war, mutual hostility peaked. 
Iran started to use Shiite groups against Saddam Regime after organizing and supporting which 
would constitute the roots of the activities in Post-2003 occupied Iraq. To some extent, the 
removal of the Saddam regime significantly lessened the perceived threat from Iraq. However, 
US Middle East policies have increased long-standing concerns about potential US military 
                                                
56 Willard Scott Thompson, Power Projection: A Net Assessment of the U.s. and Soviet Capabilities (Transaction 
Publishers, 1978), 7. 
189 
 
intervention against Iran.  
Khomeini’s ideological, antagonistic approach to the US (“the Great Satan”) and Israel 
(“the Little Satan”); subsequently, he hostage crisis and Iran’s support for Hezbollah created 
incurable bias for all parties. In time, this bad condition further deteriorated because of 
developments like the U.S. President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech. Additionally, the 
alliance between the US and Israel and increasing US presence in the region doubled Iran’s 
survival concerns. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new unipolar world order provided 
room to maneuver to the United States.  The 1990–91 Gulf War and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq 
and Afghanistan caused enlarged-presence and paved the way for the United States to settle in 
the region. Thus, not only do Iranians geopolitically find themselves stranded among Sunni 
states, but also feel surrounded by the United States’ asymmetrically powerful conventional 
military forces.  
Thanks to the IRGC’s direction and support for Hezbollah, Iran could influence Lebanese 
domestic politics and Israel’s policies, even though Iran is hundreds of kilometers away from 
Israel. In Iraq, Iran used the IRGC supported Shiite groups to weaken Saddam's regime before 
the 2003 occupation. Post-occupation, the IRGC organized and supported Shiite groups for 
multiple purposes; to shape Iraq’s domestic politics through empowering Shiites and weakening 
the opposition, to prevent further US settlement in Iraq. Most importantly, in both cases, IRGC 
directed and supported these groups as a deterrent tool against possible future attacks. 
Comparatively, Iran seems weaker than the US or the US-Israel alliance in terms of 
conventional military force. In such an antagonistic relation, Iran knew that there is a high 
possibility of defeat in case of a war and that there is no way to survive by depending on 
conventional military force. Instead of conventional confrontation, by signaling a capability to 
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strike its enemies, Iranian leaders aimed to deter a potential military strike. Thus, using proxies 
provided following benefits to Iran; it is cheaper than developing conventional military 
capabilities, it is easy to deny, difficult to prove, and thus it has low risk in terms of provoking 
military retaliation. 
Obviously, since the mid-1980s strategic motivations are the most influential ones for 
Iran’s decision-making, in contrast to domestic and ideological motivations.  
In chapter two, Iranian foreign policy goals were briefly defined as follows; 
1. Regime survival (above all else) 
2. State security and survival (the defense of Iranian territory against external 
threats), 
3. Projecting power and becoming the dominant power in the region,  
‘Regime survival’ is emphasized as the indispensable (sine qua non) goal of Iran foreign 
policy, above all else. Since its inception, revolutionary Iran has primarily been concerned with 
regime survival and this deeply influenced its strategies. Besides all other goals, which also serve 
regime survival, the IRGC and the Quds Force were primarily used to attain this goal, which has 
been overlooked among other goals.  
What is the Difference between ‘Regime Survival’ and ‘State Survival’? 
The realist school, which was dominant throughout the Cold War, portrays international 
relationship as a struggle for power among self-interested states. In time realism evolved, and 
neorealism -structural realism- became the most popular international relations theory because of 
its persuasive power in explaining state behaviors. That’s why IR instructors devote a large 
percentage of time to covering neorealism.  
According to Waltz, the father of neorealism, the international arena is an anarchic and 
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self-help system. In other words, there is no an authority to protect states from one another. In 
Waltz’s words, “[s]elf-help is the principle of action in such an order, and the most important 
way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own security.”57 According to 
this perspective, in this anarchic and self-help system states can never trust other states, today's 
friend may be tomorrow's enemy, thus each states has to survive on its own. States are the 
primary actors and constitutive units of the international system. In this international 
environment, all states as units primarily seek to survive by pursuing power and balance against 
its powerful rivals.  
However, in Iran's case, I argue that ‘regime survival’ is the primary goal rather than 
‘state survival.’ ‘Regime survival’ occupies the first place in the Iranian leader’s agenda, and 
directly effects its domestic and foreign affairs decision-making and, of course, defines the 
IRGC’s extraterritorial activities. Briefly, herein the regime represents Iran’s current political 
system and the ruling elites who hold the power. The meaning of the regime and its components 
will be explained broadly in the following part. 
As stated by Hunter, who cites R S. Northedge: ‘foreign policy is a dialogue between the 
inside and the outside,’ “ the pattern of states external behavior is determined by a constant 
interaction between its domestic needs and realities  - internal determinants - and the 
characteristics of the external environment within which they operate.” 58 Thus, in the next part 
of this chapter, I will try to analyze the domestic and external conditions that created the Iranian 
leader’s obsession of regime survival.  
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Domestic and External Conditions that Made the Regime Survival Priority of the Ruling 
Elites  
At this point, it would contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of defining policy 
preferences and decision-making to start by searching for answers to the questions of ‘what does 
regime mean?’ and ‘who constitute the regime in Iran?’ 
In the scholarly literature, a variety of definitions for a political regime exist. Among 
them is Skaaning’s definition, which is based on detangling the existing conceptual origins of ten 
broadly accepted definitions. Skaaning defines four principles in the definition of political 
regime: character of rulers, access to power, vertical power limitations, and horizontal power 
limitations. He states that “political regime designates the institutionalized set of fundamental 
formal and informal rules identifying the political power holders (character of the possessor(s) of 
ultimate decisional sovereignty) and it also regulates the appointments to the main political posts 
(extension and character of political rights) as well as the vertical limitations (extension and 
character of civil liberties) and horizontal limitations on the exercise of political power 
(extension and character of division of powers – control and autonomy).”59  
As stated by Walt, “a revolutionary state rests on new principles of legitimacy, displays 
new symbols of authority and identity (names, flags, anthems, etc.), adopts new rules for elite 
recruitment, and creates new political institutions and governmental procedures.” 60 The 1979 
Iran revolution was not merely a ruler change. The revolution changed rulers, access to power, 
vertical and horizontal power limitations in Iran. 
Initially, the revolution was made by many segments of Iranian society. All anti-Shah 
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groups -Marxists, liberal National Front, secularists, Islamic activists- participated in it. Shortly 
thereafter, the Shah was removed from power. Rather than returning to their mosques and 
madrasas, Khomeini and his followers began to take steps to increase their power and to control 
the government.  In time, all participants who took part in the revolutionary government and 
were not supporters of Khomeini were eliminated. The power sharing moved from a very broad 
range of ideologically different anti-Shah segments to a very narrow group of clerical elites. 
After the revolution, the concept of velayat-e faqih developed by Ayatollah Khomeini 
was the basis of Iran’s political system. According to the concept of velayat-e faqih, the supreme 
leader is the temporal, spiritual and legal leader of the ummah (Muslim community) during the 
absence of the Twelfth Imam. Velayat-e faqih has provided the constitutional justification for the 
regime’s political reconstruction. 
The new regime has a dual and unique political system; in addition to deriving its 
legitimacy from the velayat-e faqih system, it also employs republican institutions. In the 
political structure of Iran, there is a parliament and a president, both selected by Iranian voters. 
However, it has also a supreme leader who is more powerful than the president and is not 
democratically elected. Moreover, the unelected institutions of Iran's government are more 
powerful than the elected ones. 
The Supreme Leader is constitutionally the ‘guardian jurist’, ‘leader of the Islamic 
revolution’ and ranked above the state president. Ultimate power resides in the Supreme Leader 
who appoints and dismisses all key senior positions - the head of the judiciary, the supreme 
commander of the IRGC, the supreme commander of the regular military and the security 
services, the head of state radio and television, and the clerical jurists in the Council of the 
Guardian- ; he controls all important institutions of state such as the courts, the police, the 
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military, and can veto candidates for office and veto parliamentary legislation.61  
The influence on decision-making by the ultimate power of the supreme leader and 
unelected institutions (such as guardian -partly unelected- and expediency councils) establishes 
an elaborate system of checks and balances, which seek to safeguard regime survival and to 
maintain the status quo. Thus, it can be said that the state system is designed according to this 
sensitivity, and the supreme leader is “the ultimate gatekeeper.”62 
Thaler supports this thought with the following: “multiple institutions that perform 
identical or similar functions—and therefore compete with each other for resources and status—
has generated a diffuse and complicated system. In theory, this multifarious, redundant design 
prevents any one center of power from gaining undue influence over the entire system and 
ensures the overall survival and security of the regime and the central position of the Supreme 
Leader.”63 
The decisiveness of the supreme leader, guardian council (Six of twelve members 
appointed by the Supreme Leader) and expediency council on the decision-making process limits 
the democratic and republican process. With these characteristics, it is not easy to position Iran 
in a particular regime type. As stated by Chebabi, Iran “[l]ike totalitarian regimes, it proclaims 
the absolute supremacy over public life of an ideology, i.e. ‘Islam’; like authoritarian regimes it 
permits a limited degree of pluralism; and like democracies it holds elections in which the people 
sometimes have a genuine choice, to wit Mohammad Khatami’s upset victory in the presidential 
elections of May 1997….”64 
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Rakel, based on Linz and Chebabi’s assessments, identifies the regime type as follows; 
“the political system of the IRI between 1979 and 1989, when Ayatollah Khomeini was the 
supreme leader, was classified as close to totalitarian and, since 1989, as authoritarian with some 
limited democratic features.”65 
All in all, the regime is designed to prevent any individual, institution, and faction from 
dominating the system and insulate the regime against internal and external threats. 
To understand how ideologically valuable the regime is, Khomeini’s following statement 
is very explanatory; 
A government which is a branch of the Prophet Mohammad's absolute guardianship 
is one of the primary Islamic precepts and takes priority over all subsidiary precepts, 
even over praying, fasting and pilgrimage ... if necessary, [a] governor can close or 
destroy mosques ... the government can unilaterally terminate its religious agreements 
with the people if an agreement violates the expedience of the country or Islam. And 
[it] can abandon every commandment- both worshipping and non-worshipping 
precepts- which is against the expedience of Islam.66  
Khomeini repeatedly stated “the regime preservation (hefz-e nezam) was of highest 
necessity among all that is required (oujab-e vajebat)”67 even fundamental religious practices. 
Domestic and External Conditions during Khomeini Period  
The first decade of the regime was completely dominated by Khomeini. Khomeini made 
all his efforts to consolidate the new regime during his leadership. To this end, Khomeini tried to 
prevent all potential internal disputes between the Parliament and the Guardian Council, and 
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created the Expediency Council for mediating between two intuitions.  
Despite the fact that he eliminated and suppressed all existing and potential opposition, 
Khomeini faced ‘four unsuccessful coup attempts’68 and revolts in some regions. However, the 
regime survived. In the successful consolidation of the new regime, three key components were 
influential; “1) Ayatollah Khomeini as the leader and moral authority of the revolution; 2) the 
clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic Party; 3) the IRGC and other pro-Khomeini militias.”69 
Among them, the IRGC made a significant contribution to this success by preventing initial 
domestic threats against the regime. Buchta states that the IRGC was the revolutionary clergy’s 
strongest weapon in suppressing the oppositions and uprisings of separatist minorities such as 
Kurds, Beluchis, and Turkmen between 1979 and 1982.70 In addition to the suppression of all 
opposition, the following reasons were the key factors for the establishment of the IRGC;  
-­‐ To control the streets and to ensure internal security and stability, 
-­‐ To consolidate and improve clergies’ power in the newly established regime and  
-­‐ To advance the Khomeini’s ideology in state and society.  71, 72, 73, 74  
Before the death of Khomeini, domestic factors, particularly the Iran–Iraq war and the 
task of “exporting the revolution," contributed to the new regime’s power inside, which was 
mostly succeeded by the IRGC. 
Walt, in Revolution and War, puts forward that “[t]he greater the divisions within the 
revolutionary state (either within the elite or between the government and the population at 
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large), the more bellicose its foreign policy will be.”  According to him, this proposition takes 
two distinct forms:  
-­‐ A conflict among factions within the revolutionary regime promotes conflicts 
with other states in order to secure greater power for themselves. 
-­‐ In order to rally popular support, to justify internal repression, and to provide a 
scapegoat should domestic problems persist, revolutionary leaders pursue 
conflicts with other states.75 
In both forms, the aim is to consolidate the regime’s power at home. 
Between September 1981 and May 1982, with three major military attacks, Iranian forces 
successfully repulsed the Iraqi forces to the original border in most places.76 Although there had 
been opportunities for a negotiated settlement in mid-1982 as Iran’s forces approached the 
border, Iran did not choose to sue for peace. Instead, Iran declared that its forces were "going to 
liberate Jerusalem, passing through the holy city of Karbala" in Iraq just after the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon in June 1982.77 
In this decision, in addition to the regime’s expansionist ideology, it seems that the ruling 
elites practically calculated that both the Iran–Iraq war and active participation in Lebanon 
affairs could contribute to consolidating the revolution and Khomeini’s power by rallying 
popular support and justifying internal repression. Another benefit of war was to keep the regular 
army under control; as stated by Wehrey  “as long as the regular army was stretched thin and 
fully deployed on the western border (with Iraq), it could not mount any sort of a coup d’état 
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against Khomeini and his cohorts.”78 
Additionally, the war created a valid reason for investments that were made for the 
IRGC, which actively took part in the war. During the war, the IRGC, which was constituted by 
unarguably loyal members to the regime, evolved into a complete military thanks to these 
investments. The IRGC’s involvement in the war and Lebanese affairs also created legitimacy in 
society. Then, material investments and gained legitimacy made the IRGC a balancing power 
against the regular army, whose loyalty was in question for Khomeini. 
The IRGC’s initial ideological activities in the name of ‘export of the revolution’ in 
Lebanon also served to weaken and punish the regime’s perceived external enemies by 
Hezbollah as a military strategy. According to Skuldt, roughly 57% of Hezbollah attacks 
explicitly targeted countries that were directly providing military, financial, or logistical support 
to Iraq.79  
All in all, in the first decade of the revolution, while the new regime had been fighting for 
its survival, the IRGC had been the key institution for preserving the regime in the following 
ways; 
-­‐ Iran’s inherently multiethnic population and ideologically different groups’ 
struggle for power in the post revolution vacuum created a significant threat to the 
new regime. This was coupled with the shadow of the regular army’s potential 
coup threat. 
-­‐ In this environment, the IRGC suppressed all ideological opposition and ethnic 
uprisings. The IRGC became a balancing power and removed the potential threats 
against the regime that might come from the regular army. 
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-­‐ The triumph of the IRGC over all existing domestic threats preserved and 
consolidated the power of the new regime in its initial years. 
-­‐ Khomeini and the IRGC commanders viewed the Iran–Iraq war as not only 
matters of military strategy. As stated by Wehrey, it was more than a struggle for 
the territorial integrity; it was also “an opportunity to further consolidate and 
institutionalize the revolution, purging it of known and potential opponents.”80 
Similarly, the IRGC’s commanders also viewed the war as “a mechanism to 
consolidate their internal position and marginalize the regular forces politically”81 
-­‐ In addition to the Iran–Iraq war, with the IRGC’s involvement in Lebanon affairs, 
creating and supporting Hezbollah, besides strategic calculations, the regime 
aimed to consolidate the revolution’s following ideological and moral basis: 
• Export of the revolution, 
• Islamic unity and responsibility of other Muslim and ‘oppressed’ nations, 
• Confrontational and assertive anti-western (namely anti-Americanism, or anti-
Zionism) 
• Rejection of all forms of domination, 
As a military strategy, the regime also aimed to get the states to abandon their support of 
Iraq and to create room to maneuver by driving Israel and the West out of Lebanon.  
-­‐ These improvements showed to Khomeini and the ruling elite how vital it was to 
have absolutely loyal armed forces for safeguarding regime survival. During the 
first decade, the IRGC’s power and size significantly expanded and became the 
strongest security pillar of the new regime. To invest in the development of the 
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IRGC had been the strategic priority of Khomeini. The more the IRGC got 
stronger, the more Khomeini and the regime got stronger. The IRGC’s activities 
in Lebanon and in the Iran–Iraq war legitimized all efforts of the IRGC’s to get 
stronger than other security institutions. Thus, this prepared the conditions of 
becoming a major domestic political, economic, and security power center and the 
bedrock of the regime’s ideology.  
Domestic and External Conditions during Post-Khomeini Period  
The realities of international politics, and need for foreign capital and technical expertise 
to carry out economic reconstruction convinced Khomeini to temper the ideological principles of 
the early days of the Islamic Republic. This started a slight transition to pragmatist policies. 
Subsequently, the end of the costly Iran–Iraq war, the death of Khomeini, and the collapse of the 
bipolar international system created new conditions for the regime. Despite the 
institutionalization of revolution, the regime couldn’t feel itself secure.  
After Khomeini’s death, the Assembly of Experts made Ali Khamenei the Supreme 
Leader. He had played an important role in the Revolution and served as the president for two 
successive terms from 1981 to 1989.82 His death removed a towering and symbol figure of the 
revolution from the scene. Khamenei was not as charismatic and powerful as Khomeini. Since 
becoming the supreme leader, Khamenei has tended to follow Khomeini’s principles instead of 
initiating his own approaches. While he has been trying to balance ideology and the realities of 
international politics, he has avoided both confrontation and accommodation with the West in 
general. Khamenei’s lack of authority has affected domestic political improvements, and as well 
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as foreign policymaking. He was not able to suppress different factional approaches. Since the 
mid-1980s, different approaches to policy-making and rivalries for power created factions. This 
degree of political diversity did not disturb Khomeini, so long as the factions remained loyal to 
him and to certain fundamental principles of revolutionary Iran.  
Additionally, the absence of a charismatic and dominant leadership has opened room to 
maneuver for key individuals who actively had taken part in the revolution. These key 
individuals, constant power-holders in the political structure and society, have constituted the 
ruling elites. Each of them has his own sphere of influence; some control the different 
institutions of the state and others represent the factions. They are absolutely loyal to the regime, 
because, besides their ideological motivations, each of them knows that their power depends on 
the continuity of the regime.  
In the post Khomeini period, despite the institutionalization of the revolution to some 
extent, regime survival remained as the top priority of the ruling elites. New domestic, regional 
and global conditions introduced new threat perceptions for the regime. In the following section, 
these threat perceptions and its results will be analyzed.  
Factional rivalry has seen as part of a check-balance system as long as it does not threaten 
the revolutionary regime. As stated by Wehrey “[f]actional maneuvering is a key manifestation 
of the competition for power and influence, and foreign -and domestic- policy issues are used as 
tools and are extensions of this competition.” 83 In other words, the factions use foreign policy to 
bolster their domestic position. On the contrary, an opponent can discredit a faction for 
threatening the regime because of its policies. 
In the May 1997 elections, Mohammad Khatami was elected as the President of the 
Islamic Republic. Khatami, as a protagonist of the Reformist faction, attempted to avoid past 
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ideological priorities, and he tried to improve basic principles of democratic political system; 
such as freedom of speech, rule of law, civil society and pluralism.84  
Besides domestic political reforms, Khatami inaugurated important changes in Iranian 
foreign policy. The post-Soviet and post-Iran–Iraq war environment was the main reason for this 
policy orientation. Afghanistan and Pakistan were in chaos and challenged by Wahhabist 
religious fanaticism. The newly independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus were trying 
to overcome weak social, political and economic conditions. Iraq was suffering sectarian and 
ethnic tensions. There were very hostile relations with pro-American Sunni regimes.85 Last and 
most importantly, there was the growing US presence in the region. 
To minimize the uncertainties originating in this chaotic environment, Khatami adopted 
the strategy of improving Iran’s regional and international relations. Khatami tried to behave less 
ideologically and promote relations with European countries, stability of the region, and active 
participation in international organizations.  
In the aftermath of Sept. 11, within hours after the attacks by al-Qaeda extremists, 
Khatami condemned the attacks, and he was ‘the first cleric in the Muslim world to call for ‘holy 
war’ (jihad) against terrorism.’86 The Khatami government cooperated with the US against the 
Taliban regime, which had harbored the anti-American al-Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan. 
Relations between the United States and Iran seemed to be warming up. However, following 
President Bush’s 2002 ‘Axis of Evil’ speech in which Iran was accused of supporting terrorism, 
pursuing nuclear weapons, and destabilizing Afghanistan, the relations with the US reversed.  
Khatami’s moderate domestic and international stance received its first major setback and 
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opened a new era in Iran’s international relations. After the speech, US-Iran relations entered a 
long stalemate. Thus, this improvement gave conservatives the opportunity to discredit 
Khamenei in the eyes of Iranian public.  
The conservatives viewed Khatami government as a direct threat to their position in the 
power structure. As stated by Gheissari and Nasr, “[i]f the Revolution of 1979 presented a 
unique opportunity for the clerics to dominate Iranian politics, the Khatami movement presented 
their opponents with a chance to challenge that domination.”87 
Khatami’s policies surfaced the ideological disagreements between conservatives and 
reformists. Divisions went deeper with time, and Khatami’s re-election in 2001 created further 
ideological polarization between the two factions. The division, in the words of Kamrava and 
Hassan-Yari, caused a very tough power struggle that affected “all aspects of Iranian politics and 
society; ranging from fundamental differences in foreign and domestic policies to the dismissal 
of “reformist” ministers, clamping down on supposed public immorality, closing down numerous 
newspapers and jailing their editors, drastically increasing the number of public floggings, and 
unleashing violent vigilantes on activists and other well-known figures.”88 
The conservative resistance bloc against the reformist bloc, under the leadership of 
supreme leader Khamenei, included “the top echelon of the Revolutionary Guard, the leadership 
of various ’foundations’, conservative clerics associated with the Guardian and Expediency 
Councils (that oversee the legislative and judicial processes), the judiciary and key seminaries in 
Qom.”89 
From 1997 on, the conservatives’ strategy was to prevent the erosion of ideological 
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precepts of the revolution and expand their dominance in the state structure. The best way that 
the conservatives could maximize their prospects for survival was to gain power at their rivals' 
expense.  
These international and domestic improvements prepared the end of Khatami’s 
presidency and the conditions of presidential victory of Ahmadinejad in 2005. Ahmadinejad 
heavily used foreign policy for domestic consumption. He introduced a new tone in foreign 
policy orientation and stressed its inefficiency based on cooperation and interaction with the 
West that had been followed by the two previous presidents of Iran. Instead, he adopted a foreign 
policy based on confrontation with the West and interaction with other states. 
During his presidency, it can be said that Iran’s foreign policy recalled the policies of the 
Revolution’s early years. In Rubin’s words, he seemed to be “a hardliner á la Khomeini and used 
a very hostile tone, especially against the US and Europe, and also Israel.”90 Ahmadinejad 
adopted a more confrontational, assertive and active foreign policy to present Iran as an 
independent regional power. However, this new strategy not only deepened hostile relations with 
the US and Israel but also provoked Sunni-Arab states who were concerned with Ahmadinejad’s 
nuclear ambitions and increasing support for Shiite groups.   
According to Saikal, by “claiming that the United States and its allies, especially Israel, 
were determined to destroy the Islamic regime” he tried to build Iran’s military and nuclear 
power and maintained support for Iran’s partners including Syria, Lebanese Hezbollah, and 
proxies in Iraq. On these controversial issues, he received the conservatives’ and the IRGC’s 
support.91  
After the first period of Ahmedinejad, the unprecedented character of the 2009 election 
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and its immediate aftermath, when hundreds of thousands of protestors occupied the streets for 
protesting the manipulation of the election results, showed how factional disputes can destabilize 
a system, and, ironically, how the most powerful faction, the Conservatives, was the least 
institutionally organized of factions.92 The consensus on the revolutionary precepts among 
factions did not seem to the conservatives to be enough protection for regime survival. The 
factional disputes stand as a potential threat for the regime, unless the conservatives are not as 
powerful as to control and shape domestic politics. 
This motivation doubled with developments after 9/11, which drastically changed the 
regional security environment. The US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003 led to the 
enlarged presence of the United States and paved the way of its settling in the region. Iran’s 
sworn enemies, the Saddam regime and the Taliban, were eliminated and no longer a threat. 
However, the stationing of US forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, Tajikistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Turkey and Pakistan caused Iranians to feel themselves 
completely surrounded. Additionally, the US and Israel’s explicit threats and talk of regime 
change caused unease among the conservatives. They feared a counterrevolution supported by 
the United States as happened in the overthrow of Mosaddegh in 1953. Thus the regime adopted 
a multifaceted strategy, which ranged from improving nuclear weapon and ballistic missiles to 
the use of Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups.  This would establish a negotiating position for 
containing the US and deter possible foreign intervention. 
Since 1997, and particularly after 9/11, the IRGC has played a vital role in challenging 
both internal and external vulnerabilities. Parallel to this responsibility, significant investment 
was made to the IRGC, which ranged from the advanced weapon system to increasing life 
standards of members. As expected, this resulted in increasing power of the IRGC and 
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subsequent militarization of the political system to some extent. 
As one of the most loyal supporters of the regime, the scope of the IRGC’s influence on 
foreign-policy-making, strategic decision-making, in the economy and even in cultural life has 
been significantly expanded. For instance, although the Revolutionary Guards' involvement in 
politics was relatively small in numbers -in single digits- between 1980 and 2004, it has grown to 
unprecedented levels since 2004, when former IRGC members won at least 16 percent of the 290 
seats.93 According to Gheissari and Nasr, they constitute one-third of the conservative parliament 
that was elected in early 2004.94 Besides the IRGC’s expanding political role and influential 
institutional diffusion, during Ahmadinejad presidency, the IRGC accelerated and expanded its 
reach into the economy, the roots of which date back to the wake of the Iran–Iraq War. 
Ahmadinejad “favored the IRGC by offering it numerous lucrative no-bid contracts, especially in 
the areas of oil and natural gas extraction, pipeline construction, and large-scale infrastructure 
development.”95 According to Hen-Tov and Gonzalez “[b]ased on available data, it is reasonable 
to estimate that the Guards controlled less than five percent of GDP shortly after the end of the 
Iran—Iraq War in 1989. Now (2011), they directly or indirectly oversee at least 25 percent of 
GDP, and more likely about 35 percent and growing.”96 
All in all, even though the nature of threats held different characteristics in Khomeini and 
post-Khomeini periods, the IRGC has been the most influential instrument against these threats. 
During Khomeini's leadership, the IRGC suppressed all ideological oppositions and ethnic 
uprisings; the IRGC became a balancing power and removed all potential threats against the 
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regime that might come from the regular army. In the post-Khomeini period, increasing factional 
disputes after 1997, demonstrations in 2009, the post-9/11 security environment and explicit 
regime change threats increased the ruling elites’ sensitivities. This led the conservatives’ efforts 
to concentrate their power. Similarly, as in Khomeini leadership period, the regime saw the 
IRGC as the key instrument against both internal and external challenges. In this line, the ruling 
elites chose to empower the IRGC as a strategic move. 
The leaders of the IRGC also know that the IRGC’s own survival was entirely dependent 
on the survival of the regime. If the regime lives, the IRGC exists. To justify its existence and all 
investments made by the regime in the hearts and minds of society, it has needed valid reasons. 
Thus, its extraterritorial activities have aimed to appeal to Iranian society’s nationalist and 
religious sentiments, in addition to its functions against domestic and external threats. In a nut 
shell, there has been a two-way interaction and a mutual interdependence between the IRGC and 






The 1979 Iranian Revolution is the most important turning point in Iran’s recent history. 
The revolution put Iran in a controversial and exceptional position in the Islamic World, and the 
regional and global arena. There were many factors that constituted ground for the revolution. 
Particularly, the Shiite clerical power in society can be accepted as the most important one.  
Since 1501, when Shiism became the state religion with compulsory conversion as a 
political move against the expansion of foreign influences, Shiism and clerics have been an 
active component of Iranian politics. In a series of events, the Tobacco Monopoly revolt (1890-
1891), the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1906), the Oil Nationalization Movement of Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh (1951-1953), and the Iranian Islamic Revolution (1978-1979), 
reactions to the domination of Iran and exploitation of its wealth and resources by foreign 
powers, clergies played a prominent role. Their historically rooted influence and well-established 
network in society made them a victor of the 1979 Revolution under Khomeini’s leadership.  
The 1979 Iranian Revolution was not merely a change in rulers. It made Khomeini’s 
ideology, which is a blend of his interpretation of Shiism and Persian nationalism, the dominant 
characteristic of the post-revolutionary era, and has influenced every aspect of life. The 
revolution has changed its political structure, the priorities of policy makers, the economic 
spheres of Iran, but even more fundamentally, culture and society. After the revolution, Iran 
declared itself a theocratic republic guided by religious principles and named itself the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. The revolution also completely transformed Iran’s foreign policy and 
international standing.   
Throughout Iranian revolutionary foreign policy history, the pattern of Iran’s external 
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behavior were directly or indirectly determined by numerous factors: Iran’s geographical and 
demographic realities, historical experience (lessons learned), post-revolutionary ideology which 
is a blend of nationalism and Khomeini’s interpretation of Shiism, the post-revolutionary 
political structure and decision-making process, national interests, immediate domestic needs, 
ruling elites’ priorities (ideological/individual), regional improvements and threat perceptions.  
Based on observations and assessments from internal and external determinants of Iran’s 
foreign policy making, Iran’s foreign policy goals are defined as follows: Regime survival is the 
indispensable (sine qua non) goal of Iranian foreign policy and above all else; State security and 
survival (the defense of Iranian territory against external threats); Projecting power and 
becoming the dominant power in the region. The goal of ‘regime survival’ is an outcome of 
Khomeini’s ideology as well as his heritage, and occupies first place in the Iranian leader’s 
agenda and directly affects domestic and foreign affairs decision-making. 
Iran employs a number of different tools in attaining these foreign policy goals. Among 
them, the IRGC is the most crucial and controversial one. The IRGC has actively taken the lead 
in achieving all three goals, the preservation of the regime is a unique task and its reason for 
existence. However, the IRGC’s way of achieving these goals are very controversial.  
Iran deliberately supported several armed non-state actors and provided them a broad 
range of state support in the form of ideological direction, organizational assistance, diplomatic 
backing, training, operational direction, money, arms, logistics, and sanctuary. The IRGC has 
served as an outpost o provide this support. 
The regime’s initial ideological motivations, parallel to changes in foreign policy 
approaches, have been replaced with rational and strategic calculations. The need for foreign 
capital and technical expertise to carry out economic reconstruction, which mostly originated 
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from the costly Iran–Iraq war and international isolation, made this transformation a necessity. 
However, the IRGC’s extraterritorial-capability has always been used it covertly and 
professionally. In terms of strategic purposes, the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities served as a 
tool of deterrence and retaliatory force against the adversaries of Iran, a bargaining chip and a 
way of projecting power to different audiences. 
The controversial nature of these activities emerges at this point. Despite the fact that the 
IRGC has the characteristics of a regular conventional armed force, based on the international 
law and state sponsorship of terrorism literature, the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities are outside 
the legal frame of ‘use of military force’ and mostly fit the characteristics of ‘state sponsorship of 
terrorism.’  
If we take into account Iran’s foreign policy goals which are very common for all states, 
the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities as a strategy to achieve these goals challenge international 
norms and provoke other regional actors who are mostly Sunni and have strong prejudices 
against Iran. This condition creates an obstacle to Iran’s integration into the international system, 
which is increasingly globalized and interconnected, and an environment, which is costly for Iran 
to live within and highly isolating. Paradoxically, these attitudes put Iran in a situation that 
contradicts the goals of ‘state security and survival’ and ‘becoming the regional power.’  
Thus, the real reason behind the regime’s insistence for this strategy is preserving the 
current political system and the power of current ruling elites. Briefly, it is called ‘regime 
survival’ in this study. There are several issues that have created this phenomenon. In the 
following section, the reasons that have created the ruling elites’ motivations and sensitivity of 
regime survival will be addressed.   
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Structural and Ideological Basis of Regime Survival 
As stated by Hunter, “the character of states’ political systems and their decision-making 
apparatus and processes greatly influence their external behavior.”1 The 1979 Iranian revolution 
was not merely a ruler change. In Walt's words, it created the new principles of legitimacy, new 
symbols of authority and identity, new rules for elite recruitment, new political institutions, and 
governmental procedures.2 Walt’s definition of ‘a sharp departure from those of the old regime’3 
explains what happened in Iran with the 1979 Revolution. Following the revolution, Khomeini’s 
ideological doctrines formed all facets of life: political, educational, legal, social, and religious.  
The main concern of the new political leadership was the survival of the newly 
established political regime. Survival was the raison d’etre of the new polity. Khomeini defined 
regime preservation as the highest priority even over fundamental religious practices. In the 
words of Stanley, Khomeini’s formulation regarding the survival of the regime is as follows; 
“the regime is the embodiment of Shia Islam’s authority on Earth and to abandon it would be to 
abandon the will of God. Thus, the survival of this government and its form is an existential 
imperative as well as an expression of self-interest and Iranian nationalism.”4 
 The political system of the Islamic Republic, which enjoys the concept of velayat-e faqih 
and republican characteristics, is the embodied form of Khomeini’s ideology. The preservation 
of the Islamic Republic is defined as the ultimate religious value of the regime’s ideology by 
Khomeini which can be died for. Tucker quotes Stephen Hanson’s “ideology unites activists 
around a set of shared beliefs and symbols and provides a ‘higher cause’ that legitimates their 
                                                
1 Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era, 20. 
2 Walt, “Revolution and War,” 1992, 334. 
3 Walt, “Revolution and War,” 1992, 140. 
4 Stanley, “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 4. 
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struggle.”5 Regime preservation (hefz-e nezam) has been a ‘higher cause’ of revolutionary 
ideology. The IRGC, which can be characterized as the loyal armed forces of the regime, by 
definition ‘guardian of the revolution,’ has been the primary instrument for implementing this 
task. 
Moreover, the political structure, institutions, rules for elite recruitment, and 
governmental procedures have been designed accordingly. The Supreme leader, and several 
institutions –particularly unelected components of the regime- have been loyal protectors of the 
regime. The ultimate power of the Supreme Leader and unelected institutions’ (such as partly 
unelected Guardian Council and Expediency Council) influence on decision-making establishes 
an elaborate system of checks and balances, which seek to ensure regime survival and to 
maintain the status quo. To prevent potential instability that was a threat to the regime, Khomeini 
established the Expediency Council in 1988 to mediate disputes between the Parliament and the 
Guardian Council. Even this decision was made in order to preserve the regime in case of 
political dispute that might harm the regime’s legitimacy. The IRGC, which is an institutional 
armed organization and an alternative to the regular army, is established solely to preserve the 
regime. Thus, the political structure is designed in a way to prevent any individual, institution, 
and faction from dominating the system and several institutions are created to insulate the regime 
against internal and external threats.  
With these characteristics it is not easy to position Iran in a particular regime type. As 
stated by Chebabi, Iran “[l]ike totalitarian regimes, it proclaims the absolute supremacy over 
public life of an ideology, i.e. ‘Islam’; like authoritarian regimes it permits a limited degree of 
pluralism; and like democracies it holds elections in which the people sometimes have a genuine 
                                                




choice, to wit Mohammad Khatami’s upset victory in the presidential elections of May 
1997….”6 The regime has totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic features. Furthermore, after 
the Ahmadinejad presidency, the IRGC’s increasing influence on strategic decision-making and 
cultural life started the debate of Iran’s being a ‘praetorian state.’7 For the sake of simplification, 
as classified by Rakel, the regime type can be defined as close to totalitarian during Khomeini’s 
leadership; since 1989 as authoritarian with some limited democratic features.8  
Khomeini named the new regime as ‘Islamic republic.’ He avoided to use the very notion 
of democracy that is an undesirable Western concept and stated that ‘Islam itself is democratic.’ 
Although the new regime was born of a popular movement that inherently had democratic 
aspirations; in practice, since establishment, the ruling elite has violated them in many ways that 
range from the manipulation of electoral processes, inhibiting free speech, human rights 
violations, and suppression of all opposition to control of the media. The regime did not refrain 
from acting in undemocratic ways.9 The regime’s priority has been survival, and its leaders’ 
priority has been to stay in power, not democratic republican aspirations. 
Skuldt, in her study, draws attentions to the connection between the regime survival 
strategies and Buena de Mesquita et al.’s selectorate theory.10 I also find this approach useful in 
explaining the dynamics between regime survival and the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities. As 
stated by the authors of The Logic of Political Survival, all political leaders’ -whether democratic 
or autocratic, in any type of regime- primary objective is to remain in power. In their words, 
Our starting point is that every political leader faces the challenge of how to hold on 
to his or her job. The politics behind survival in office is, we believe, the essence of 
                                                
6 Chehabi, “The Political Regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Comparative Perspective,” 48. 
7 Hen-Tov and Gonzalez, “The Militarization of Post-Khomeini Iran,” 45. 
8 Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran, 2009, 18:27. 
9 Alex Vatanka, “The Authoritarian Resurgence: Iran Abroad,” Middle East Institute, April 30, 2015, 
http://www.mei.edu/content/article/authoritarian-resurgence-iran-abroad. 
10 Skuldt, “State Sponsored Terrorism?” 
214 
 
politics. The desire to survive motivates the selection of policies and the allocation of 
benefits; it shapes the selection of political institutions and the objectives of foreign 
policy; it influences the very evolution of political life. We take as axiomatic that 
everyone in a position of authority wants to keep that authority and that it is the 
maneuvering to do so that is central to politics in any type of regime.11 
According to the authors, in order to survive, the leaders need to create and maintain a 
winning coalition in exchange for a share of public/private goods. The winning coalition, which 
is the faction that keeps a leader in power, emerges from a group called the selectorate that is 
authorized to choose the leader. The leadership position is always desirable and therefore 
competitive. Thus, all leaders are preoccupied with their survival against a challenger. 
In order to remain in power, the leader must guarantee the winning coalition’s support by 
allocating resources to the members of the coalition. In a democracy, the size of the winning 
coalition is larger relative to the size of the selectorate than in autocracies. The leaders try to 
generate more support by providing public goods to the coalition’s members. This ends up in a 
probability that a member of the winning coalition may join a challenger’s coalition with the 
belief of continuing to receive the same benefits. In an autocracy, the winning coalition is 
smaller and each member has more to gain or lose, because given valuable private goods are not 
accessible to the larger population instead of equably distributed public goods. In the words of 
the authors; “the survival of leaders in small winning coalition systems depends on their ability 
to provide private goods to their supporters.”12 Fewer members given larger and more valuable 
gains, in turn, generate stronger loyalty. The members of small winning coalitions have much to 
lose if the leader is replaced, and thus as long as the leader remains in power, it means that they 
guarantee the expected benefits. 
                                                
11 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 2003), 8–
9. 
12 Ibid., 102. 
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Given this context, in the case of Iran there are two levels of winning coalitions that 
originate from the nature of the dual political system; the first includes unelected components of 
the political structure –such as the members of the Expediency Council, Guardian Council, Head 
of Judiciary, Commanders of the Armed Forces- under the leadership of the supreme leader, 
mostly conservatives that have a long history in this coalition; the second gathers around the 
president who constitutes the elected component of the political structure. 
The leaders and members of the IRGC have been part of the permanent winning coalition 
since the revolution. Their power and wealth have grown over time. As one of the beneficiaries 
of the regime, the IRGC has always been loyal to the supreme leader and the regime and always 
played a key role against both internal and external threats. Because, as mentioned earlier, it is 
clear that the IRGC’s institutional survival is dependent on the regime’s survival. Mutual 
dependency between the IRGC and the regime and the IRGC’s benefits from the regime makes 
sense in terms of the logic of ‘winning coalition’. 
Domestic and External Threats against the Regime  
During the first decade of the revolution, the regime was dominated by Khomeini as the 
leader and moral authority of the revolution. The consolidation of the new regime had been the 
primary goal during his leadership. Instead of a power struggle among Khomeinists, the regime 
faced threats from ‘others’ who did not have any connection to Khomeini. The initial domestic 
threats originated from ethnic fragmentation and military coup attempts. The IRGC was 
Khomeini’s ‘strongest weapon’ in suppressing the opposition and uprisings of separatist 
minorities. Keddie characterizes the Khomeini period as follows: “The decade of Khomeini’s 
rule was marked by the ever-growing power of his followers and elimination, often by violence 
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and despite resistance, of opposition groups, and by increasing enforcement of ideological and 
behavioral controls on the population.”13 Besides these domestic factors, in particularly the 
IRGC’s role in the Iran–Iraq war and the task of ‘exporting the revolution’ contribute to further 
consolidation and institutionalization of the revolution. 
In the post-Khomeini period, increasing factionalism -particularly Khatami’s reformist 
domestic and foreign policies were perceived as a threat that might erode the ideological precepts 
of the revolution and conservatives power. Then, the conservatives adopted a strategy that 
expanded their dominance in the power structure.  
Additionally, the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003 led to the enlarged 
presence of the United States and paved the way for its settling in the region. Although Iran’s 
sworn enemies, the Saddam regime and Taliban, no longer being a threat, Iran was surrounded 
by US military supremacy. Furthermore, the US and Israel’s explicit threats and talk of regime 
change caused unease among Iranian ruling elites. Thus, the regime adopted a multifaceted 
strategy, which ranged from improving nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to the use of proxy 
groups. Since 1997, and particularly after September 11, 2001, the IRGC has taken the vital role 
of challenging both internal and external vulnerabilities. This has resulted in increasing the 
power of the IRGC and subsequently the militarization of the political system to some extent. 
The IRGC has been an active part of regime survival strategies as a loyal supporter with 
its Basij force, which is the principle force responsible for upholding Islamic norms in society 
and social control at home; and with the Quds Force, which is an intelligence and unconventional 
warfare component of the IRGC abroad. 
                                                
13 Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, 241. 
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Need for Legitimacy 
In any type of regime, democratic or autocratic, the maintenance of power and stability of 
the political system necessitate the pursuit of legitimacy –“the terms by which people recognize, 
defend, and accept political authority”14 According to Weber, an authority becomes valid once 
the actors subject to it believe in its legitimacy. In his words: 
Custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity do not 
form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination. In addition there is normally 
a further element, the belief in legitimacy.15 
As stated by Campell, “Weber holds that beliefs in legitimacy maintain the stability of an 
order of domination he by no means wishes to confer any actual legitimacy upon that order.”16 
According to him, Weber emphasizes here the empirical significance of validity. In the words of 
Weber: 
Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the 
appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as the basis for its continuance. In 
addition every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its 
legitimacy.17 
Lipset defined legitimacy as the “capacity of the system to engender and maintain the 
belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate one for the society”18 
Both Weber and Lipset emphasized the ability of a ruler to persuade the ruled of the 
                                                
14 Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International 
Political Culture, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2002), 2. 
15 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978), 213. 
16 David Campbell, “Truth Claims and Value-Freedom in the Treatment of Legitimacy: The Case of Weber,” 
Journal of Law and Society 13, no. 2 (1986): 209, doi:10.2307/1410281. 
17 Weber, Economy and Society, 213. 
18 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man; the Social Bases of Politics, First Edition, Doubleday Anchor Books 
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), 64. 
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legitimate nature of a political system. In a broader sense, the system is legitimate insofar as 
people believe that it should be obeyed. Thus, legitimacy can be accepted as a powerful ordering 
tool and “a necessary component of authority and thus of power.”19   
As Weber pointed out, the modes of legitimation may include tradition, charisma or 
rational-legal authority: Tradition, “the authority of the "eternal yesterday", i.e. of the mores 
sanctified through the unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform”; 
Charisma “the authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma), the absolutely 
personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual 
leadership”; Rational-legal authority “domination by virtue of "legality", by virtue of the belief 
in the validity of legal statute and functional "competence" based on rationally created rules.”20 
For instance, contemporary nation-states in the Western world can be classified as Rational-legal 
authorities; some states may blend various type of legitimations.  
As stated by White, “all regimes, from naked tyrannies to pluralistic democracies, seek to 
legitimate themselves.”21 Although the pursuit of legitimacy is a necessity for all kind of 
regimes, it proves significantly more difficult for the authoritarian states. For authoritarian 
regimes there are essentially two ways to keep domestic stability and maintain power: coercion 
and repression on one side, the quest for legitimacy on the other. In Non-Democratic Regimes: 
Theory, Government and Politics, for a new dictatorship, Brooker put forward the same 
prescription in different words. His two-pronged approach is as follows: 
-­‐ The new regime claims to be legitimate and seeks to have its claims to legitimacy 
accepted by state and society.  
                                                
19 Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics, 70. 
20 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Routledge Sociology Classics (Milton Park, Abingdon, 
Oxon  ; New York: Routledge, 2009), 78–79. 




-­‐ It also deploys a range of organizations, organs or administrative devices that 
strengthen its (at least partially coercive) control over state and society -so that 
even if the claims to legitimacy are unsuccessful, the regime may still be able to 
hold and effectively use the public offices/powers it has seized or 
misappropriated.22 
Although Brooker proposes these means for a new dictatorship, I believe that these are 
valid for most of the non-democratic regimes.  
Brooker’s first approach includes two ways of seeking legitimacy: electoral means of 
legitimation and ideological means of legitimation. In electoral means of legitimation, the regime 
uses “an electoral/democratic façade is in a sense their recognition that public offices should 
indeed he owned by the public and that to be legitimate a government must be based upon the 
people’s choice, the popular will, or some other democratic basis.”23 Although ideological 
legitimation has not been as common as the electoral legitimation, it can be observed in several 
cases. In ideological legitimation, the ruler or the regime has the right to rule based on 
ideological values. According to Brooker it is “to some extent the modern equivalent of the now 
largely extinct religious claims to legitimacy.”24  
North analyzes ideology’s effect in seeking legitimacy. Regimes need to depend on some 
ideational element or ideology to legitimize their rule by establishing an abstract relation 
between the ruler and the ruled. He links legitimacy to policing cost. Legitimacy created by 
ideology is a cost-effective method of ruling. In the words of North: 
                                                
22 Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics (New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 
2000), 101. 
23 Ibid., 104. 
24 Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes, Second Edition (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 139. 
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The costs of maintenance of an existing order arc inversely related to the perceived 
legitimacy of the existing system. To the extent that the participants believe the 
system fair, the costs of enforcing the rules and property rights are enormously 
reduced by the simple fact that the individuals will not disobey the rules or violate 
property rights even when a private cost/benefit calculus would make such action 
worthwhile.25  
Brooker’s second approach for maintaining power and preserving stability is 
strengthening control, which can be defined as coercion and repression. As an important source 
of stability, and to strengthen their control over state and society, the regimes “deploy a 
(competent) security/intelligence organ or organization.”26 Although coercion and repression are 
often predominating methods during the consolidation of power, the rulers also seek to find 
different means for legitimating their rule.  
Hurd defines three generic reasons why an actor might obey a rule: “(1) because the actor 
fears the punishment of rule enforcers, (2) because the actor sees the rule as in its own self-
interest, and (3) because the actor feels the rule is legitimate and ought to be obeyed.”27 In this 
context, depending on the characteristics of the ruler and ruled, the methods of maintaining 
power and preserving stability range from the material benefits that authoritarian regimes offer to 
the ‘winning coalition’, electoral/ideological legitimation of coercion and sometimes become a 
mix of methods.  
Another means in the legitimization is the external use of force for internal political 
purposes (domestic policy making through foreign policy means). Skuldt, in her study, explains 
this phenomenon through the logic of diversionary war theory.28 According to this logic, rulers 
may pursue a belligerent foreign policy in order to distract the public from internal 
                                                
25 Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1981), 53. 
26 Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes, 2009, 144. 
27 Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International Organization 53, no. 02 (March 
1999): 379, doi:10.1162/002081899550913. 
28 Skuldt, “State Sponsored Terrorism?” 
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socioeconomic and political problems, to unify the nation against an external threat, and thereby 
increase their own domestic political support. It is often assumed that this strategy is more likely 
to take place in democracies because of electoral accountability, less likely in authoritarian 
regimes because of the coercive basis of their authority and their insulation from society. 
However, because of the problem of legitimacy, greater need for the maintenance of internal 
unity and domestic political support makes autocratic regimes more prone to diversionary 
actions, which may be in different forms such as hostile diplomatic action, limited military 
action, and substantial military force. The construction of an external threat and pursuit of a 
diversionary action against that threat may serve well to increase the internal unity of the 
autocratic regime as well as its support in society and to legitimize it by appealing patriotic 
symbols of the nation.29 
The revolutionary regime, since its inception, has been in the pursuit of legitimacy to 
maintain its power and domestic stability. Indeed, the revolution against the Shah, which was 
started by the participation of a number of different groups, ended with Khomeini’s hijacking. In 
the ethnically and politically fragmented Iranian society, Khomeini adopted a two-pronged 
approach to maintain domestic stability and hold his power: (1) Coercion and repression, which 
was executed by the IRGC (and its branches) against domestic threats. This issue was discussed 
in detail under the title of “Domestic and External Threats to Regime Survival.” (2) Seeking 
legitimacy through electoral and ideological means. 
The new regime was based on the convergence of two means of legitimacy; political and 
religious, in the words of Brooker, electoral and ideological. The regime’s dual system included 
the velayat-e faqih system, which is the embodied form of Khomeini’s ideology, and also 
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republican institutions, which are an electoral/democratic façade that aimed for public 
recognition. The dominance of the Supreme Leader and the network of unelected components of 
the government over elected institutions have overshadowed the democratic characteristics of the 
regime and made it a façade. The limited political pluralism, which originates from vague 
candidate eligibility criteria and a multi-layered vetting process, can be given as an example of 
this phenomena.  
Although the ideological incentives have been taken place with rational calculations of 
national interests, the core ideological principles -velayat-e faqih, the presumption of Islamic 
leadership, anti-Americanism, or anti-Zionism- have been the limits of decision-making. With 
the application of the expediency concept, the regime created the capability of softening the 
ideological strictness and legitimization of decisions that contradict ideological principles. 
Otherwise, the loss of these core ideological principles would make the existence of the Supreme 
Leader, the IRGC and unelected theoretical components of the political structure questionable. 
The first decade of the revolution under Khomeini’s leadership can be defined as 
charismatic legitimation in Weber’s typology. With the death of Khomeini, the regime’s 
ideological legitimization began to weaken. In contrast to Khomeini’s powerful personality as 
the father of the new regime, Khamenei’s lack of acceptance within the clerical community and 
his relatively low profile as a Supreme Leader resulted in questions to his ideological legitimacy. 
The increasing factionalism and, subsequently, Khatami’s reformist domestic and foreign policy 
were perceived as threats to the regime by the conservatives gathered around the Supreme 
Leader. This perception was doubled with antagonistic relations with the US-Israel alliance and 
the increasing presence of the US in the Middle East. Additionally, arguments about the 
manipulation of the election results in 2009 and the regime’s fierce post-election suppression of 
223 
 
demonstrators showed how ‘electoral legitimacy’ is still in question. 
In such domestic and foreign political environment, the IRGC was the most important 
actor. It could use Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups against Israel and the US; it also suppressed 
perceived threats to the clerics’ power. In other words, the IRGC became the protector of 
velayet-e faqih inside, a warrior against the US and Israel (executor of anti-US and anti-Zionist 
strategies) outside, which are the core principles of ideology. 
In addition to the IRGC’s strategic purposes, their extraterritorial activities also 
consolidate the ideological legitimacy of the regime in various ways. Their activities against the 
great Satan -the US- and little Satan -Israel-, which are deemed the enemies of the Muslim 
world, aim to appeal to the religious and nationalist feelings of society. 
The successes of Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite groups were perceived as successes for the 
IRGC and the regime. This has increased the regime’s popularity at home. To fight for a ‘higher 
cause’ outside and being successful in this fight constitutes an effective strategy for the 
establishment of domestic cohesion inside and keep alive ideological motivation. This 
phenomenon of foreign policy produced social control can be expressed by the term ‘boomerang 
effect.’ In the logic of diversionary action, the boomerang effect can be explained as follows: 
The IRGC’s extraterritorial activities against perceived enemies and for national interests can be 
defined as a kind of permanent war. This permanent war outside is a way of distracting society 
from domestic problems and unifying them against an external threat, which ends by increasing 
political support for the regime inside. Lastly, the IRGC’s extraterritorial activities based on 
ideological motivation and national interests legitimize its existence and the regime’s 
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